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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ERA OF PRESIDENT TRUMP
ERWIN CHEMERINSKYt
It's truly my great honor and pleasure to be here. You might
remember last summer, in campaigning for President, Donald Trump
referred to the press, and I'm quoting his exact words, as "dishonest,
disgusting, and scum."' Just ten days ago, you might have heard in a press
conference, President Donald Trump said that the "press is out of
control."2 He referred to the press as the greatest hreat facing the country.
The next day, in a Tweet, he referred to the press as being the enemy of
the people.3
As long as there has been a United States, there has been an
adversarial relationship between those in government and the press. It's
never started quite so soon in a President's administration as what we're
seeing in the last few weeks. But also, never in American history has any
President spoken of the press in these terms. It certainly forces us to think
about what is the nature of the First Amendment in the context of the
Trump Presidency.
Now, this is supposed to be a talk about the First Amendment, in a
slightly different context, because Denver Law Review was kind enough
to invite me and it was supposed to be delivered on September 6, and by
coincidence, I had a Ninth Circuit argument the next day so I had to
postpone. But though I apologized for having delayed this, I think the
timing could not be more appropriate in talking about what is the nature
of the First Amendment and its protections in this moment of American
history, and what the Trump Administration is likely to mean for it.
I think to answer this question, I need to develop two points. The first
is what's the nature of the Supreme Court's protection of the First
Amendment? It doesn't make sense to look at just what Donald Trump is
saying because we need to consider the Supreme Court's orientation to free
speech at this moment in American history. Then second, what exactly can
t Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California
Berkeley School of Law. This speech was originally presented at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law on February 28, 2017.
1. See Jeremy Diamond, Trump Launches All-Out Attack on the Press, CNN (June 1, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/3 1/politics/donald-trump-veterans-announcement.
2. Donald Trump Says Press Is 'Out of Control,' BBC (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38997075.
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2017, 2:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632065.
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the Trump Administration do and what can't it do with regard to its assault
on the press.
It's interesting to talk about the Roberts Court and freedom of speech.
Obviously, we look at what the Roberts Court's orientation of the First
Amendment is in order to imagine what it could with regard to some of
the cases coming up in terms of Trump Administration actions. I think that
the Roberts Court is in some ways different from any other we have seen
in American history with regard to freedom of speech. It is a Supreme
Court that is very protective of freedom of speech except when the
institutional interest of the government as government are implicated.
Then it's not at all protective of speech.
So, in talking about the Roberts Court and to have a basis for talking
about how the Trump Administration is going to be dealt with in the
courts, let me separate each of these two things I've said about the Roberts
Court. One is its general orientation towards protecting speech, but the
other is its refusal to do so when the government as government is
involved.
You find its strong commitment to free speech as a general matter, in
so many developments and areas. For example, the Roberts Court has
refused to expand the categories of unprotected speech with the First
Amendment. If you study free speech law, you know that at least since the
early 1940s, the Supreme Court has said that there are some categories of
speech that are unprotected, so the government can prohibit or at least
regulate the expression. Incitement of illegal activity, obscenity, child
pornography, and false and deceptive advertising are all categories of
unprotected speech.
The Roberts Court has been asked to expand those categories and
create new categories of unprotected speech, but it has refused to do so.
Most notably, in a couple of cases, the Roberts Court was asked to find
that violent speech is unprotected, and therefore, the speech can be
prohibited or at least regulated by the government. The Roberts Court
emphatically refused to do so.
One of these cases was United States v. Stevens' involving a federal
law that prohibited the sale or distribution or possession of images of
animal cruelty. One of the arguments that the United States government
made to the Supreme Court was just as the government could try to dry up
the market for child pornography by prohibiting possession of it, so should
the government be able to dry up the market o depictions of animal
cruelty. The government focused on these so-called snuff films that
depicted great cruelty to animals.
Then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan argued the case to the Court and
said that such violent depictions, pure violence depicted towards animals,
4. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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should be outside the scope of First Amendment protections, but the
Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, rejected that argument. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote for the Court and only Justice Alito dissented. Chief Justice
Roberts explicitly said that there is no exception to the First Amendment
with regard to violent speech.
Another example of this was a case called Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants.' California adopted a law that made it a crime to sell or rent
violent video games to minors under eighteen years of age without parental
consent. It didn't prohibit such violent video games, it just required the
same kind of parental consent that the Supreme Court has approved for
sexually explicit materials. But the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,
declared the law unconstitutional. Here, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion
for the Court. What's more, the Court expressly declared that there is no
exception to the First Amendment for violent speech. The Court
emphatically said that children are protected under the First Amendment,
and that video games, even violent ones, are speech protected under the
Constitution.
The Court couldn't analogize, as Justice Breyer did in his dissent, to
regulations of sexually explicit speech. But Justice Scalia said sexually
explicit speech is a category outside the First Amendment, at least
regarding obscenity, because there's no such category with regard to
violent speech.
Another illustration of the Roberts Court's conmitment to free
speech is that it's narrowed the existing categories of unprotected speech.
Not only is it unwilling to create new ones, but it's been unwilling to extend
the existing ones and has even limited them. I think perhaps the most
revealing case with regard to the Roberts Court and free speech is a
decision called Snyder v. Phelps6 that involved a small church at Topeka,
Kansas, the Westboro Baptist Church, led by Fred and Margie Phelps that
make it a practice of going to funerals of those who died in military
service. They use that as the occasion for expressing a vile anti-gay, anti-
lesbian message.
Matthew Snyder was a Marine who died in military service in Iraq.
The members of Westboro Baptist Church went to his funeral in Maryland.
They asked the police where they could stand before the funeral and during
it. The officers pointed to a spot about one thousand feet away from the
funeral. Before the funeral service began, they chanted and sang. During
the service, they were silent but held up signs. That night on the news,
Matthew Snyder's father, Albert Snyder, was able to watch footage and
read the signs. He was deeply offended. He sued, based on diversity
jurisdiction in federal court, for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and invasion of privacy. After all, the Supreme Court had said that there
5. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
6. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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can be tort liability for speech so long as it's consistent with the First
Amendment.
The jury ultimately awards $10 million in compensatory and punitive
damages. But the Supreme Court found that the awarded damages and
liability violated the First Amendment. What's more, it was an 8-1
decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court and Justice Alito
dissented. I think this case stands with a very important proposition-that
the government cannot punish speech or hold speech liable just because
it's offensive. The Court said there cannot be liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for speech that is otherwise protected by
the First Amendment.
Let me give you a third way that the Roberts Court is protective of
speech. It has been quite emphatic that any content-based restrictions on
speech must meet strict scrutiny. If you study First Amendment law, you
know that even before the Roberts Court, the Supreme Court had said that
content-based restriction of speech-attempts by government to regulate
speech based on the topic or the message-must meet strict scrutiny and
must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling purpose.
But no Supreme Court has been more insistent on that proposition
than the Roberts Court. I will give you a couple of examples. United States
v. Alvarez' is a case where the results surprised me, though I was pleased
by it. There's a federal law that makes it a federal crime for individuals to
claim to have received military honors that he or she didn't actually earn.
This involved a man in Riverside, California, who went to a meeting, it
was a board that he was elected to, and he claimed to have been awarded
the Congressional Medal of Honor that he didn't actually earn. The United
States government prosecuted him for violating the Stolen Valor Act of
2005.
Ultimately, the case came to the Supreme Court, and in a 6-3
decision, the Supreme Court found the federal statute unconstitutional and
ruled in favor of Alvarez. Here, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the
Court. Justice Kennedy said the federal statute is a content-based
restriction on speech, whether it applies is entirely on the content of the
message. If somebody falsely claims to receive a military honor, then it's
a federal crime. But Justice Kennedy said since it has to meet strict
scrutiny, the government has to show not just a compelling interest, but
that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. The Court said the
government failed strict scrutiny; the government couldn't show us it was
hurt by the relatively few instances in which individuals falsely claim
military honors. Moreover, he said there are other remedies available.
More speech, as according to this case. Just expose that the person didn't
actually receive the military honor.
7. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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Or another example of the Supreme Court being insistent that
content-based restrictions have to meet strict scrutiny was Reed v. Town
of Gilbert. The town of Gilbert is in Arizona. It had an ordinance that
prohibited signs on public property, but it had about two dozen categories
of exceptions. One exception was for political signs. The ordinance was
very broad in this exception. Political signs could be put up throughout the
election season, there could be more than one sign on the same piece of
public property, the signs could be almost any size, and the signs could
remain up during the election season.
On the other hand, there was another exception for directional
signs-signs to give people directions to a meeting or to worship services.
These signs had to be put up only a few hours before the meeting or the
worship service and they needed to be taken down several hours after.
There can be only one sign on a particular piece of public property giving
directions, and it had to be quite small.
Reed is the pastor of the Good News Church in Gilbert, Arizona. He
says their church relies on signs to tell people where worship services are
being held on Sundays and challenged the ordinance. The lawyer
representing Clyde Reed and the Good News Church did something very
clever in his brief before the Supreme Court-something that all of us who
handle appeals might learn from. The first page of his brief is two pictures.
One picture is a corner in Gilbert, Arizona, during the election season. It
was crowded with many different signs of various sizes and shapes. The
other picture was a corner where there's one tiny sign for the Good News
Church all by itself.
The Supreme Court unanimously declared the Gilbert ordinance
unconstitutional. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court.
He said all content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny
unless it is a category of unprotected speech. He subjected this ordinance
to strict scrutiny and declared it unconstitutional. I did some quick research
after this case came down, looked at just the cities where I live in Orange
County, California. Every single one of them had a content-based
restriction on signs on public property, every one of which would be
unconstitutional. I haven't done the research for Denver, for surrounding
cities. My guess is the same is true here.
One final way in which the Roberts Court has been very protective
of speech is expanding who is protected by the First Amendment's
safeguarding of expression. The most famous case here, perhaps the most
important case in the first dozen years of the Roberts Court, is Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.9 There, the Supreme Court held
8. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
9. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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that corporations have the right to spend unlimited amounts of money from
their corporate treasuries on elections.
Just seven years earlier, in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,0 the Supreme Court upheld the same provisions that were
struck down in Citizen United. Citizens United explicitly overruled
McConnell. Of course you can ask, what was the difference between 2003
and 2010? Did the Court find some musty history of the First Amendment
that led it to believe it made a mistake? No, the difference is that Justice
O'Connor, who'd been in the majority in McConnell, was replaced by
Justice Alito, who then cast the deciding vote with those with the dissent
in McConnell to overrule.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission has an enormous
effect in our political system. The effect is probably less seen with regard
to presidential elections. It's much more at the local or even the state level.
Campaigns where the candidates have less name recognition, campaigns
where money can make so much difference. There's now starting to be a
substantial body of political science literature that shows in these elections,
campaign spending makes a difference, and the ability of corporations to
spend the money of their treasuries determines who gets elected and
determines who even runs for office, as often people choose not to run,
knowing the corporate wealth that will be ready against them.
If you put together all of the cases that I described for you, you can
see why I say the Roberts Court has generally been a strongly pro-speech
Court, and you have to keep that in mind, but there is an important point
here. The Roberts Court has not been a pro-speech Court when the
institutional interests of the government as government are at stake. I can
give you many illustrations of this as well. Think about the situations
where the government can claim an institutional interest. One would be
the employment context. Here, a very important case from the Roberts
Court is Garcetti v. Ceballos." Richard Ceballos is a deputy district
attorney in Los Angeles County. He's also an adjunct professor at my law
school. He had a case where he doubts about the veracity of the testimony
of the witness, a deputy sheriff. He did some investigation, and he
concluded that the deputy sheriff was lying. He wrote a memo to the file
to that effect.
His supervisor, by coincidence a former student of mine at the
University of Southern California Law School, told him to soften the tone
of the memo. He refused to do so. He turned it over to the defense lawyer,
as he believed he was constitutionally obligated to do under Brady v.
Maryland.12 His supervisor removed him from his supervised position and
transferred him to much less desirable location. He sued and said that this
10. 540 U.S. 93 (2010).
11. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
12. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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demotion violated the First Amendment, because it was retaliation for him
writing that memo and giving it to the defense lawyer.
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 against Richard Ceballos. Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. Ironically, he was joined by the
same justices who joined him in Citizens United four years later--Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice
Kennedy said, "There is no First Amendment protection for the speech of
government employees on the job in the scope of their duties." That is
upholding, I'm quoting, "There is no First Amendment for the speech of
government employees on the job in the scope of their duties."
Think of a whistleblower who stays internal to the organization and
then gets demoted or fired. There's no protection. Over a decade and a half
ago, I was asked to do a report on the Los Angeles police department in
the wake of the Rampart scandal. I had the chance to interview almost a
hundred police officers as part of preparing my study. I learned that here
was a code of silence strictly enforced with the Los Angeles police
department, that officers who came forward and reported misconduct felt
that their back wouldn't be protected if they were in danger. Indeed, I
learned a new phrase-"freeway therapy"-that if an officer reported
misconduct of another officer he or she would be transferred to the
precinct furthest from where he or she lived. In Los Angeles, that can be a
two-hour drive, hence the phrase freeway therapy.
I concluded that to deal with the problem of police abuse in Los
Angeles, the code of silence had to be tackled. There had to be protection
for officers who came forward and reported misconduct. Garcetti v.
Ceballos said there is no First Amendment protection for the officer who
comes forward and reports misconduct within the department. There's no
First Amendment protection for speech on the job in the scope of duties.
When you think about the institutional interest of the government,
another area you might focus on is students. Here too, there's a Roberts
Court case rejecting protection of freedom of speech. The case is called
Morse v. Frederick.3 The Olympic torch was through Juno, Alaska. A
school released its students to stand on the sidewalk and watch. A student
got together with his friends and unfurled a banner that said, "Bong hits
for Jesus." My favorite part of the oral argument was when Justice Souter
said, "I have no idea what that means."
But the principal thought that was a message to encourage illegal
drug use. She confiscated the banner and suspended the student from
school. The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the principal and against
the student. Chief Justice Roberts determined that schools have an
important interest in discouraging illegal drug use. Therefore, the Chief
13. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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Justice said schools can punish speech that they see as encouraging illegal
drug use.
Justice Stevens, writing for dissent, argued that there's no reason to
believe that this banner would have any effect in encouraging illegal drug
use. Is it hard to believe that New York students, the smartest or the
slowest among them, were likely to use illegal drugs because of this
banner? But that didn't matter to the majority.
Another area of focus on the interest of government as government is
in the context of the military. I argued a Supreme Court case a few years
ago on behalf of Dennis Apel. Dennis had been part of a protest on a
military base, and he was then issued an order that prevented him from
ever going onto a military base again. What was involved here is whether
he could go in the public area of the military base, which was on the side
of a major road, the Pacific Coast Highway. We won unanimously in the
Ninth Circuit, but I lost in the Supreme Court by the close margin of nine
to nothing. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, expressing the need for
great deference to the military when it comes to regulating speech, even
when it comes to areas of military bases that are public.
Another area where we might see the institutional interest of the
government as government is regarding prisoners. Again, the Roberts
Court has not been protective of speech. To give you an example, there
was a case a decade ago, Beard v. Banks.'4 It involved the Pennsylvania
rule that said that in a maximum-security prison, inmates could not have
any written material, and that would include any photographs of family
members. They couldn't have newspapers, they couldn't have books, they
couldn't have magazines, they couldn't have pictures of loved ones. What
is a clearer restriction of free speech than that? And yet, the Supreme Court
upheld that rule, proclaiming the need for great deference to prisons and
prison authorities.
You see this deference to the government as government when
national security is at stake. I think one of the more important cases the
Roberts Court with regard to freedom of speech was Humanitarian Law
Project v. Holder5 in 2010. It involved the federal statute that makes it a
federal crime to give material assistance to a terrorist organization. The
issue in this case is whether speech alone is enough to be found material
assistance.
The facts of the case are quite important. It involved two groups of
Americans. One wanted to advise a Kurdish group on how to use
international law in the United Nations for peaceful resolution of the
disputes. This Kurdish group wanted to form a separate country, breaking
away from Turkey. The other involved a group of Americans that wanted
to help a Sri Lankan group. The Sri Lankan group was seeking to get
14. 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
15. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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humanitarian assistance from the United Nations and other international
organizations.
There was no allegation at any stage of the litigation that these
American groups were advocating terrorism or devising how to commit
terrorist activity. It was speech on how to use international law to
peacefully resolve disputes and to get humanitarian assistance. Yet, the
Supreme Court ruled, in a 6-3 decision, that this speech could be punished
as material assistance for a terrorist organization. Both the Sri Lankan and
the Kurdish groups were labeled by State Department as terrorist
organizations, and the Supreme Court said any speech to help them could
be punished.
A dissenting Justice Breyer said that what the Court should have
thought of here is whether this speech is inciting illegal activity. We have
a test for that, and it was announced in Brandenburg v. Ohiol6 in 1969.
Speech can be punished for inciting illegal activity only if it's directed at
causing imminent illegality and it's likely to result in illegality. He said
the majority doesn't even mention the test. The majority expresses the need
for great deference to the government as government.
I'll give you one more example of how the Roberts Court has not been
protective of speech when government as government is involved, and
that's in the area of government speech itself. In fact, I find one of the most
troubling areas in terms of First Amendment in the Roberts Court is
creating this new principle that if the government itself is the speaker, then
there's no basis for a First Amendment challenge. I'll mention a case from
just a year and half ago, from June of 2015. It's a case called Walker v.
Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans."
Texas has two kinds of license plates. There are the general plates,
the ones you get if you don't request anything else, and then there are
specialized plates. There are many ways in which specialized plates can
come to be produced. Nonprofit organizations can request that Texas
produce specialized plates with particular insignias, slogans, pictures. For
example, the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles has produced license
plates that say, "Go Gators," referring to the University of Florida sports
team. They produced license plates that say, "I'd rather be golfing," and so
on.
The Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans requested
that the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles issue license plates with the
Confederate flag. Texas refused to do so, and a lawsuit was brought
against them. The Fifth Circuit said that this was a content-based
restriction on speech and should be unconstitutional.
16. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
17. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed in favor of the State
of Texas. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court. His opinion was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Thomas. Justice Alito wrote the
dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. That's not a split you see every day on the Roberts Court. Justice
Breyer said that when the government is the speaker, its speech cannot be
challenged as violating the First Amendment. He says the government has
to be able to speak. It needs to encourage people to recycle, encourage
parents to vaccinate their children. He said license plates are a form of
government speech, they're a government-issued ID. He said, Texas, since
it is government speech, can refuse to have the Confederate flag on the
license plates.
Justice Alito, writing for the dissent, said the license plate may be
government speech, but what's on it is private speech. Texas has created a
forum for private messages. He disagreed with the majority that when
people see something on a license plate, they perceive it as government
speech. He says when people see "Go Gators" on a Texas license plate,
they don't assume that the Texas legislature has encouraged people to root
for the Florida Gators rather than the Texas Longhorns. When they see "I'd
rather be golfing," they don't assume the State of Texas has encouraged
people to golf rather than go to work.
I like the result in this case. I like that Texas isn't going to issue
license plates with the Confederate flag. But I find myself much more in
agreement with the dissent than with the majority. Texas doesn't have to
allow private groups to put messages on a license plate. Once it does so, it
shouldn't be able to discriminate based on the content, based on the topic
or the viewpoint.
The reason I'm so upset about the government speech factor is I see
no stopping point. The Supreme Court has said that the government can
speak by adopting private speech as its own. Imagine that a city council
said that "we are going to allow anti-abortion protests, but not pro-choice
protests in city park" and then adopt the anti-abortion protest as its own
government speech. Or what if a city playhouse says, "We're only going
to produce plays written by Republican authors." Or libraries say, "We're
only going to buy books written by liberal authors." All of that should
clearly violate the First Amendment, but he speech adopted by the city
council, the playhouse, and the library is all government speech. Should
the government be able to engage in content-based restrictions just by
declaring the message to be adopted as government speech? That seems
the door the Court has opened by saying it's going to give so much
deference to government as government.
I've tried to give you a detailed picture of the Roberts Court being
protective of speech, but not when the government as government is
involved. It's in this context that I think I can talk about what we're seeing
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already, what we might see over the course of the next four years from the
Trump Presidency.
In some ways, of course, it's early to be talking about the Trump
Presidency. We're just one month and eight days into the Trump
Presidency, but we certainly had the statements I mentioned in my
introduction, of the press is the enemy of the American people, the press
being out of control. What are some of the things that the Trump
Administration might do, and how might the courts deal with these in light
of the law that I just described to you?
One thing that candidate Donald Trump repeatedly said is that he
wanted to see the American law of defamation changed. " He said that if
he became President, the law of libel and slander would be revised to make
it much easier for plaintiffs to succeed. He spoke approvingly of the law
in England in this regard that does make it much easier for plaintiffs to
succeed. In the United States, if the plaintiff is a public official or a public
figure, he or she can recover for defamation only by proving actual malice,
that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless
disregard of the truth. In England, generally, the burden of proof is
reversed, and also, there's no notion of actual malice.
I do not think that President Trump is going to succeed in this regard.
First, as we all know, defamation law is state law-it's not federal law.
There is no federal law with regard to libel and slander. It's a law in each
of the fifty states, so what can the President and Congress do about it? But
second, limits on defamation come from the First Amendment and there's
no indication that the Roberts Court or even any of its members want o
reconsider those.
If you ask me what the most important free speech case is in all of
American history, I would say New York Times v. Sullivanl9 in 1964. No
free speech case is more revered, none is more canonical than that. When
it came down, then-University of Chicago law professor Harry Calvin said
it should be an occasion for dancing in the streets. It was New York Times
v. Sullivan that said that a public official can recover for defamation only
by proving with clear and convincing evidence, falsity in the statement,
and actual malice.
It was New York Times v. Sullivan that said that public debate has to
be open and robust. It was New York Times v. Sullivan that said that even
a false speech has to be protected by the First Amendment so it would be
the breathing space that expression needs. It was New York Times v.
Sullivan that said that even "vituperative attacks on public officials," those
were the Court's words, are protected by the First Amendment.
18. See Adam Liptak, Can Trump Change Libel Laws?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/201 7/03/30/us/politics/can-trump-change-ibel-laws.html.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
DENVER LA W REVIEW
Now, one of the justices on the current Court has called into question
New York Times v. Sullivan. I do not see that President Trump's desire to
change defamation law will come to any fruition. I don't think the states
are going to change their law, but even if they do, the First Amendment
still limits defamation recovery.
But that's just one area where candidate and President Trump called
for changes in the law. It's clear that President Trump has a focus, one
might say a preoccupation, of those who are leaking information to the
press. You might have seen two weeks ago when national security advisor
Michael Flynn was forced to resign. There was a good deal of attention.
Why was he forced to resign? He had impermissible, and maybe illegal,
contacts with Russia before Trump was inaugurated. He lied to Vice
President Pence and others about his.
What did President Trump say about Flynn? Did he criticize Flynn
for the contacts with Russia? Did he criticize Flynn for the lies, including
to the Vice President? No. What President Trump said was these were
results of leaks, maybe as a result of leaks from holdovers from the Obama
Administration. In fact, if you're seeing today's news, the headline of
CNN, it is President Trump saying that perhaps President Obama is
responsible for those leaks.20
Last week, there were reports of other impermissible contacts
between those in the Trump campaign and Russia. President Trump
criticized the media for reporting this and again said they're going to look
for leaks. You might have seen in the last couple of days White House
Press Secretary Sean Spicer said, he took the phones of those who work
for him and looked at the phones to see if they were sending leaks,
including by encrypted messages.
There are certainly things that the United States government can do
if it wants to go after those who are leaking information. One thing you
can do is bring prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 191821 that makes
it a crime to disclose national security information. It's interesting that he
Espionage Act of 1918 and its precursor, the Espionage Act of 1917,22 had
been on the books now just about a century. In an entire hundred years,
there have only been twelve prosecutions brought under the Espionage
Act. Nine of them were brought during the Obama administration.
Given the attitude that President Trump has expressed towards those
who are leaking information and his attitude towards the press more
generally, I predict we are going to see more, many more prosecutions
under the Espionage Act for leaking national security information.
20. Eli Watkins, Trump Says Obama Behind Leaks, CNN (Mar. 1, 2017, 1:05 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/donald-trump-barack-obama-leaks.
21. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2012)).
22. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2012)).
564 [Vol. 94:4
2017] FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE ERA OF PRESIDENT TRUMP 565
First Amendment issues may arise. I think that the First Amendment
would protect the press that publishes the information, but I don't think
that the First Amendment's going to provide protection for the government
official who is caught leaking the information. After all, in Garcetti v.
Ceballos that I told you, the Supreme Court held that there's no First
Amendment protection for speech of government employees on the job
within the scope of their duties. In general, the Supreme Court has failed
to provide much protection in the context of somebody who might be
providing information to the press.
Yet history also shows the importance of such leaks of information.
The Watergate scandal and the cover-up, illegal activity, came to light only
because of an anonymous source-Deep Throat. The torture that occurred
in Abu Ghraib was revealed only because of leaks. The massive illegal
wiretapping done under the Bush Administration was revealed only
because of leaks. The more the government is successful in using the
Espionage Act to dry up such leaks, the more all of us will lose a key check
on the government.
Another tactic that I believe we're going to see from the Trump
Administration is forcing reporters to disclose their sources. This too was
done perhaps more by the Obama Administration than any prior
administration. Think of New York Times reporter Judy Miller going to
prison for not fully disclosing sources, but that was before the Obama
Administration. I can point to a number of instances where the Obama
Administration tried to force reporters to face the penalty of contempt of
court to disclose their sources. I think because of the preoccupation for
leaks in the Trump Administration, you'll see them trying to bring
reporters before grand juries and force them to disclose their sources.
Here too, the law provides relatively little protection. The key
Supreme Court case here was Branzburg v. HayeS23 in 1972. There, the
Court ruled 5-4 that reporters do not have any First Amendment protection
that is keeping them from disclosing their sources. States and state courts
generally have some "shield law" protecting reporters, but there is no
federal shield law, and the absence of a federal shield law means that if the
Trump Administration wants to bring reporters forward, they can do so.
Another thing that we began to see and are likely to see even more is
the Trump Administration discriminating among media outlets. You might
remember that during the presidential campaign, President Trump's
campaign denied media credentials to the Washington Post and Politico
because he found their reporting to be too unfavorable. Last Friday, the
Press Secretary did an informal briefing, he called it, and I'm quoting, "a
gaggle," and excluded from being there among others, the New York
23. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Times, the Los Angeles Times, Politico, and BuzzFeed.24 The editors of
the New York Times responded to this by saying that in all the years the
New York Times has been covering the Presidency, never before have
they seen a President exclude members of the media on the basis of a
particular outlet being unfavorable in covering an administration.2 5
This was an informal briefing. There's no doubt that presidents and
press secretaries have done informal briefings to some and not all of the
media, and yet the idea of literally someone standing at the door and
saying, since you're from the New York Times, or you're from the Los
Angeles Times, or you're from Politico, you're not welcome. Whereas all
of the far-right media was allowed into that briefing.
I think if this becomes a pattern, you will see a lawsuit filed certainly
if there is an official press conference and only those who report favorably
to the President are allowed in. I think here, the media will win and the
Trump Administration will lose, that this is viewpoint discrimination. It's
being done by the government at official events, and viewpoint
discrimination goes to the very core of the First Amendment.
Now I focused on only some of the things that are likely to occur in
the next four years, but just that these have happened in such a short time
shows why it's so important to focus on the Trump Presidency and the First
Amendment and why it's so important to do so in the context of where is
the Roberts Court with regard to free speech, when are they likely to be a
check on the government and when are they likely to side with the
government.
I conclude with the words of James Madison from the Federalist
papers. He said, "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: [that] people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
[that] knowledge gives."26 He said, "A popular Government, without
popular [knowledge], or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."27
24. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Intensifies His Attacks on
Journalists and Condemns F.B.I. 'Leakers,' N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/white-house-sean-spicer-briefing.html.
25. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
For older youth in the foster care system, particularly those nearing
their emancipation, there exists a developmental paradox. They are
caught between the freedoms of childhood and the responsibilities of
adulthood.' They are still the subjects of legal proceedings where judges
and other professionals are making decisions in their "best interests" and
I. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, SUCCESS BEYOND 18: A BETTER
PATH FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TRANSITIONING FROM FOSTER CARE TO ADULTHOOD 2-3 (2013) [herein-
after JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18] (noting young people are legal adults at age eighteen, yet
still need support).
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yet simultaneously encouraged to ready themselves for the challenges of
living on their own.2
The child welfare system as a whole has struggled to define the
rights and responsibilities of older youth in its care, specifically as com-
pared to the clearly delineated rights and interests of their parents and the
state at large. Indeed, transition-age youth3 in child welfare have a unique
hybrid status.
From the moment they enter foster care, the system and its many
players hold court hearings, visits, and meetings where decisions are
made for and on behalf of the youth.4 Court orders, rules of placement,
licensing regulations, and laws govern these youth's day-to-day lives. In
this system, the adults-judges, attorneys, caseworkers, Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASAs), and others-assess and decide what is
"best" for them.5 These decisions, made by those who are in many ways
strangers, range in significance and include where youth can go to
school, whether they can have cell phones, who they can spend time
with, what extracurricular activities they can be involved in, whether
they can get driver's licenses, and many other life decisions, both big and
small.6 While youth may be a part of these decisions, too often they are
left on the outside, deemed "too young to understand" the concerns and
considerations of the adult professionals in their lives.7
At the same time, as these youth approach the age of eighteen, they
are expected to act more like adults.8 They participate in independent
living classes and create plans for housing, education, and employment.9
The system expects them to take advantage of the services and opportu-
2. Id. at 17-20; id. at 4 ("Young people in foster care must have opportunities to practice
decision-making and planning and gain increasing levels of autonomy.").
3. The definition of "transition-age youth" tends to vary by context and use. In this Article,
the Author specifically uses the term to reference youth, ages sixteen to twenty-one, who are in the
process of transitioning out of the foster care system.
4. Suparna Malempati, Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counselfor Children in Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings, 11 U. N.H. L. REV. 97, 101 (2013) ("Under current juvenile law, the legal
principles that govern the operation of the juvenile dependency court are the best interests of the
child and family preservation.").
5. Id. at 102 ("The best interest standard is a child-centered principle that focuses on the
safety and well-being of the child.").
6. See id (recognizing best interest standard "directs and guides many court decisions about
appropriate outcomes for children").
7. See infra notes 330-35 and accompanying text (discussing the system's treatment of
youth as "outsiders").
8. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: NEW
RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TRANSITIONING FROM FOSTER CARE 1
(2011) [hereinafter JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN] ("Unlike younger children in foster care,
for whom safety and protection are the greatest need, older youth are in the process of developing
greater autonomy and practicing adult roles and responsibilities.").
9. See Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Not So Happy Birthday: The Foster Youth Transition from
Adolescence into Adulthood, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 250, 251 (2010) ("While the average age of financial
independence in America is twenty-six years of age, our current policies and practices are premised
on the presumption that foster youth can somehow attain financial and emotional independence by
age eighteen.").
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nities offered to them. Often, if a youth does not take advantage of those
services as decided by the state, then the state asks the court to dismiss
the case once the youth reaches age eighteen. When this happens, court
proceedings that were once designed to further the youth's well-being
and protection are often arbitrarily dismissed leaving the youth to fend
for him or herself. Indeed, when older youth in dependency proceedings
make mistakes, when they challenge rules, or otherwise act in disregard
of the court processes, they often hear that they are "old enough to know
better."10
These youth are stuck between childhood and adulthood, where the
laws of neither truly fit their situations. Historically, our federal and state
laws have not been crafted for flexibility, particularly with the nuances
necessary to address the stages of development for this age group.
In September 2014, Congress passed the Preventing Sex Trafficking
and Strengthening Families Act (the SFA), a law aimed at enhancing
engagement of older youth in their own dependency cases.12 Among its
many provisions, the SFA requires that each state provides foster chil-
dren under age fourteen a copy of their rights with respect to education,
health, visitation, and court participation.'3
This Article considers the SFA's "list of rights" provision in light of
the historical landscape and court culture surrounding children's rights in
dependency cases. If rights equate to status or value in court proceedings,
how does the SFA's provision fit with the current status of transition-age
youth in the foster care system? First, Part I summarizes the history of
the dependency court, its purpose, and the interests at stake in such cases.
Part II addresses the unique status of transition-age youth, from the
"magic" of adulthood at age eighteen to the state of research on adoles-
cent brain development and decision making. Part III analyzes the rights
of youth in dependency proceedings, the potential impact of the SFA's
rights provision, and the emergence of state Foster Care Bills of Rights.
Finally, this Article recognizes that he developmental needs of transi-
tion-age youth call for system reform with more flexible legal parame-
ters, greater advocacy on behalf of the direct wishes of youth, and an
overall change in child welfare culture.
10. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text (discussing the legal responsibilities of
young people upon reaching the age of majority).
11. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing the disconnect between rigid
jurisdictional statute in Colorado and developmental needs of transition-age youth).
12. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 113,
128 Stat. 1919, 1928-30 (2014).
13. Id. § 113(d).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DEPENDENCY COURT
A. The Underpinnings of a Child Welfare System
To fully understand the context of the rights-based culture in the
dependency courts, we must start by examining the origins of juvenile
law. The history of "[c]hildren's status can be viewed as a movement
from children as property, to children as welfare recipients, to children as
rights-based citizens."l4
In fact, the early inklings of family law date back to the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, where intervention into the family was justi-
fied both by the need to regulate poverty and the need to regulate
wealth.'5 Published in 1697, the "first English-language book on children
and the law, Law Both Ancient and Modern Relating to In-
fants, . . . described children as chattel."1 6 Children were the property of
their parents, and as property owners, parents could use and treat chil-
dren as they wished.17 At the time, for the wealthy classes, family law
was meant to ensure the "proper passage of wealth" and guarantee that
taxes were collected on such property.' For the poorer classes, laws al-
lowed the government to assume an obligation to care for children as an
"ultimate parent," and provided a mechanism for apprenticeship pro-
grams for such youth.19
The eighteenth century saw the American colonies adopt laws simi-
lar to the English Poor Laws,20 expanding the state's reach to removal of
poor children not solely due to their poverty, but also because "their par-
ents were not providing 'good breeding, neglecting their formal educa-
tion, not teaching a trade, or were idle, dissolute, unchristian or uncapa-
ble."'q21
With the industrialization era and the coming of the nineteenth cen-
tury, America responded with the "first great event" in child welfare: the
22
House of Refuge Movement. Many of these houses emerged not with
the intent of protecting children from their caretakers, but more so in an
14. Marvin Ventrell, The History of Child Welfare Law, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY CASES 189, 193 (Donald N. Duquette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2016) (discussing the historical
development of children's rights).
15. Id. at 200 (noting driving social policies leading to early child welfare intervention).
1 6. Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children 's Law and
Practice, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 65, 66 (characterizing early views on children).
17. Id.
18. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 201 (discussing early interest of court or crown where patriarch
denied prior to heir's majority).
19. Id. at 201 (noting concepts emerging out of Elizabethan Poor Laws).
20. Id. (referencing "statutory scheme dealing with the custody of poor children").
21. Id. at 205 (quoting Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 212 (1971) (recognizing "poor plus" system of North American Poor
Laws)).
22. Id. at 208 (detailing the American response to urban poor children).
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effort to address poverty as a major cause of vagrancy and criminal acts
by children.2 3
B. Parens Patriae and the Child Savers
Ultimately, the judicial system validated the efforts of the House of
Refuge Movement, and through a series of cases, established a practice
of state intervention into the private family unit through the doctrine of
parens patriae.24 Parens patriae, meaning "ultimate parent or parent of
the country," provided a basis for the "state's authority and obligation to
save children from being criminal."25 It has continued to serve as the
foundation upon which the modem juvenile court is based.26 As our
United States Supreme Court has noted: "Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are as-
sumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."27
In an early documented opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered the case of Mary Ann Crouse, a child incarcerated at the Phil-
adelphia House of Refuge because she was beyond her parent's control.28
In dicta, the court discussed the state's authority to intervene: "To this
end may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education,
or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common
guardian of the community? . .. The right of parental control is a natural,
,,2 30but not an unalienable one."2 9 Other courts similarly adopted this view,
and the parens patriae doctrine thereafter became the cornerstone of
juvenile law.31
Just as the courts were adopting the parens patriae paradigm, "child
savers" were also making their mark on the development of juvenile law
in the nineteenth century.32 These were individuals dedicated to saving
"those less fortunately placed in the social order."33 Largely consisting of
"bourgeois wom[e]n," the movement sought to instill "white, Protestant,
middle-class values" into children so that they could "become proper
citizens."34
23. Id. at 208-09 ("The movement began with the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism,
which believed that poverty was a cause, if not the primary cause, of crime committed by chil-
dren.").
24. Id. at 210 (noting early court involvement in juvenile matters).
25. Id. (defining state intervention).
26. See In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635-37 (Ind. 2004) (providing historical perspective of
juvenile court).
27. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (describing role of parents and State).
28. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 211 (citing Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 10 (Pa. 1839)).
29. Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11 (detailing parens patriae authority of the State).
30. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 214-17 (discussing cases of Emily and Mary Ellen).
31. Id. at 218 (analyzing development ofjuvenile court philosophy).
32. Id. (noting Progressive Era movement of "Child Saving").
33. Id. (defining "movement").
34. Id. at 191-92 (providing underlying views of movement).
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The work of the child savers and the parens patriae movement cul-
minated in the creation of the juvenile court. In 1899, Cook County,
Illinois, formally opened the first juvenile court, which served as the
model for subsequent juvenile courts across the country.36 Under the
juvenile court, the parens patriae doctrine justified both delinquency and
dependency intervention.37
C. The Fundamental Rights ofParents
In addition to the judicially-embraced parens patriae authority of
the state, a historical look at U.S. Supreme Court opinions also details a
clear recognition of a parent's fundamental right-under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution-to the care,
custody, and control of his or her children.3 8
This recognition of parents' rights by the Court began in 1923 with
the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,39 where a teacher was criminally charged
for teaching German to a student (at the parents' request) in violation of
a statute prohibiting the teaching of a language other than English to
children who had not yet completed eighth grade.40 Here, the Court in-
terpreted the concept of liberty to include a parent's right to "establish a
home and bring up children.' I
The Court continued to solidify this fundamental right of parents to
their children through a series of cases, including, among others, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,4 2 Wisconsin v. Yoder,43 Santosky v. Kramer,4 and
Troxel v. Granville.5 With each case, the Court distinctly defined the
right as a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
46
the children. This right of parents rests on two essential presumptions:
"(1) parents possess what children lack in areas of functioning, and (2)
parents' love and affection for their children generally causes parents to
35. Id. at 219 (detailing history ofjuvenile court formation).
36. Id.
37. Id. (recognizing that juvenile court had authority both to handle delinquent behavior and
to protect dependent children).
38. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing parents' rights to children as
"perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Id. at 396-97 (reciting facts of case); see also Ann M. Haralambie, U.S. Supreme Court
Cases Regarding Child Welfare, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING
CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra
note 14, at 275, 277 (discussing Supreme Court recognition of parental rights).
41. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (defining rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing right to direct education of children).
43. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (upholding parents' right to free exercise of religion for chil-
dren).
44. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.").
45. 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (detailing constitutional case law on the fundamental right of
parents to children).
46. See id (providing a historical account of Supreme Court parental right cases).
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act in their children's best interests."A7 While of constitutional magni-
tude, these rights are not absolute, thereby allowing intrusion by the state
under parens patriae authority.4 8
D. Children as Subjects
At each historical junction detailed above, the focus was on the state
as the "protector of the helpless or less fortunate."4 9 The role of children
throughout was either as property or as the beneficiary of assistance.so
The juvenile system has consistently "held a paternalistic view of chil-
dren because of their status as minors and because of societal concerns
for child welfare."5 1 Because children have historically been viewed as
dependents and not individuals, the role of the juvenile court has been to
"dictate[] the appropriate outcomes for children without regard for the
child's rights and without consideration of the child's point of view."52
E. Gault and the Delinquent Child
The broad scope of a court's authority under the parens patriae doc-
trine continued, largely unfettered, until the U.S. Supreme Court's case
of In re Gault5 3 in 1967.54 The Gault Court authored the now famous line
in the historical shift from youth as welfare recipients to youth as rights-
based individuals: "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is- for adults alone."5 5 In the case, the Court considered the proce-
dural due process rights of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault, who was ar-
rested based upon a neighbor's complaint that Gault and his friends made
indecent remarks to her on the phone.6 The Gault Court held that a trial
court's "exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not un-
limited[,]" 5 7 and recognized that juveniles, like adults, have due process
rights to "notice of charges, confrontation and cross-examination, prohi-
bition against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel."
47. Jennifer K. Smith, Comment, Putting Children Last: How Washington Has Failed to
Protect the Dependent Child's Best Interest in Visitation, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 769, 776 (2009)
(addressing bases for parental rights doctrine).
48. See Haralambie, supra note 40, at 277 (noting limit to parental rights); see also Smith,
supra note 47, at 776-77 (same).
49. See Malempati, supra note 4, at 100 (depicting State as parent).
50. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 201 (characterizing history of children's rights).
51. Malempati, supra note 4, at 100 (emphasis added) (describing parens patriae view of
juvenile court).
52. Id. (emphasis added) (noting limited role of child in court process).
53. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967)).
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
56. Id. at 4 (providing facts of case).
57. Id. at 30 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)).
58. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221 (detailing juvenile due process rights recognized in
Gault).
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Seen by some as a "great advancement in children's rights",5 9 with
Gault, the "parens patriae authority essentially disappeared from the
delinquency court context" thereafter distinguishing the court's involve-
ment with juveniles in delinquency cases from the experiences of youth
in dependency court.60 Despite the marked change in delinquency mat-
ters, "Gault did not dismantle, or even limit, the parens patriae authority
of the dependency court." 61 Children in dependency cases "remained the
beneficiaries of the court's parens patriae authority," but the view shift-
ed from youth as pre-delinquents to youth needing protection from mal-
treatment.6 2
F. Today's Dependency Court
Today, the parens patriae doctrine continues to provide courts with
63
the authority to act in the best interests of children. In many ways, the
court's adherence to its paternalistic view of children "has impeded the
progress of the juvenile court into an effective rights-based system, par-
ticularly in the area of dependency cases."64 The dependency system
continues to pose "a struggle between the rights of parents to maintain
family autonomy and the rights of the state to intervene and protect the
interests of a child in cases of abuse and neglect. Little attention, howev-
er, is paid to the affirmative rights that children have in the dependency
context."65
II. THE STATUS OF OLDER YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE
In the world of parents' rights, state intervention, and children need-
ing protection, older youth sit on a fence with one foot still dangling in
the days of their childhood and the other stretching to touch the ground
of adulthood. As of September 2015, approximately twenty-six percent
of youth in foster care were age fourteen and older.66 A prior report de-
termined that youth over age fourteen "remain in foster care at least
twice as long as the total foster care population, on average."67 During
fiscal year 2015, over 20,000 youth exited the system through emancipa-
59. Id.
60. Kelly Crecco, Striking a Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's Privacy Inter-
ests in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, II FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 490, 495-96 (2013) (describing
historical separation of juvenile court proceedings).
61. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 221.
62. Crecco, supra note 60, at 496 (emphasizing change in view of dependent children).
63. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 2004) (recognizing parens patriae jurisdiction);
Smith, supra note 47, at 778 (recognizing parens patriae jurisdiction).
64. Malempati, supra note 4, at 101.
65. Smith, supra note 47, at 778 (providing that children's rights are often overlooked).
66. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT
1 (2016).
67. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 8.
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tion, heading out to the world on their own.68 For these youth, emancipa-
tion meant having "left care without a legally sanctioned permanent fam-
ily relationship to offer guidance and support as they made the transition
into adulthood."69
Before we can evaluate the rights belonging to transition-age youth,
we must first consider their place in the current dependency landscape,
including their stages of development, their potential outcomes as inter-
dependent adults, and the laws pertaining to their age group.
A. Emerging Adulthood: A New Developmental Stage
Contrary to laws across the country, developmentally, there is no
magic transformation from adolescent o adult on one's eighteenth birth-
day.70 Adulthood is not a moment in time event, but rather the culmina-
tion of a gradual process of growth and preparation.7 1
Erik Erikson, a German-born American psychoanalyst who estab-
lished an eight-stage theory to healthy psychosocial development from
infancy to death,72 described this transition-age period in two parts: the
adolescent stage (from ages twelve to eighteen) and the young adulthood
stage (from ages nineteen to forty).73 In the adolescent stage, youth
struggle between identity and role confusion.74 This is the time when
youth are sorting through "beliefs, values, and ideals" to determine who
they are.7 5 This period is also when youth develop a sense of self-
sufficiency.76 Then, in the young adulthood stage, the young person
77seeks to develop intimacy and avoid isolation. For Erickson, these are
two distinct developmental events.
Research has come to show, however, that "young people do not
move seamlessly from adolescence at age 18 to young adulthood at age
68. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 66, at 3; MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH
PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE CARE 3 (2004).
69. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 8-9.
70. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (noting arbitrary nature of age eighteen
as dividing line between childhood and adulthood).
71. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF
FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 26, at 1 (2011) (describing transition to adulthood);
see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing adolescence as a develop-
mental stage).
72. See Richard 0. Brooks, "The Refurbishing": Reflections upon Law and Justice Among the
Stages ofLife, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 650-51 (2006) (recounting Erikson's theory of development).
73. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1 (presenting Erikson's
stages).
74. Id. (noting psychosocial crisis of each stage); see Brooks, supra note 72, at 652 tbl.1
(describing psychosocial modality as "to be oneself (or not to be)").
75. Andrea Corn & Howard Raab, Age-Appropriate Time Sharing for Divorced Parents, 81
FLA. B.J. 84, 86 (2007) (detailing the psychosocial stage of adolescence).
76. Id.
77. See JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAiN, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1 (presenting Erikson's
stages).
78. Id. (highlighting seven stages).
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19, as the traditional model might suggest."79 Many now support the
concept that there is instead a transition process of "emerging adult-
hood," ranging roughly from age eighteen to age twenty-five.8 0 Emerging
adulthood does not occur at some pre-determined age, but rather repre-
sents the time period when youth are moving towards greater independ-
ence.
B. Adolescent Brain Development and the Impact of Trauma
Over the last decade, neuroscience research has demonstrated that
82
the adolescent brain is not the same as the adult brain. In fact, it was
previously believed that brain development was complete by age six.83
Research now shows, however, that adolescence is a second wave of
significant brain growth and development.84 This development begins at
puberty and stretches all the way to the mid-twenties.85 For a young
woman, the brain generally reaches full maturity between ages twenty-
one and twenty-two.86 For a young man, this point is not reached until
almost age thirty.87
Neuroscience rests on several key principles of brain architecture,
as articulated by Harvard University's Center on the Developing Child.88
They include the following concepts:
* Brains are built over time, from the bottom up.
* Brain architecture is comprised of billions of connections between
individual neurons across different areas of the brain.
* The interactions of genes and experience shape the developing
brain.
* Cognitive, emotional, and social capacities are inextricably inter-
twined throughout the life course.89
79. Id. at 15 (noting changing research on adolescent development).
80. Id. at 15-16, 16 fig.2 (recognizing new developmental stage).
81. Id. at 15-16 (defining stage).
82. Id. at 20 (highlighting distinctions in brain development).
83. Id. at 2 (noting historical assumption on brain development).
84. See Gene Griffin, Child Development and the Impact of Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra note 14, at 69, 80 (referencing research of Jay N.
Giedd and others); see also DANIEL R. WEINBERGER ET AL., THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN
PROGRESS 1 (2005) (recognizing "profound brain growth and change" during adolescence).
85. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20 (defining period of develop-
ment).
86. Id. at 22 (detailing female development).
87. Id. (defining male development).
88. Griffin, supra note 84, at 79 (referencing Ctr. on the Developing Child, Brain Architec-
ture, HARV. U., http://developingchild.harvard.edu/science/key-concepts/brain-architecture (last
visited July 6, 2017)).
89. Id. (articulating key concepts of brain architecture).
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Beginning at puberty, a number of important changes in the adoles-
cent brain occur.90 First, the prefrontal cortex gradually develops.91 This
is the part of the frontal lobe that is responsible for functions such as
"reasoning, decision making, judgment, and impulse control ... ."92 It is
the last part of the brain to reach full development.93 As the prefrontal
cortex develops, youth become less dependent on the limbic system-
"the emotional center of the brain"-when making decisions.94
Second, during adolescence, the brain changes its production of do-
pamine-the "chemical that links action to pleasure[.j" 9 5 When this oc-
curs, youth need to reach a higher threshold of stimulus prior to feeling
pleasure.96 As a result, they seek new excitement and risk.97
Third, adolescence is the period of "use it or lose it." 98 During this
time, the gray matter of the brain starts to thin as the synapses-"links
between neurons that transmit and receive information"-undergo a
pruning process.99 Those synapses that are frequently used become
stronger and more established through a process called myelination.0 0
Those that are unused are pruned away.'0 Through this process, youth
may lose as many as 30,000 synapses per second over the entire cerebral
cortex. 102
Young people in the foster care system undergo this developmental
process just as their peers, yet many are simultaneously impacted by pri-
or trauma. 13 Specifically, youth who have experienced physical or emo-
90. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20-23, 23 figs.3 & 4 (describing
impact of brain development on adolescent functioning).
91. Id. at 20-21 (defining "prefrontal cortex" as "part of the brain that governs a person's
executive functions").
92. Id. at 20; see WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at I (listing prefrontal cortex functions
as "setting priorities, organizing plans and ideas, forming strategies, controlling impulses, and allo-
cating attention").
93. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra
note 84, at 1.
94. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining the transition from
emotional to rational decision making).
95. Id. at 21; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 1 (discussing "one of the neuronal mech-
anisms that increase[s] the capacity for more mature judgment and impulse control").
96. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 21-22 (describing the functional
impact of chemical change).
97. Id. (explaining changing behavior of adolescents based on dopamine increase during this
period).
98. Id. at 22 (highlighting a critical mechanism for brain resiliency).
99. Id; see also WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 11-12, 12 fig. 3 (depicting the cutting
back of "inefficient or ineffective connections to achieve maximal efficiency of function").
100. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22; WEINBERGER ET AL., supra
note 84, at 11 ("Like Michelangelo starting with a block of granite and eliminating rock to create the
masterpiece David, certain connections are strengthened and others eliminated--in essence, brain
functions are sculpted to reveal and allow increasing maturity in thought and action.").
101. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22.
102. Id. (detailing extent of myelination process).
103. Griffin, supra note 84, at 80 (recognizing that adverse childhood experiences may cause
short or long term developmental damage).
2017] DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSITION-AGE YOUTH 579
tional abuse may suffer disrupted or delayed brain development.104 These
delays may negatively impact he behavioral, emotional, or social devel-
opment of youth.1 0 5
The beautiful phenomenon of the brain rewiring during adoles-
cence, through the "use it or lose it" processes, however, means that it is
possible for the effects of trauma to be offset.106 The brain has great neu-
roplasticity, or resiliency, during this period.107 When a youth has correc-
tive experiences and supportive relationships during this time, the
youth's brain will literally rewire and create new neural connections.1os
On the other hand, the failure to provide opportunities to establish resili-
ency means that those neural pathways may be lost.109 The manner by
which the system supports and facilitates the transition to adulthood for
older youth in the foster care system is indeed crucial to their future well-
being and success.
C. The Midwest Study
The challenges faced by those exiting the foster care system are
well-documented through the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Function-
ing of Former Foster Youth (Midwest Study).110 A longitudinal study
conducted by researchers at Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago,
the Midwest Study followed a sample of young people (initial baseline
interviews of 732) from Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa as they transi-
tioned from the foster care system into adulthood."' Researchers inter-
viewed the youth participants at ages seventeen or eighteen years old,
with repeat interviews conducted at ages nineteen, twenty-one, twenty-
three or twenty-four, and twenty-six.1 12 The study compared the out-
comes of foster youth across a variety of domains to the outcomes of
their nonfoster care peers, who were documented through the National
104. JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 25 (acknowledging that completion
of brain development may occur later for youth impacted by trauma).
105. Id. (noting the impact of trauma).
106. Id. at 27 (emphasizing room for brain healing during time period).
107. Id. at 27-28 (explaining that the brain is not hard-wired by age three as previously be-
lieved).
108. Id. at 28 (recognizing that rewiring occurs with healthy, supportive relationships and
experiential learning opportunities); see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 8
("Neuroscience makes clear that support during the cognitive, social, and emotional development
processes of adolescence and emerging adulthood can lead to healthy and constructive adulthood.").
109. See JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 22 (describing the pruning
process).
110. Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster
Youth, CHAPIN HALL, http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwest-evaluation-adult-
functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited July 6, 2017) (providing full PDFs of Midwest Study
reports).
111. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 3 (setting forth parameters of study).
112. Id. at 4 (detailing survey waves).
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Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).113 Former foster
youth struggled across the board in the comparisons.114
Youth growing up outside of the foster care system generally bene-
fit from the support of family, both financially and emotionally. 15 It is
estimated that "parents provide their young adult children with material
assistance totaling approximately $38,000 between the ages of 18 and
34."ll6 Meanwhile, foster youth enter the adult world without the same
built-in safety nets. The study found that "[o]n many dimensions that
would be of concern to the typical parent, [the young people in the Mid-
west Study were] faring poorly as a group."'
In addition, young people interviewed through the Midwest Study
were much less likely to be living with their biological parents than their
peers.18 In fact, in a separate 2003 survey, about fifty-five percent of
young men and forty-six percent of women (outside of the foster care
system) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were living with at
least one of their parents.1 9 Meanwhile, since exiting foster care, about
eighteen percent of former foster youth had experienced homelessness at
least once between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one.120
The Midwest Study demonstrated similarly poor outcomes for for-
mer foster youth in areas of education and employment.121 Nearly a quar-
ter of the Midwest Study youth did not graduate high school or obtain
their General Educational Development (GED) by age twenty-one as
compared to eleven percent of their Add Health peers.122 Moreover, only
thirty percent of Midwest Study youth completed any college compared
to fifty-three percent of Add Health youth.12 3 Fewer young people in the
Midwest Study were employed, on average, as compared to their peers,
and their peers generally earned about one dollar more per hour than the
former foster youth.124 The median earnings among those Midwest Study
113. Id at 5 (explaining comparison groups).
114. See id. at 6 ("Across a wide range of outcome measures, including postsecondary educa-
tional attainment, employment, housing stability, public assistance receipt, and criminal justice
system involvement, these former foster youth are faring poorly as a group.").
115. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF
FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 21, at 5 (2007) (citation omitted) (describing ongoing
support of family during transition years).
116. Id. (quantifying parental support to young people).
117. Id. at 83 ("If the outcomes of these young adults were assessed through the same lens that
most U.S. parents would use to view the progress of their own children, the findings presented here
should be very troubling.").
118. Id. at 14 (noting that former foster youth were more likely to be living with relatives than
biological parents compared to their peers).
119. Id. at 5 (highlighting parental support in housing).
120. Id. at 15 (recognizing homelessness as problem experienced by former foster youth often
more than once).
121. Id. at 26-37 (detailing survey results in education and employment areas for former foster
youth at age twenty-one).
122. Id. at 26 (providing results on educational achievement).
123. Id. (stating survey results regarding post-secondary education pursuits).
124. See id at 31-32 (comparing employment outcomes for former foster youth and peers).
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youth who were employed was only $5,450 at the age of twenty-one, as
compared to the $9,120 made by their peers.125 A significant amount of
the young people in the Midwest Study benefited from public assistance
of some kind.126
Former foster youth in the study were also more likely to receive
mental health counseling and substance abuse treatment, to become
pregnant, and to become involved with the criminal justice system.127
While the Midwest Study noted a number of devastating outcomes
for the former foster youth population, it also acknowledged several
strengths, including the youth's ability to "exhibit extraordinary opti-
mism and high aspirations," as well as close relationships with members
of their biological family. 12 8 In addition to comparisons to their Add
Health peers, the Midwest Study provided researchers the opportunity to
compare the outcomes of youth exiting foster care in Illinois to those
exiting in Wisconsin and Iowa.12 9 At the time, Illinois was the only state
of the three to allow youth to remain in foster care until age twenty-one
as opposed to age eighteen.13 0 The study found that with more time in
foster care-and perhaps more supportive opportunities to rewire their
brain and heal past trauma-youth had better life outcomes across sever-
al domains.
D. The Federal Legislative Landscape
The Midwest Study provided a look at the impact of existing federal
law targeted towards transition-age youth, as well as an impetus for fu-
ture legislative change.
In 1986, Congress amended Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
creating an Independent Living Program utilizing federal dollars to help
states support older youth in the foster care system in their transition to
adulthood.13 2 Subsequently, in 1999, Congress passed the Foster Care
Independence Act (Chafee Act), 13 3 which created the John Chafee Foster
Care Independence Program. The Chafee Act doubled the federal fund-
ing available to states for independent living purposes and expanded
125. Id. at 35 (distinguishing groups based on income).
126. See id at 38-39 (explaining survey results regarding receipt of government benefits).
127. Id. at 44-46 (mental health and substance abuse treatment); id at 50-53 (pregnancy); id.
at 64-67 (criminal justice system involvement).
128. Id. at 84 (reviewing positive results gathered by study).
129. See id at 87 (comparing Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin systems).
130. Id. (noting Illinois' extended care system).
131. See id. at 87-88 (recognizing benefit of longer transition period from foster care system
while acknowledging need for further time to study impact of law); see also Courtney et al., supra
note 110.
132. Frank E. Vandervort, Federal Legislation Protecting Children and Providing for Their
Well-Being, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND
STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES, supra note 14, at 231, 253 (detail-
ing congressional response to transition of older youth from foster care).
133. John H. Chaffee Foster Care Independence Program, 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2012).
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youth eligibility for services.134 It also provided vouchers for post-
secondary education and vocational training.135 In part, researchers in-
tended the Midwest Study to look at how foster youth were transitioning
to adulthood since the Chafee Act became law.
136
The initial stages of the Midwest Study informed further federal
policy change related to this population.13 7 In 2008, Congress passed the
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (the
Fostering Connections Act), which formally recognized the benefit of
providing older youth in care additional time for their transitions.' 3 The
Fostering Connections Act amended the definition of "child" in Title IV-
E of the Social Security Act.1 3 9 The new definition included young peo-
ple up to age twenty-one (instead of terminating services at age eight-
een), if the young person was engaged in one of four activities: (1) com-
pleting high school or a GED program, (2) enrolled in college or voca-
tional school, (3) participating in a program to remove employment bar-
riers, or (4) employed at least eighty hours per month.14 0 Young people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were also eligible to remain
in care if they were incapable of performing the four activities previously
listed due to a medical condition.14 1
Following this policy change under the Fostering Connections Act,
states were eligible to receive federal funding to reimburse the costs of
foster care for youth in this transition-age group, as of 2011.142 A number
of states then modified their local laws to match this expanded definition
of child.143 In many ways, this change marked an awareness that young
people exiting foster care, just like their non-foster care peers, need time
to achieve their goals, make permanent connections or achieve legal
permanency, learn from mistakes, and develop new skills or supports.14 4
States continue to work towards effective implementation of the Foster-
ing Connections Act, particularly addressing whether policies and prac-
134. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 5 (providing account of federal legislation).
135. Id. (discussing services provided by Chafee Act).
136. Id. at 6 (identifying one goal of the Midwest Study).
137. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 2 (noting impact of Midwest Study on federal legisla-
tion).
138. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
351, 122 Stat. 3949.
139. Id. § 201(a) (extending the definition of "child" under federal law).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B)(iv)(I)-(IV) (2012) (highlighting eligibility requirements).
141. Id. § 675(8)(B)(iv)(V) (recognizing a medical condition exception).
142. See JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 10 (providing recommendations to
leverage federal funding from Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoption Act).
143. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 388.1, 11400(aa) (West 2017) (defining non-
minor dependent status for older youth); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-4501 to -4514 (2017) (establishing
Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2017) (defining "child").
144. See JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 7-9 (describing needs of transition-
age youth and appropriate design for foster care system support).
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tices are developmentally-appropriate for this transition-age popula-
145tion.
E. The Research on Adolescent Decision Making
Just as the delinquency courts were first to adopt the view of chil-
dren as "rights-based" individuals, so too have other courts been willing
to consider the research on adolescent development.146 In 2005, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons,147 held that the death pen-
alty for those under age eighteen at the time of their convictions was
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.148 In so finding, the Court took ample time to analyze research on
the developmental differences between youth and adults.149 The Court
noted three key differences.150 First, youth tend to exhibit a "lack of ma-
turity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" more often than
adults, "qualities [which] often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions."'5 1 In fact, "adolescents are overrepresented statis-
tically in virtually every category of reckless behavior." 5 2
Second, juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure or other out-
side negative influences.5 3 They have less control over their own envi-
ronments.154 Third, their character is less well-formed or fixed than that
of adults.'55 With these principles in mind, the Court determined that
"[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked
and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability."'56
Following the Court's Roper opinion in 2005, the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) faced criticism for what some viewed as
inconsistent positions on adolescent decision making.15 7 The Roper
Court, in its ultimate opinion and accompanying analysis of adolescent
development, heavily relied upon the APA's position that adolescents are
145. See id at 3 (emphasizing the need to extend foster care jurisdiction based on "unique
developmental tasks of [adolescent] life stage and their legal status as adults").
146. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors'Access
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop," 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
583, 583-86 (2009) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on adolescent development
research).
147. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
148. See id at 578-79 (stating holding).
149. See id at 569-73 (differentiating the judgmental capacity of adults from adolescents).
150. Id. at 569-70 (noting "general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults").
151. Id at 569 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)) (highlighting the first distinction between adults and adolescents).
152. Id (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspec-
tive, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 339, 339 (1992)) (noting recklessness of adolescence).
153. Id. (describing the second distinction between adolescents and adults).
154. Id (explaining juvenile susceptibility to outside influence).
155. Id. at 570 (recognizing the third distinction between adults and adolescents).
156. Id. at 572-73 (analyzing developmental research in context of death penalty sentence).
157. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583-84 (describing alleged inconsistency of APA's
positions on adolescents).
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less mature than adults in terms of criminal responsibility.15 ' In 1990,
however, the APA asserted in Hodgson v. Minnesota" that "because
adolescents had decision-making skills comparable to those of adults,
there was no reason to require teenagers to notify their parents before
terminating a pregnancy."I60 To many, these two briefs represented con-
tradictory positions on the developmental capacity of young people. 61In
fact, however, these two positions can be reconciled through careful
analysis of existing research.
162
Following these cases, a number of researchers from the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice considered age differences in many cognitive and psychosocial
capacities.163 Researchers determined:
[W]hereas adolescents and adults perform comparably on cognitive
tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities that were referred to in
the [APA's] Hodgson brief-abilities that permit logical reasoning
about moral, social, and interpersonal matters-adolescents and
adults are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial ca-
pacities listed by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion in Roper-
capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influence.16
Indeed, studies show that there are no "appreciable differences" in
logical reasoning or competency-related abilities between youth age six-
teen and older and adults.165 On the other hand, "psychosocial character-
istics such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, future orientation, and sus-
ceptibility to peer pressure" continue to develop "well beyond middle
adolescence and even into young adulthood... ."166
The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study demonstrated: "By age 16,
adolescents' general cognitive abilities are essentially indistinguishable
from those of adults, but adolescents' psychosocial functioning, even at
the age of 18, is significantly less mature than that of individuals in their
mid-20s."l67 This analysis affirmed the allegedly contradictory views of
158. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-73 (analyzing case in light of adolescent development re-
search); see also Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583 (detailing the Roper analysis of the APA's
position).
159. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
160. Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 584 (citation omitted) (referencing Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)).
161. See id ("Justice Kennedy explicitly asked at oral argument in Roper if the APA had 'flip-
flopped' between 1989 (when its final amicus brief was filed in the abortion case) and 2004 (when
its brief was filed in the juvenile death penalty case).").
162. See id. at 584-87 (reconciling APA positions).
163. Id. at 585 (establishing the reason for MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study).
164. Id. at 586 (summarizing findings that distinguish cognitive capacity from psychosocial
capacity in decision making).
165. Id. (recognizing the similarity between adults and older youth in logical decision making
abilities).
166. Id. at 587 (describing age differences in psychosocial characteristics).
167. Id. at 592 (presenting study findings).
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the APA in its briefs in Hodgson and Roper.168 The distinction in deci-
sion making is clear:
When it comes to decisions that permit more deliberative, reasoned
decision making, where emotional and social influences on judgment
are minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are consultants
who can provide objective information about the costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just as capa-
ble of mature decision making as adults, at least by the time they are
16....
In contrast, in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are typically
characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social coercion,
or that do not encourage or permit consultation with an expert who is
more knowledgeable or experienced, adolescents' decision making,
at least until they have turned 18, is likely to be less mature than
adults'.169
Certainly, the United States Supreme Court appreciated these dis-
tinctions in adopting the APA research, both in Hodgson-where the
Court upheld the right of adolescents to seek abortions without parental
consent-and in Roper-where the Court rejected the juvenile death
penalty.170
These studies, however, create space for similar discussions on ado-
lescent decision making in the dependency arena. In terms of cognitive
abilities, foster youth over age sixteen are capable of logical reasoning
equivalent to that of adults.'7 ' They can engage in case-planning and
legal decision making when they have adult support to advise them
through this process.172
In contrast, the studies call into question the psychosocial abilities
of youth to make decisions when emotions are high, peer pressure exists,
and adult consultation is absent.173 These include decisions such as driv-
ing without a license, purchasing drugs or alcohol, or engaging in sexual
activity.174 The lack of maturity with these types of decisions does not
negate responsibility or justify actions, but rather, demonstrates the need
for greater restraint or added protection to help transition-age youth nay-
168. See id. at 586 ("[W]e believe that APA's seemingly contradictory positions in Hodgson
and Roper are in fact quite compatible with research on age differences in cognitive and psychoso-
cial capacities.").
169. Id. at 592 (highlighting contextual differences in decision making abilities of adolescents).
170. See id at 583-84 (describing distinctions in adolescent ability in the context of Supreme
Court holdings).
171. Cf id. at 592 (discussing mature decision making of adolescents in medical, legal, and
research study contexts).
172. Cf id. (noting adolescent capability in "legal decision making (where legal practitioners,
such as defense attorneys, can play a comparable role)").
173. See id at 592-93 (emphasizing lack of mature decision making from adolescents in par-
ticular contexts).
174. See id at 593 (providing examples of immature decision making contexts).
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igate these events.175 Indeed, in some ways, transition-age youth are both
old enough to understand and yet not always old enough to know better.
To adequately meet the needs of young people as they transition in-
to adulthood, we must design a system that recognizes these distinctions.
III. DEFINING THE RIGHTS (AND RESPONSIBILITIES) OF OLDER YOUTH IN
DEPENDENCY CASES
A. The Legal Significance ofAge Eighteen
While the age of eighteen does not indicate any magical, transform-
ative experience in the journey from child to adult, particularly as re-
search on adolescent development now notes an emerging adulthood
spanning all the way to age twenty-five, the legal system, for all intents
and purposes, views the age of eighteen as a significant marker.176 Even
as the Roper Court carefully weighed the research on distinctions be-
tween capacities of adolescents and adults, it fell back to eighteen as its
default.7 7
The majority described the difficulty: "The qualities that distinguish
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By
the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity
some adults will never reach."17 8 Ultimately, the Court found that "a line
must be drawn[,]" and that "[t]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood."l7 9
At the age of eighteen, young people assume a number of "rights"
in our country. In almost every state, by the age of eighteen young peo-
ple are eligible to vote in elections or serve on juries.'so At eighteen,
young people can enlist to fight in our military, or even marry, without
their parents' consent.i18
Turning eighteen also means that young people may be legally re-
sponsible for their actions in ways they never have been before.'82 If they
commit a criminal offense, they subject themselves to the adult criminal
175. Cf id. at 592 (describing immature decision making due to lack of consultation with
knowledgeable or experience expert).
176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (determining age of eighteen to be a divid-
ing line between juveniles and adults).
177. Id. (noting need to draw line of distinction).
178. Id. (recognizing subjectivity of choosing eighteen as age of distinction).
179. Id. (explaining Court's analysis in deciding upon eighteen as "age at which the line for
death eligibility ought to rest").
180. See id apps. B & C (listing state laws on voting and jury service).
181. See id. app. D (referencing state laws on marriage without parental consent); see also 10
U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012) ("[N]o person under eighteen years of age may be originally enlisted without
the written consent of his parent or guardian . . . .").
182. See Krinsky, supra note 9, at 250 (recognizing eighteen as "time of change" where "youth
can exercise the right to vote, enlist in the military, and sign legal documents").
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system and face corresponding consequences.'83 In most states, the age
of eighteen is considered the age of majority.184 Upon reaching majority,
young people can legally enter into contracts or sign apartment leases.'85
If they lapse in payments or responsibilities under these agreements, they
face the repercussions.
Yet despite these "coming of age" rights and responsibilities in
many areas of our legal system, the dependency systems across our coun-
try are not consistent in taking note of any change to the young person's
legal status. Even following the Fostering Connections Act, some states
continue to use age eighteen as the end of a court's intervention or legal
jurisdiction over youth.186 For young people in these states, services may
be provided by means of administrative programs, yet there no longer
remains any legal enforceability for such services as youth begin to tack-
le the world of adulthood.'
In other states, the dependency system has extended jurisdiction
over young people until the age of twenty-one, yet there is no marked
difference in how the dependency court system treats those young people
as they cross the threshold of eighteen. In Colorado, for example, the
continuing jurisdiction statute reads, "the jurisdiction of the court over
any child adjudicated as neglected or dependent shall continue until he
becomes twenty-one years of age unless earlier terminated by court or-
der."'8 8 Prior to a youth's eighteenth birthday, the Colorado court should
consider the activities outlined in the Fostering Connections Act to assess
whether the youth needs more time after age eighteen to stay within the
dependency court's jurisdiction.1 Nothing about the youth's status,
however, actually changes at eighteen.190 Furthermore, prior to eighteen,
youth in foster care in Colorado receive an attorney, not to represent their
183. See United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The Supreme Court's
decisions limiting the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a
juvenile is an individual with a chronological age under 18.").
184. See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across
Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 343, 374-75 (2012) (providing historical account of reduction of
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen by state legislatures in 1970s).
185. See Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1125 (2012) ("In the United
States, most jurisdictions have a functional minimum age for the right to contract of eighteen years
old.").
186. See Bruce A. Boyer, Foster Care Reentry Laws: Mending the Safety Net for Emerging
Adults in the Transition to Independence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 837, 850 n.66 (2016) (cataloging states
that do not extend jurisdiction beyond eighteen by statute, but provide some support for former
foster youth post-eighteen).
187. See id at 850 (recognizing administrative approach to extended service provision).
188. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-205(1) (2016) (providing for continuing jurisdiction of court).
189. See id § 19-3-205(2)(a) (listing considerations for extending jurisdiction past age eight-
een).
190. See id § 19-3-205(1) (providing for jurisdiction continuing until age twenty-one with no
specified change at age eighteen).
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direct wishes, but to represent their best interests.9 9 Upon turning eight-
een, youth continue in a "best interests" court system with the same
model of guardian ad litem representation, now stretching all the way
until age twenty-one if the court determines continued jurisdiction would
be best for them.192 Without changing system culture to match develop-
mentally-appropriate milestones for this transition-age population, we
run the risk of making age twenty-one the old cliff of age eighteen.
Indeed, the age of eighteen is both significant and totally insignifi-
cant, depending on our perspective.1 93 The law does not always exhibit
flexibility, and so for need of clarity, our system creates importance
around the chosen age.194 The dependency system does not consistently
match the line drawn in other legal contexts; yet, it also does not authen-
tically follow the developmental lessons that we know to be true for tran-
sition-age young people. Perhaps most critically, as some have recog-
nized, "The notion that a single line can be drawn between adolescence
and adulthood for different purposes under the law is at odds with devel-
opmental science."'9 5
B. The Current Status of Youth Rights
While the rights of parents and states' interests have been consist-
ently articulated in dependency cases,'9 6 the same cannot be said for the
rights of children. Children are thought to have "interests," while parents
are thought to have "rights."' 9 7 Many fear that affording rights to chil-
dren will only come at the expense of the rights of their parents, as if
parents have already cornered the market on rights with little to go
around. 198
Still others believe that the rights of children are subsumed by the
rights of their parents, or in their parents' absence, by the state under the
191. Id. § 19-3-203(3) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem charged with represen-
tation of child's best interests).
192. Cf id §§ 19-3-203, -205 (providing for jurisdiction and legal representation with no
marked change at age eighteen).
193. Compare JIM CASEY, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that
change from adolescent to adult is not complete on eighteenth birthday), with Preston & Crowther,
supra note 184, at 374 (recognizing age of legal majority at age eighteen).
194. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (adopting eighteen as default distinc-
tion).
195. Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 583 (highlighting disconnect between law and re-
search).
196. For a discussion of the rights of parents and the State's parens patriae interest, see supra
notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
197. Compare supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text, with infra notes 202-89 and accom-
panying text.
198. See Howard Davidson, Children's Rights and American Law: A Response to What's
Wrong with Children's Rights, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 69, 70 (2006) (explaining lack of American
laws with "children's rights" in title).
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parens patriae doctrine.199 Under this viewpoint, children do not need
separate, independent rights.200 They are taken care of when the system
201
protects the rights of others. Such a view can be easily understood in a
system completely designed around child protection and best-interest
decision making.
When discussing the rights of parents, federal and state courts are
consistently clear in their definition: Parents have a right to the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children.2 02 This is the starting point for the
discussion of protections that children are thereby owed.203 Even in cases
where children have been recognized to have some independent status,
the "right" is not so easily defined; it is fluid based on the child's context
204
or the issues at stake in the particular court proceeding.
In Alabama, a court recognized, "Parents and their children share a
liberty interest in continued association with one another, i.e., a funda-
mental right to family integrity."205 In Colorado, children have protected
interests "in continuing family relationship[s] . . . [and] in a permanent,
secure, stable, and loving environment."206 Children in Florida have a
"fundamental liberty interest to be free of physical and emotional vio-
lence at the hands of [their] . . . most trusted caretaker."2 0 7 In Georgia,
children have a liberty interest in "maintaining the integrity of the family
unit and in having a relationship with [their] biological parents."2 08 Kan-
sas has noted a child's fundamental liberty interest in his or her parent-
age, reciprocal to a parent's interest in maintaining the familial relation-
ship with the child.209 Children in Massachusetts have an absolute inter-
est in "freedom from abusive or neglectful behavior."2 10 Texas acknowl-
199. Cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (establishing legal presumption that fit
parents act in children's best interests); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (noting
State's obligation to control children when parent is unable).
200. Cf Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (recognizing rights of parents to make decisions for children
and limits on State intervention with no discussion of rights of children).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., id. at 65 (noting constitutional right of parents to "care, custody, and control of
their children"); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (same); In re K.M., 653
N.W.2d 602, 607 (Iowa 2002) (same); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 297 (Me. 2000) (same).
203. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-69 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), standard test to assess procedural due process owed to parents at termination of parental
rights hearings).
204. For a discussion of how the rights and interests of children are defined across the country,
see supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
205. J.B. v. DeKalb Cty. Dep't. of Human Res., 12 So. 3d 100, 115 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
206. See People ex rel. C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 607 (Colo. 1982) (identifying interests at stake in
termination of parental rights hearing).
207. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (second altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation omitted) (describing child's fundamental liberty interest).
208. See Kenny A. ex rel. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (discussing
constitutional interests of children).
209. See Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841, 846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (addressing fundamen-
tal liberty interests of parents and children in paternity action).
210. See Care & Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Mass. 1990) (emphasizing abso-
lute interest in freedom from harm compared to child's interest in family integrity, which is not
absolute).
DENVER LAW REVIEW
edges that children have an "interest in a final decision and thus place-
ment in a safe and stable home."2 1 1
There are countless other statements of recognition that youth too
have interests at stake in these proceedings.2 12 There is overlap amongst
213many, and yet no clear trumpeted statement of the right2. It is unclear
whether interests in these cases are equated to the rights of parents or are
mere factors in the "best interest" decision making itself. What is the
value of these expressions?
At times, the federal courts have attempted to wade into these
214murky waters2. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard the
case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices.215 In this case a boy and his mother sued county social workers
after the boy was severely beaten and permanently injured by his father
following reports made expressing concerns for the boy's safety.2 16 De-
spite the reports, the county failed to act in removing the boy from his
father's care.2 17 The boy brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-
leging that the Department's failure to act deprived him "of his liberty
interests in 'free[dom] from ... unjustified intrusions on personal securi-
ty"' under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 18 The
Court, however, rejected this argument and held that "nothing in the lan-
guage of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private ac-
tors."219
In doing so, the Supreme Court made a careful distinction relevant
to youth in state custody foster care.220 The Court found:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains
an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself,
211. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 304 (Tex. 2002) (considering promotion of child's inter-
ests by Texas rules).
212. See, e.g., In re Dependency of M.S.R., 271 P.3d 234, 244 (Wash. 2012) (recognizing
fundamental liberty interests of children in termination proceedings, including "interest in being free
from unreasonable risk of harm and a right to reasonable safety; in maintaining the integrity of the
family relationships, . . . and in not being returned to (or placed into) an abusive environment over
which they have little voice or control").
213. Compare supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text, with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65 (2000) (defining parents' fundamental right to care, custody and control of child).
214. See Dale Margolin Cecka, The Civil Rights of Sexuality Exploited Youth in Foster Care,
117 W. VA. L. REV. 1225, 1253-57 (2015) ("Foster children's rights while in custody of the state are
not well settled.").
215. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
216. Id. at 191-93 (recounting facts of case).
217. Id. at 192-93 (describing action taken by county department).
218. Id. at 194-95 (alteration in original) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1977)).
219. Id at 195 (stating holding of Court).
220. See Taylor 1. Dudley, Bearing Injustice: Foster Care, Pregnancy Prevention, and the
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 77, 96-97 (discussing applicability of DeShaney in other
contexts).
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and at the same time fails to provide for his basic needs-e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action set by . . . the Due Process
Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment].221
Since DeShaney, several courts have addressed violations of the
substantive due process rights of foster children.222 In 2003, the Wash-
223
ington Supreme Court heard the case of Braam ex rel. Braam v. State,
a class action filed against the State "in an effort to improve the lives of
foster children in the State's care."22 4 The plaintiffs in Braam specifically
challenged the State's practice of indiscriminately moving children from
placement to placement, in addition to the lack of appropriate mental
health treatment to meet the children's needs.225
The Braam case provided a solid opportunity to explore the land-
scape of the substantive due process rights of foster children across the
country.22 6 The Washington court concluded that "foster children have a
substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm,
including a risk flowing from the lack of basic services, and a right to
,227
reasonable safety." Any violations of these rights would be measured
under the professional judgment standard-"whether the State's conduct
falls substantially short of the exercise of professional judgment, stand-
ards, or practices."22 8 Since Braam, other foster youth have sought relief,
with varying degrees of success, from violations of their substantive due
process right to be free from harm while in state custody.229
It is worth noting that the Braam court dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims based on state statutes.230 None of the dependency laws created a
private cause of action for youth.231 The court stated "that parties believ-
ing themselves aggrieved by [the State's] failure to abide by these [state]
statutes, including a foster child through an attorney or guardian ad litem,
will have an opportunity to raise the issue in the context of dependency
actions."232 The court similarly rejected claims under other federal child
221. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (distinguishing case at hand from case with child in state
custody); Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (requiring State to provide neces-
sary services to involuntarily committed mental patients to ensure their "reasonable safety").
222. See, e.g., Cecka, supra note 214, at 1253-57 (recounting case law on foster child's right to
be free from harm while in state custody).
223. 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003).
224. Id. at 854 (providing case background).
225. Id. at 855 (describing nature of claim).
226. See id. at 856-57 (providing string citation to persuasive authority on substantive due
process rights of foster children).
227. Id. at 857 (defining the substantive due process right).
228. Id. at 858 (identifying appropriate culpability standard for violations of children's substan-
tive due process rights).
229. See Cecka, supra note 214, at 1253-57 (providing case law summary).
230. See Braam, 81 P.3d at 863 (affirming trial court's dismissal of state claims).
231. Id.
232. Id. (identifying context of dependency case to be proper avenue for violations of state
statutes as opposed to separate cause of action).
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welfare laws, noting that the federal funding mandates of such laws did
not create an explicit cause of action.233
In addition, courts have also evaluated the procedural due process
rights of youth under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn
v. Perdue,234 a case heard by the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, was a class action brought by foster youth in Fulton
and DeKalb counties, asserting various violations of their due process
235rights under the Georgia constitution. Among their arguments, the
plaintiffs claimed that they had a constitutional right to counsel in all
deprivation cases, not just at the time of termination of parental rights
236hearings. The court recognized that foster youth in state custody were
"entitled to constitutionally adequate procedural due process when their
liberty or property rights [were] at stake."237 In Kenny A., the court de-
fined the youth's fundamental liberty interests at stake in such cases as "a
child's interest in his or her own safety, health, and well-being, as well as
an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a
relationship with his or her biological parents."2 38 The process of taking a
child into state custody creates a "special relationship" that "gives rise to
rights to reasonably safe living conditions and services necessary to en-
sure protection from physical, psychological, and emotional harm."239
The court then conducted the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge test to
assess what process was owed in such cases.2 40 Ultimately, the Kenny A.
court concluded that children had a procedural due process right o coun-
241
sel under the Georgia constitution.
Thus, while courts have recognized substantive and procedural
rights of children in foster care, the historical landscape is varied in con-
sistency and enforceability. Future litigation will no doubt continue to
refine the rights, yet it is uncertain whether there will ever be one clear
right comparable to that of parents in such dependency cases.
More recently, in 2011, a class action suit, D.B. v. Richter,242 was
filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York on behalf of transi-
243tion-age youth in the foster care system. Specifically, the class in-
233. Id. at 863-65 (affirming trial court's dismissal of federal statutory claims).
234. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (2005).
235. Id. at 1355-56 (stating facts of case).
236. Id. at 1357.
237. Id. at 1359 (recognizing procedural due process rights of children).
238. Id. at 1360 (articulating rights of foster children).
239. Id. (providing that fundamental liberty interests of child are at stake throughout the pro-
ceedings).
240. Id. at 1360-61 (discussing the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), analy-
sis).
241. Id. at 1360 (stating holding of court under Due Process Clause of Georgia Constitution).
242. Index No. 402759/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) filed Oct. 17, 2011.
243. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement at 1, D.B. v. Richter, Index No. 402759/11
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), http://www.legal-
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volved all youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one who
were currently in foster care with a permanency goal of emancipation
(Another Permanent Planned Living Arrangement or APPLA) or who
1 244 Teato a ie gis h
left foster care to live on their own. The action was filed against the
New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) in an ef-
fort to help transition-age youth enforce their "right to receive help in
finding appropriate and adequate housing and to receive other help from
ACS until [their] 21st birthday."2 4 5 As a result of the case being filed, the
parties reached a settlement that required ACS to establish policies re-
garding services and support for youth transitioning out of foster care,
specifically around the area of housing.24 6
This case targeted the protections owed to transition-age youth in
247the dependency system. It raised additional questions about the rights
of this in-between age group of young people, as well as the enforceabil-
ity of rights bestowed on them.
C. The Strengthening Families Act and Foster Care Bills ofRights
Congress furthered the conversation around transition-age youth in
foster care, specifically their engagement in case planning and their
rights in the system, with the passage of the SFA in September 2014.248
The SFA is "designed to promote well-being and normalcy for youth in
foster care[,]" included provisions encouraging states to identify and
protect youth at risk of sex trafficking, to improve opportunities for
youth in foster care, to support permanency efforts through adoption
incentives, and to enhance international child support recovery efforts.249
In one key provision, the SFA called for states to implement a "rea-
sonable and prudent parent standard," which would allow foster parents
to make more of the day-to-day decisions for youth in their homes.2 50
The goal is to provide a sense of normalcy to foster youth by allowing
them to participate in extracurricular, cultural, and social activities with
aid.org/media/152814/d.b.%20v.%20richter/o20notice.english.pdf (providing notice of a proposed
settlement to all eligible youth).
244. See id. at 1; see also Proposed Class Action Settlement Averts the Danger of Homeless-
ness for Young People Aging Out of Foster Care, LEGAL AID Soc'Y (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.legal-
aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/inthenews/proposedclassactionsettlementavertsthedangerofho
melessness.aspx (detailing news coverage of proposed class action).
245. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement, supra note 243 (asserting right of current and
former foster youth in case).
246. See id. at 2-4 (summarizing terms of proposed settlement).
247. Id. (identifying services to be provided to current and former foster youth).
248. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128
Stat. 1919 (2014) (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
249. See JENNIFER POKEMPNER ET AL., PROMOTING NORMALCY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
FOSTER CARE 2 (2015) (summarizing general provisions of SFA); see also Preventing Sex Traffick-
ing and Strengthening Families Act § 2 (providing Table of Contents for Act's provisions).
250. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 111 (establishing standard
for supporting normalcy for children in foster care).
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their peers.25 1 It is a recognition that youth in foster care still need to just
be kids.2 52
Other provisions seek to empower youth ages fourteen and older to
engage in their own dependency cases.2 53 The SFA specifies that he case
plan "shall be developed in consultation with the child [age fourteen or
older] and, at the option of the child, with up to 2 members of the case
planning team who are chosen by the child and who are not a foster par-
ent of, or caseworker for, the child."25 4 This provision seems to reflect an
understanding of the adolescent's cognitive capacities for decision mak-
255ing at these ages. With guidance and opportunity, they are able to par-
ticipate in these decisions.
The SFA also amended the federal language to describe this process
as "transition planning for a successful adulthood," as opposed to transi-
tion planning for "independent living." 2 56 This also reflects changing
views around successful outcomes for these youth, recognizing that
adults do not, in fact, live independently, but rather live "interdependent-
ly" with support from many permanent connections with friends and
family.257
In the discussion of furthering youth rights, the essential provision,
the "List of Rights" addition, reads:
(b) List of Rights.-The case plan for any child in foster care under
the responsibility of the State who has attained 14 years of age shall
include-
(1) a document that describes the rights of the child with respect to
education, health, visitation, and court participation, the right to be
provided with the documents specified in section 475(5)(I) in accord-
ance with that section, and the right to stay safe and avoid exploita-
tion; and
251. Id.; POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 8-21 (analyzing implementation strategies for
normalcy provisions).
252. Cf POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 5 ("Indeed, normalcy for youth means being
able to do what is considered 'routine' for many teenagers .... .").
253. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (providing for involve-
ment of older foster youth in their own case planning).
254. Id. (designing case planning with emphasis on youth engagement).
255. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing adolescent capacity for logical
decision making).
256. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (amending terminology
to reflect changing views).
257. Jill K. Jensen, Fostering Interdependence: A Family-Centered Approach to Help Youth
Aging Out of Foster Care, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 329, 329-30 (2004) ("Programs
that focus on the concept of 'independent living' should be redefined as preparation for 'interde-
pendent living."'); id at 330 ("Interdependent living ... is defined as 'being able to carry out man-
agement tasks of daily life and having a productive quality of life through positive or appropriate
interaction with individuals, groups, organizations, and social systems."' (quoting ANTHONY N.
MALUCCIO ET AL., PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR LIFE AFTER FOSTER CARE: THE CENTRAL ROLE
OF FOSTER PARENTS 10 (1990))).
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(2) a signed acknowledgment by the child that the child has been
provided with a copy of the document and that the rights contained in
the document have been explained to the child in an age-appropriate
258
way.
The effective date for this provision was September 29, 2015, with a
delayed date permitted if state legislation was required.259
A collaborative brief on effective implementation of the SFA articu-
260
lated the rationale behind these provisions. With regard to case plan-
ning, the SFA represents a "recognition that young people should be in-
cluded in these important processes and that youth as young as age 14
can have a very informed perspective that can lead to better permanency
outcomes and compliance with the case plan."2 61 Providing youth with
their rights is intended to "strengthen[] their self-sufficiency and pre-
pare[] them for a successful transition out of foster care and into adult-
hood."262 While the report recommends that the Department of Health
and Human Services should provide a model List of Rights, it acknowl-
edges the absence of a clear list in the SFA itself.26
With this general mandate, the list of rights in each state may look
somewhat different from one another, so long as they cover the essential
topics-education, health, visitation, and court participation.264 Even
before the enactment of the SFA, a number of states enacted Foster Chil-
dren Bill of Rights.26 5 With the SFA's passage, additional states have
sought to adopt such lists in an attempt to define the rights of foster chil-
26
dren and foster parents and satisfy the SFA's requirements.266 Some of
these Bills of Rights are enacted through state statute, others find their
way in departmental policy or regulation.2 67
258. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act § 113 (establishing "List of
Rights" provision).
259. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE PREVENTING SEX TRAFFICKING
AND STRENGTHENING FAMILIES ACT (P.L. 113-183) TO BENEFIT CHILDREN AND YOUTH 26 (2015).
260. Id. at 8-9 (stating it was a "collaborative effort of Children's Defense Fund, Child Wel-
fare League of America, First Focus, Generations United, Foster Family-based Treatment Associa-
tion, and Voice for Adoption").
261. Id. at 26.
262. Id.
263. See id at 27 ("It would be helpful for HHS to provide a model for the List of Rights.").
264. POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 14 ("Youth should know what the law requires and
allows. They should be supported in advocating for themselves on all important issues, including
normalcy, family visitation, educational choices, and health care.").
265. See Jill Reyes, Child Welfare Bills of Rights for Foster Children, 31 CHILD L. PRAC. 156,
156 (2012) (discussing state trend to pass child welfare bills of rights prior to passage of any federal
legislation).
266. Foster Care Bill of Rights, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/foster-care-bill-of-rights.aspx (noting pending state
legislation to define rights of foster children and parents).
267. See Reyes, supra note 265 (noting use of statute of local child welfare agency policy to
create bills of rights).
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On the whole, such lists of rights are fairly benign. They generally
set forth expectations for the foster care system at large in terms of how
children in its care should be treated.268 Such bills often include "provi-
sions regarding frequent contact with parents, siblings, and family mem-
bers, foster youth's access to their advocates and the courts, and partici-
pation in age-appropriate school activities.
The ABA Center on Children and the Law has "also assessed which
states' child welfare bill of rights include: protection against abuse or
corporal punishment, access to healthcare, protections against excessive
medication, and preparation for independence."270 As of 2012, only five
states-California, Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, and Pennsylvania-
included all four of these topics in their statutes, while six additional
states-Hawaii, Maine, New Mexico, New York, Texas, and Wiscon-
sin-incorporated these provisions into their departmental policies.2 7'
The focus of such lists is primarily on what youth in foster care de-
serve: safe and healthy placements where their day-to-day needs are
272 273met, an explanation of why they are in care, the ability to participate
in case planning,274 educational stability,275 freedom from abuse or ne-
glect,276 sibling contact,277 pflvacy,278 prompt access to any needed
treatment or services,279 visitation with birth parents,280 representation of
268. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(b) (2016) ("The purpose of this Article is to
assign the authority to protect the health, safety and well-being of children separated from or being
cared for away from their families.").
269. See Reyes, supra note 265 (noting that most states have policy adopting "Bill of Rights
for Foster Children" from Philadelphia in 1973).
270. Id.
271. Id. (listing states with comprehensive bill of rights in either statute or policy).
272. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(A)(2) (2016) (stating the right to "live in a safe,
healthy and comfortable placement"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(1) (2016) (stating the
right to "live in a safe, healthy, and comfortable home").
273. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(A)(3) (stating the right to "know why the child
is in foster care and what will happen to the child and the child's family, including siblings, and case
plans").
274. See, e.g., II PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(16) (2011) (discussing the right to involvement in
case planning and court participation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.008(b)(14) (West 2017) (dis-
cussing the right to participation in or development of treatment plans).
275. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-113 (2016) (discussing the right to continuity of educa-
tional services); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633 (noting the right to educational stability); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-38-10 (2016) (discussing the right to educational services).
276. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(1) (2016) (stating the right to live in home "free
from physical, psychological, sexual, and other abuse"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(a)(1) (2016)
(stating the right to "safe foster home free of violence, abuse, neglect, and danger").
277. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-10a(a) (2016) (ensuring the right to sibling visitation);
FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(15) (2016) (ensuring the right to regular sibling contact).
278. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(a)(1 1) (2016) (granting right to "have their
confidentiality protected as required by state and federal law"); II PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(17)
(granting right to confidentiality).
279. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(4) (granting right to access treatment necessary
to meet needs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.4085(7) (2016) (establishing goal of dependent children
receiving necessary treatment).
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their voices in court,28 1 access to personal possessions,2 82 freedom from
discrimination,283 independent living services,284 lifelong connections
with kin,285 and opportunities to experience normalcy.286
The SFA requires states to provide these lists (or those similar) to
youth using youth-friendly language.28 7 This is documented by having
288the youth's signature acknowledging receipt of the rights. While this
documentation addresses notification to youth of their rights, concerns
remain regarding enforcement.2 89
D. The Meaning ofRights
The term "Bill of Rights" is an interesting one. Historically, it refer-
enced the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, encom-
passing a "list of treasured liberties."29 0 The original Bill of Rights was
thought to be "the product of the bitter struggles of men and women who
loved freedom and hated tyranny."291 It was the recognition of almost
inherent rights.292
The various state Bills of Rights for foster youth are similarly lofty
in nature, though often lacking in protections. Unfortunately, these state
280. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(3) (ensuring a child's right to contact with par-
ents); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(e) (West 2016) (establishing a right for children placed outside their
home to visit their parents).
281. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(1 7) (2016) (establishing policy of foster
children's right to "attend court hearings and speak to the judge"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
263.008(b)(13) (2016) (noting right to participation in court).
282. See, e.g., MASS. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FOSTER CHILD BILL OF RIGHTS (high-
lighting right to access in policy bill of rights).
283. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16001.9(a)(23) (establishing policy or foster chil-
dren's right not to be subjected to discrimination or harassment); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(2)
(granting right to "[f]reedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, disability, national
origin, age or gender").
284. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(a)(12) (granting right to independent living
services beginning at age sixteen); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a)(10) (ensuring a child's right to
age-appropriate life skills training and transition planning starting at age twelve).
285. See, e.g., MASS. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 282 (highlighting right to
receive support in maintaining positive connections with relatives).
286. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(a)(6) (2016) (establishing right to attend "com-
munity, school and religious" activities); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-113(b) (2016) (establishing rights
related to education).
287. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 9 (discussing details of Act's "list of rights"
provision).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 675a(b)(2) (2012) (requiring "signed acknowledgement by the child").
289. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 10, 10 n.46 (recognizing that child's acknowl-
edgement of receipt does not address enforcement of child's right).
290. See Garrett Epps, Speech, The Bill ofRights, 82 OR. L. REV. 517, 521 (2003) (delivering
history of the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution).
291. See Frank H. Elmore, Liberty Under the Bill of Rights, 50 FED. RULES DECISIONS 65, 65
(1970) (presenting historical account of Bill of Rights).
292. See id. at 66 (describing Bill of Rights amendments as "most essential portions of the
Constitution").
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Bills of Rights "typically do not create enforceable rights or specify any
means for their enforcement."293
In Colorado, for example, the statute specifically reads that the leg-
islature only intended the list as "guidelines to promote the physical,
mental, social, and emotional development of youth in foster care and to
prepare them for a successful transition back into their families or the
community.294 These guidelines may be limited in application "to rea-
sonable periods during the day or restricted according to the routine of
foster care homes to ensure the protection of children and foster fami-
lies." As such, the rights are neither absolute nor enforceable.295
In Florida, the statutory list delineates that it establishes "goals and
not rights."296 It shall not "be interpreted as requiring the delivery of any
particular service or level of service in excess of existing appropria-
tions[,]" nor shall it create any "cause of action against the state ....
Similarly, Hawaii's list establishes "guiding principles."29 8 Arizona and
North Carolina make clear that any violations do not create causes of
action.299 These are expectations of care, meant more so to inform foster
parents and state agencies of their enduring obligations to youth, not to
allow youth to have an equal and enforceable stake in the proceedings.
A few states have described grievance procedures for violations of
any listed rights, falling short, however, of creating separate causes of
action. In Delaware, aggrieved youth "may motion the court ... for ap-
propriate equitable relief."3 00 Nevada provides rights of redress. Penn-
sylvania allows for filing of a grievance in accordance with county poli-
cy.302 Youth in Rhode Island can seek appropriate equitable relief from
the family court.303 In Montana, youth should contact the Foster Care
304
Program Officer, who will follow-up on their concerns.
Thus far, there have been few cases across the country actually liti-
gating the rights listed in the various state Bills of Rights. In the Arizona
293. See POKEMPNER ET AL., supra note 249, at 10 (noting lack of creation of enforceable
rights).
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-7-101(2) (2016) (setting limits on enforceability).
295. See id.
296. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085 (2016).
297. Id. (limiting enforceability of Bill of Rights).
298. HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-3(a) (2016).
299. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-529(C) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-10.1(a) (2016).
300. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2522(b) (2016) (establishing remedy).
301. NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.550 (2015) (allowing child to redress alleged violation with foster
care provider or employee, agency, juvenile court, guardian ad litem or attorney for child).
302. 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2633(24H25) (2016) (establishing grievance process).
303. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-15(m) (2016) (providing remedy for child aggrieved by violation
of bill of rights).
304. MONT. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD & FAM. SERVS. Div., THE
POLICY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA REGARDING RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE (2015),
http://dphhs.mt.gov/CFSD.aspx (follow "Montana Foster Youth Rights" hyperlink) (establishing
process for youth to express concerns about care or treatment).
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case of K.D. v. Hoffman,305 a thirteen-year-old argued that the court vio-
lated her rights when it denied her request to attend and testify at a ter-
mination of parental rights hearing.3 06 She asserted that the Arizona Bill
of Rights for Children and Youth in Foster Care Act (AZ Bill of Rights
Act) gave her the right to "attend the ... court hearing and speak to the
judge."307 Despite this argument, the Arizona Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the legislature did not intend to grant youth in foster care ab-
solute rights in passing the AZ Bill of Rights Act, and thus the act estab-
lished no legally enforceable right or cause of action.30s
New Jersey, on the other hand, clearly recognizes a private cause of
action for violations of the Children's Bill of Rights.309 In KJ. v. Divi-
sion of Youth and Family Services,310 a federal district court of the Dis-
trict of New Jersey discussed the Bill of Rights in detail.3 1' It noted that
the "Act outlines the State's responsibilities when undertaking to protect
children by placing them outside of the home."3 12 It recognized this as an
313affirmative obligation of the State. It was designed to "protect the most
fundamental rights of children placed outside the home[,]" recognizing
the rights of youth independent of their parents.314
Moreover, the court noted that the Child Placement Bill of Rights
Act was created separately from the rest of the child welfare laws, "sug-
gesting that it was meant to provide a separate remedy."3 15 Despite a lack
of any articulation of a remedy within the Act itself, the court held that it
nonetheless provided a private right of action, as doing so was "proper
and necessary."316 Thus, in New Jersey, youth have equitable access to
enforcement of their rights.
In sum, the SFA provides that youth in every state receive a copy of
their rights; yet for the vast majority of youth across the country, having
"rights" means something less than a guarantee-whether through a bill
305. 359 P.3d 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
306. See id at 1023 (describing procedural history and basis of claim).
307. See id. at 1023-24 (relying on alleged violation of subsection (A)(16) of Bill of Rights to
assert cause of action).
308. Id. at 1024 (limiting enforceability of Arizona Bill of Rights for Children and Youth in
Foster Care Act).
309. K.J. v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 363 F. Supp. 2d, 728, 743-48 (D.N.J. 2005) (con-
sidering federal due process claims and state law claims of foster youth).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 741-45.
312. Id. at 741 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-1 to 9:6B-6 (West 2016)).
313. Id. at 742 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(b) (West 2016)).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 741.
316. Id. at 745 ("[T]he Child Placement Bill of Rights Act seeks to remedy the harm which
arises when the State agencies and the placement system fail to carry out the State's affirmative
obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the children entrusted to its care.").
317. Id.
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of rights or through case law. 1 Indeed, "mere encouragement and policy
promulgation without any accompanying enforcement mechanism is not
likely to bring about dramatic improvements for foster youth." 3 19
IV. THE CHANGING CULTURE OF A LONG-STANDING SYSTEM
In a myriad of ways, the SFA causes advocates to engage in conver-
sations about he value of transition-age youth. It recognizes the essential
piece they bring to case planning for their own life outcomes.3 20 it
acknowledges that this age group should be focused on transitioning with
supportive connections, not ultimate day-to-day independence.3 21 It re-
quires from states a declaration of expectations as to what .youth deserve
from a system legally obligated to support their well-being.3 22
Each of these elements of the Act is crucial to creating a dependen-
cy system built around the emerging adulthood of this age group in the
pursuit of achieving better outcomes for their futures. The SFA, howev-
er, is just the beginning. While it provides for the rights of youth by
name, it does little to encourage the enforceability of such rights, or even
to create accountability for the promises that such lists of rights make to
youth.
Our child welfare history shows our progression in viewpoint re-
323garding youth. Since the time of Gault, the delinquency system has
been two steps ahead in considering the status of young people, specifi-
cally the status of their development and decision-making capacity. 324it
is time for the dependency system to follow suit, moving past the pater-
nalistic paradigms and instead considering this age group's need for an
environment of both independence and support.
A. A Look Towards Developmental Appropriateness
Much of this discussion is less about specific laws or policies, and
ultimately, more about culture change in our dependency systems. Judg-
es are crucial in this process-asking questions of youth (and other par-
ties) rooted in a knowledge of developmental research, giving young
people an equal place at the table, and holding them, their families, and
318. For a discussion of the rights of transition-age youth both in bills of rights and in case law,
see supra notes 200-90 and accompanying text.
319. Paul Jacobson, Note, Promoting "Normalcy" for Foster Children: The Preventing Sex
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, 81 Mo. L. REv. 251, 263 (2016).
320. See Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, §
113(a), 128 Stat. 1919, 1928 (2014) (providing for greater engagement of older youth in case plan-
ning).
321. See id. § 113(c) (amending terminology to focus on transition planning).
322. See id. § 113(d) (requiring states to provide a "list of rights").
323. See Ventrell, supra note 16, at 192-93 (discussing change in view as to children's status).
324. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (describing delinquency court's shift to acknowl-
edging youth as rights-based individuals).
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their case professionals accountable for their actions. Creating a devel-
opmentally-appropriate system does not mean making excuses for the
"bad" choices of our youth; it means establishing an environment where
young people can try new things, make mistakes, and have support in
learning from them.
One author, Emily Buss, recently called for the adoption of a new
lens for the law around minors: "developmental jurisprudence."3 2 6 This is
''an examination of the role of law as a developmental agent-an agent
that shapes how children grow up .... 327 Essentially, this view advo-
cates that "in all the domains in which law is already operating, it should
be more universally attuned to its childrearing impact."328 Professor Buss
explains the role of the law in the development of older youth, specifical-
ly the message that we send to youth about their place in society.32 9
"[Y]oung people are conditioned to assume the status of outsider: They
are not a part of the social and professional community to which all the
court personnel, their own lawyers included, belong, and they are not
included in the hearings in any meaningful way." 3 3 0 This experience
"perpetuates the youth's dependent status in the system" and "deprives
them of an important opportunity to begin, in a highly structured and
supported environment, to exercise decision-making authority over their
own lives." 33 1 This is exactly the result that we, as a system, should seek
to avoid.
B. Recommendations for Change
Changes to our system start with changes to our courts, our laws
and policies, and our practices. We must be intentional in evaluating how
our status quo supports or hinders the successful transition of older youth
as they exit the child welfare system.
1. The Meaningful Participation of Youth
The dependency system has spent much time and attention in recent
years on youth attending court. Now, courts must move beyond attend-
ance and look for meaningful participation. Professionals must spend the
325. See, e.g., Jennifer Pokempner, Implementing the Older Youth Permanency Provisions of
the Strengthening Families Act. The Court's Role, 35 CHILD L. PRAc. 65, 73-74 (providing lists of
questions court can ask regarding older youth permanency provisions of the SFA).
326. Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 741 (2016) (establish-
ing new perspective on laws regarding minors).
327. Id. at 751.
328. Id. at 755 (explaining that developmental jurisprudence looks to "parenting model," just
as therapeutic jurisprudence looks to "treatment model").




time with youth-both fully preparing them prior to court and fully de-
briefing the experience with them after the hearing.332
Keeping in mind the research discussed above, there must be oppor-
tunities for young people to practice deliberative decision making, free
from social influences and supported by "consultants who can provide
objective information about the costs and benefits . .. ."33 This is the
time when transition-age youth have the ability to create new, healthy
brain pathways and prune those pathways that have not proven success-
ful. 334 Courts can support these opportunities by asking attorneys and
other professionals how decisions have been made and what the role of
the youth has been in such processes.33 5
2. A Meaningful Time Period for Transition
The results of the Midwest Study demonstrated that with additional
time and support in their transition, young people can have greater suc-
cess in their life outcomes.3 36 This concept informed the Fostering Con-
nections Act's extension of federal funding for young people between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one who are pursuing important goals. 33 As
states have implemented the Fostering Connections Act and extended the
court's jurisdiction, they have done so in a number of developmentally-
appropriate ways.338 One option is to design the extended foster care sys-
tem around an opt-in or opt-out provision.339 This provision recognizes
that in most states, young people are legal adults at the age of eighteen.340
The opt-in or opt-out provision takes notice of that age, requiring foster
youth in the system at age eighteen to either choose to remain in the sys-
tem (opt-in) or choose to exit the system (opt-out). This is about consent.
332. See ELIZABETH WHITNEY BARNES ET AL., SEEN, HEARD, AND ENGAGED: CHILDREN IN
DEPENDENCY COURT HEARINGS 8-11 (2012) (detailing benefits of children's attendance in court
and addressing common concerns).
333. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 592; see also JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18,
supra note 1, at 12-14 (offering ten key elements to effective case planning with transition-age
youth).
334. See Steinberg et al., supra note 146, at 592 (explaining supports needed in logical decision
making).
335. See, e.g., Pokempner, supra note 325 (emphasizing the court's role in the process).
336. See WEINBERGER ET AL., supra note 84, at 5-6 (describing "[a] process of competitive
elimination").
337. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 87-88 (comparing Illinois results with Iowa and
Wisconsin results).
338. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 1-2 (noting impact of the Midwest Study on
federal legislation).
339. Compare ALL. FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ET AL., ASSEMBLY BILL 12 PRIMER 9 (2014),
http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/wp2/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/AB-12-Primer Updated-I-
1-14.pdf (characterizing California's extended care as "opt-out" program, meaning that youth's
foster care "will be extended past age 18 unless s/he elects to exit care"), with Fostering Connections
to Success Act's Older Youth Extensions in Pennsylvania, JUVENILE L. CTR.,
http://www.jlc.org/fosteringconnections#conditions (last updated July 28, 2015) (providing opt-in
choice for young people to remain in the system).
340. Cf JIM CASEY, SUCCESS BEYOND 18, supra note 1, at 4 (illustrating developmentally-
appropriate legal framework for young people between ages eighteen and twenty-one).
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Either way, such a statutory provision requires the courts and the child
welfare agencies to take note that, specifically at eighteen when the legal
stakes become higher in many other domains, the dependency system
also values the informed decision making of young people.
Hand in hand with this type of provision, many states have also
adopted a "reentry" option. 341 This allows young people who choose to
leave the dependency system after the age of eighteen the ability to re-
enter the system to receive services and supports until the age of twenty-
one.342 It gives them the extra time to work on their goals, such as school,
job training, or employment.343 Re-entry is the developmentally-
appropriate mechanism whereby youth can make a (hopefully informed)
decision to try the world on their own, while simultaneously benefiting
from an existing safety net if they need additional support.344
Certainly, extension of foster care jurisdiction with its accompany-
ing provisions comes with its own challenges. This is a means, however,
to evaluate state laws and policies and bring developmental science into
the dependency world.
3. Meaningful Legal Representation
The SFA calls for recognition of the rights of young people in de-
pendency cases. With rights comes status, along with procedural protec-
tions. If the system intends to provide young people an equitable voice in
the proceedings, it must do that through effective counsel. The right to
counsel for children in dependency cases was well-analyzed by the Ken-
ny A. court, discussed above, as a procedural due process right.3 45 For
transition-age youth, the developmentally-appropriate choice is for that
counsel to be client-directed, as opposed to representing the youth's best
interests.3 46 The youth's attorney can be that sound consultant advising
the youth of the costs and benefits of various decisions. With this sup-
port, young people can be empowered to strengthen their decision-
making capacity in a safe environment.
341. Boyer, supra note 186, at 839, 857-59 (exploring foster care reentry laws).
342. See id at 839 (providing that roughly half of states allow young people to return to foster
care "after some form of trial independence").
343. See id. at 858-60 (explaining that many state statutes or procedures governing reentry
require youth to commit to satisfying activity under Fostering Connections Act as a condition).
344. Id. at 839 ("The safety net embodied by these reentry or trial independence programs
appropriately acknowledges many of the unique challenges faced by youth seeking to navigate the
difficult transition from foster care to independence.")..
345. Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (upholding
right to counsel "under the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution").
346. See JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, FOSTER CARE TO 21: DOING IT RIGHT
5 (2011) ("Legal representation must be youth-driven, responsive, and respectful of the unique needs
of each young person.").
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CONCLUSION
Transition-age youth in foster care have immeasurable challenges
ahead of them as they exit a system that has often made decisions for
them. Historically, the dependency courts have sent these youth count-
less messages of working "about" them and "for" them, rarely messages
of working "with" them. The legal landscape generally provides these
youth with a lesser voice than their parents, or even than the state, in
determining what is "best" for them.
With the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families
Act (the SFA), Congress opened the door for states, courts, and profes-
sionals to have deeper conversations about how youth are encouraged-
or sometimes hindered-in their transition process.
Maya Angelou is often quoted as saying, "I did then what I knew
how to do. Now that I know better, I do better."347 Today, we have more
research than ever on the adolescent brain, decision-making capacity,
348and life outcomes upon emancipation. We now know better about
what our systems are doing well and what we are failing to do. The SFA
gives us an opportunity to turn this knowledge into practice and do better
for transition-age youth in our foster care system.
347. J.N. Salters, 35 Maya Angelou Quotes That Changed My Life, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG
(May 29, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jn-salters/35-maya-angelou-quotes-
th b_5412166.html.
348. For a discussion of the research surrounding adolescent development a d the longitudinal





Normally, when you hear an "animal advocate" speak it is about
one of two topics, either about the humane treatment of animals or about
animal rights. The humane treatment of animals is a topic that has a
lengthy history in this country. The work of some of the largest animal
advocacy groups in the world, like the Humane Society, largely falls
under this umbrella. Over the past half-century or so, the fight to crimi-
nalize or otherwise make illegal various forms of animal abuse-whether
against domestic pets, farm animals, or animals used for commercial
gain-has seen some success in the United States, starting with the fed-
eral Animal Welfare Act and trickling down to various state and local
laws across the nation.
Some of us distinguish, however, between advocating for humane
treatment and advocating for animal rights. Animal rights advocates of-
ten start with the premise that animals, like humans, have autonomy.
Accordingly, to protect this autonomy, animals should be given some of
the legal protections and privileges normally associated with humans.
For example, personhood, perhaps starting with non-human primates and
cetaceans, has long been seen as the ultimate goal of animal rights activ-
ists. This has been the life work of the animal rights lawyer Steve Wise
and others. Another example would be the right for an animal to protect
its interests in the courtroom, perhaps through some human guardian ad
litem. We have seen in recent years conceived lawsuits to seek compen-
sation on the behalf of animals held for entertainment, or most recently,
the idea of suing an animal's captor for libel when the public is told the
animal is enjoying his captive home. Still others have stressed the need
for direct legislative action-often at the state level-that would give
animals statutory rights to protect their autonomy and freedom.
Some animal rights activists and scholars are not fully convinced
that arguing that some animals have autonomy (which often sounds
short-hand for intelligence) and, therefore, should extend to specific
rights, is the best path forward. For example, Martha Nussbaum has stat-
t Michael Harris is the Director of the Wildlife Law Program at Friends of Animals. For 18
years he has worked as an environmental law attorney, much of the time working directly on litiga-
tion to protect wildlife and natural ecosystems. Michael received a B.A. in Environmental and
Political Studies from Pitzer College in Claremont, California, a M.S.L. from Vermont Law School,
and a J.D. from Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California-Berkeley, where he was an
Executive Editor for the Ecology Law Quarterly. Before coming to Friends of Animals, Michael was




ed that as used in the animal rights context, the term autonomy has not
been well defined and ignores that the concept of autonomy has many
different meanings depending on the philosophical approach one choose
to consider or apply. Martha has suggested that animal rights activists
should focus less on the vague concept of autonomy and instead focus on
species-specific, central capacities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity,
play, sense/imagination/thought, emotion, practical reason, affiliation,
and control over one's environment.
More practically, one of the problems that has confronted Steve, for
example, is that judges have demanded he show more than autonomy as
a basis for granting primates the legal status of personhood; the judges
also demanded that he demonstrate that primates could take an active
role in fulfilling the "rights and duties" of citizenship within a society.
Apparently this means voting, paying taxes, holding down a job, and
otherwise not being a burden to the rest of society.
Thus, what is intriguing about Martha's approach is the ability to
now argue that fulfilling "rights and duties" of citizenship is not the
proper basis for determining personhood; instead, it is the ability of an
animal to lead a meaningful life and even enrich the lives of other ani-
mals around her.
It is also exciting that science is rapidly proving that Martha is right
regarding the capabilities of animals. We are truly in a revolutionary time
with respect to scientific analysis of the cognitive, emotional, and social
lives of so many animals. When I first entered the field of wildlife con-
servation in the 1990s, the fields of wildlife biology, conservation, and
ecology focused almost exclusively on the physical needs of a species. In
other words, the focus was largely on what essential habitat conditions a
group of animals need to survive and reproduce. Today, scientists are
fascinated with the knowledge that animals feel emotions, connect so-
cially, and have points of view based upon their interactions with the
world around them. Moreover, the work of Dr. Marc Bekoff and others
in the field of compassionate conservationism has helped document the
vast amount of research into animal feelings that has exploded over the
past couple decades.
The problem for animal rights activists, however, is that rational
thinking and sound science does not necessarily translate into legal pro-
tections and principles. If you did not already know this, you certainly do
today as a result of the current policy direction of our nation on so many
issues as a result of last year's presidential election. The reason for
this-at least in my mind-is that, in a democratic society, law and poli-
cy often reflect a mixture of human emotions, which can be influenced
by secular philosophy and science, but are also shaped by a collection of
individual beliefs, biases, prejudices, and other basic fears, such as feel-
ing that one's own place in the world is threatened. Collectively, these
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emotions help form basic social norms that help hold us together and,
more importantly, provide the basis for new legal rights and obligations.
Of course, history shows us that social norms are not always stag-
nant. They can both evolve and devolve. That is a subject that can be,
and has been, explored in great depth elsewhere. For our purposes here, I
merely wish to make a suggestion as to how social norms often do in fact
change-namely through deliberation. I believe that our society, basic
constitutional structure, established political institutions, and even some
existing laws are designed,to promote deliberation as a means of estab-
lishing new legal rights and protections. Of course, the system also en-
sures that deliberation is often painfully slow, which is a major contribu-
tor to some of the reasons our democracy has proven, so far, inadequate
in protecting the rights of so many beings. I would be the first to argue
that as a society we need to do a better job of deliberating and figure out
methods to speed the process up.
Still, I believe that deliberation is the only proven means in our so-
ciety to ensure lasting, and hopefully better, legal protections for hu-
mans, non-human animals, and even the environment. Which leads me to
our approach to animals' rights at Friends of Animals.
Simply put, through our work we seek to convince, or even force,
governmental decision-makers to incorporate the whole body of
knowledge regarding an animal's well-being before undertaking any
human-initiated action that could impact that animal. Despite the capabil-
ities approach discussed by Martha, and despite this vast, ever-growing
body of knowledge we can call compassionate conservationism, legal
protections for animals still focus almost exclusively on physical suffer-
ing, death, or loss of elements essential to an animal's ability to survive.
What we are trying to establish is what Friends of Animals calls a
"right to ethical consideration." This right is not the granting of specific
substantive rights to animals, like the right to life or freedom. We fully
support the granting of such individual rights to animals in many cases.
Again, such rights are currently not part of our common social norm and
are not embodied in most human legal systems. On the other hand, there
is already philosophical, scientific, and I would also argue, legal tools
available to us to make a strong case-whether before legislatures, ad-
ministrators, or judges-to implement a right to ethical consideration in
many jurisdictions.
Establishing a right to ethical consideration is a pathway to
strengthening legal protections for animals. By requiring decision makers
and others to maintain a dialogue-a deliberation-about the human
impact on animal well-being, it is possible that societal and legal norms
regarding the rights of other animals will gradually change.
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WORKING WITH AND FOR ANIMALS: GETTING THE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK RIGHT
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUMt
Friends of animals have lots to complain about and lots of work to
do. To the familiar list of horrors-torture of animals in the meat indus-
try, misery inflicted on puppies by puppy mills, the damages of research
using animals, the manifold harms endemic to the confinement of apes
and elephants in zoos, we have some further issues that have only be-
come issues in the past few decades: depletion of whale stocks by har-
pooning, the confinement of orcas and dolphins in marine theme parks,
the poaching of elephants and rhinos for the international black market,
the illicit trafficking of elephants from Africa into U.S. zoos, the devasta-
tion of habitat for many large mammals through climate change.' New
issues arise all the time. The world needs an ethical revolution, a con-
sciousness raising movement of truly international proportions.
But bad behavior also needs law. No major crimes against sentient
beings have been curbed by ethics alone, without the coercive force of
law-although it typically takes an ethical movement to goad law into
action. And so far, both in the U.S. and in the international community,
law has been lagging behind the evolving ethical consciousness of hu-
manity. Animals still lack standing under both U.S. and international
law. They also lack any rights of ethical consideration.2 All human ani-
mals are treated as persons and ends (no matter how immature the human
is), but all non-human animals are treated as mere things, as property.3
Law must find ways to make animals legal subjects and not mere ob-
jects.4 We need to move toward a world in which human beings are truly
Friends of Animals,5 not exploiters or users.
To make progress, we need theoretical approaches that are sound in
terms of reality, grappling with what we know about animals, and that
also direct law in a useful fashion. In this Article I will examine two ex-
t Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago
Law School. A discussion of this topic presented by Professor Nussbaum can be found at our web-
site, denverlawreview.org.
1. See Jane Goodall, Forward to STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, at ix, x-xi (2000).
2. See id. at xii.
3. See id
4. See id.
5. Wild Life Law Program, Nussbaum to Activists: 'Let's Have Work and Hope,' FRIENDS
OF ANIMALS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.friendsofanimals.org/news/2017/february/nussbaum-
activists-'let's-have-work-and-hope' (summarizing remarks by the author at an event co-hosted by




tremely influential approaches to animal entitlements in philosophy, both
of which have implications for law and policy: the "So Like Us' ap-
proach and the "Least Common Denominator" approach. I shall argue
that both are defective intellectually, and also in terms of strategy. A
version of the Capabilities Approach, an approach to justice for both
humans and other animals that I have developed over the years, does far
better in directing ethical attention. Does it also do better in directing
legal strategy?
THE "So LIKE Us" APPROACH
One prominent and influential approach to animal ethics and law
seeks recognition of legal personhood, and some autonomy rights, for a
specific set of animal species, on the grounds of their human-like capaci-
ties. This approach is associated, above all, with activist and author Ste-
ven A. Wise. Wise is one of the most significant pioneers of animal law.
His 2000 book Rattling the Cage took the field of animal ethics into law,
with striking results.9 His course on animal law at Harvard Law School
was one of the first law school courses of its kind. And, as the leading
figure in the 2016 documentary Unlocking the Cage, he eloquently de-
scribes to the film's many viewers the goals of the Nonhuman Rights
Project, which he leads; the film follows his legal battles to win limited
personhood rights for several chimpanzees being held in captivity.i0
Wise's focus in the 2000 book was on chimpanzees and bonobos,"
but by now he explicitly includes all four species of great apes, as well as
elephants (presumably all three species) and whales and dolphins (pre-
sumably all species of both of those).12 His argument rests heavily on
claims about the similarity of these animals to human beings. They are,
he says, self-conscious, they are self-directing, they have a theory of
mind, they have culture, they are not "cabined by instinct," they are able
to contemplate their own future. In general they are "really really
smart."13 Centrally, he holds that they are "autonomous creatures" who,
for that reason, should have "autonomous lives."1 4
Wise is not a philosopher, and he does not explain which of the
concepts of autonomy used by philosophers he has in mind. Since he also
says that he thinks of chimpanzees as at the level of a five-year-old hu-
man child, it is not clear that he really should ascribe autonomy to them,
6. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000) (using the "So Like Us"
approach to argue for legal changes for animals).
7. See infra Section titled The Least Common Denominator Approach.
8. WISE, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. UNLOCKING THE CAGE (Pennebaker Hegedus Films 2016).
11. WISE, supra note 6.
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if that means, as it typically does, the ability to criticize one's desires in
the light of some higher-order principles, or, as Kant famously held, the
ability to free oneself from the influence of religion and culture." Proba-
bly he means some less exacting form of self-directedness, such as the
ability to choose among alternatives. (But surely many other species of
animals exercise choice!) In any case, as both book and film repeatedly
emphasize, Wise thinks these species of animals are very like humans,
and he makes that likeness the basis for his crusade to win them some
limited legal rights.16 It would surely be valuable for him to investigate
the notion of autonomy further, since we do not think that five-year-old
children should be emancipated from their parents, nor do we think that
they have a right to an independent self-planned life (or other rights as-
sociated with that, such as the right to sexual consent, the right to decide
on one's own medical treatment, and so forth). Nor does Wise actually
maintain that autonomy rights entitle apes to life without some type of
supervision or guardianship: he reassures courts that he is seeking only to
have the badly treated chimps transferred to a different supervised set-
ting, not to have them utterly freed.17 It is never made clear why he
thinks that guardianship is good for apes, and he presumably does not
think that human guardianship is good for whales and elephants, alt-
hough he does not comment on this. So the concept of autonomy and its
implications for animal lives remain unclear in his conception. One
hopes that Wise will clarify the notion of autonomy rights in further
work.
By showing how like us animals are, Wise hopes to demonstrate, he
says in the film, that the line typically drawn in law between humans and
animals is irrational and needs rethinking.'8 If we think that children de-
serve some rights, albeit with some qualifications and limitations, we
should grant that these species of animals also have rights. It is irrational
and inconsistent to treat all humans as persons, bearing rights, and to
treat all animals as like mere things. At this point Wise uses an analogy
to slavery: just as law used to treat slaves as mere property, and we have
now seen that this was morally heinous, so too we should realize that our
current treatment of animals is morally heinous.19 In the film the slavery
analogy gets strong pushback from some of Wise's interlocutors, pre-
sumably because it can be read as suggesting, inappropriately, that Afri-
can-Americans are like chimps, which is not the idea he means to con-
15. See generally J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY (1998) (providing the
history of the idea of autonomy, Kant's view, and its influence on modem concepts); GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988) (leading philosophical account in
terms of higher-order desires).
16. See WISE, supra note 6; UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.





vey.2 0 So he backs away from the analogy; but he does not back away
from the core idea that we must make a transition in law from thinking of
animals as mere things and property to seeing them as persons.21 He re-
peatedly points out that corporations are given rights under law; the ex-
tension of rights to self-directing animals is surely an easier step than
that!22
Throughout both book and film, Wise presents lots of evidence that
23the core species of animals have human-like abilities of many types.
His central rhetorical strategy in the film is to show us chimpanzees and
other apes doing things that the viewer will immediately recognize as
human-like: using sign language, giving displays of empathy when
shown a film of humans displaying emotions, and so forth.2 4
The idea that some animals are surprisingly like humans, and that
this has implications for the way we should treat them, is not new. In 55
B.C. the Roman leader Pompey staged a combat between humans and
elephants.2 5 Surrounded in the arena, the animals perceived that they had
26no hope of escape. According to Pliny, they then "entreated the crowd,
trying to win their compassion with indescribable gestures, bewailing
their plight with a sort of lamentation."2 7 The audience, moved to pity
and protest by their plight, rose to curse Pompey-feeling, writes Cicero,
that the elephants had a relation of commonality (societas) with the hu-
man race.28
Not all religions and world-views have held that humans are a supe-
rior species. Buddhism and Hinduism have more generous views of the
world of nature.2 9 As Richard Sorabji shows, even in the Western tradi-
tion the humans-on-top view was not held by most of the ancient Greco-
Roman schools of philosophy, most of whom refused to draw a sharp
line between humans and other animals, and some of whom strictly pro-
hibited meat-eating, along with all infliction of pain on animals.3 0 But the
ancient Greek and Roman Stoics, enormously influential both in antiqui-
ty and in the development of Christian ethics, did hold that non-human




23. See id.; WISE, supra note 6.
24. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
25. GAFUS PLINIUS SECUNDUS, PLINY THE ELDER: THE NATURAL HISTORY BOOK VII 251
(Tyler T. Travillian ed., Bloomsbury Academic 2015) (n.d.) [hereinafter PLINY]; CASSIUS DIO, DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY 361 (Earnest Cary, trans., Harvard University Press 4th prtg. 1969) (n.d.).
26. See DIo, supra note 25, at 361, 363; RICHARD SORABJI, ANIMAL MINDS AND HUMAN
MORALS 124 n.21 (1993) (quoting PLINY, supra note 25).
27. SORABJI, supra note 26, at 124 n.21 (quoting PLINY, supra note 25).
28. Id. at 124-25.
29. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 320 (2006) [hereinafter FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE].
30. Id. at 125.
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quasi-divine, and that on that account we can use them as we wish.31
Stoicism influenced Christianity, but so too did Judaism, which similarly
held that the human being is special. Made in the image of God, the hu-
man is the only truly intelligent and spiritual being, and the only being to
whom salvation is open.
This view is still the dominant view in Judaism and Christianity.3 2
And it is the dominant view, as well, among moral philosophers whose
intuitions have been formed in that tradition. A notable example is lead-
ing moral philosopher Richard Kraut, who, in an important paper on the
notion of goodness holds that we must be able to say why human life is
special, in order to justify our intuitions that it is all right to do medical
experiments on animals but not on humans.33 Kraut never proposes to
criticize those intuitions, and I mildly suggest that he might want to do
that!34
Wise knows his audience, and he makes the shrewd guess that if he
is to move the needle on animal rights he will have to begin where the
audience is. He calls this beginning "the first salvo in a strategic war"
and also talks of "kicking the first door open."35 So he clearly isn't indif-
ferent to the wider project of winning rights for all animals. And his
close and determined attention to the capacities and deprivations of some
species is surely commendable. Nonetheless, one might raise worries.
The choice of a theoretical framework influences where we will be able
to go. It is important to get the theory right for reasons of truth and un-
derstanding. And it is also important to get a strategy that starts us in the
right direction, rather than pointing us down a blind alley.
What, then, might be some problems with Wise's strategy from the
philosophical viewpoint? Most obviously, it validates and plays upon the
old familiar idea of a scala naturae (ladder of nature) with us at the top.
Some animals get in, but only because they are like us. The first door is
opened, but then it is slammed shut behind us: nobody else gets in. In-
stead of the old line, we have a slightly different line, but it is not really
all that different, and most of the animal world still lies outside in the
dark domain of mere thinghood.
31. See id.
32. There are dissident strands in both, and when Pope Francis told a little boy that his dead
dog was in heaven, his remark, heretical nd rapidly withdrawn, still picked up on something that
many people like to believe. At the time of my adult bat mitzvah in 2008, I was told by our cantor
that Israeli animal activists have rewritten the Kaddish, or prayer for the dead, in order to include
prayer for dead animals. I considered using this version, although in the end I did not because it is
one of the few prayers that Reform Jews learn by heart, and they would be very upset to encounter
new Hebrew words.
33. See Richard Kraut, What is Intrinsic Goodness?, 105 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 450, 456
(2010).
34. See Martha Nussbaum, Response to Kraut, 105 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 463, 467 (2010).
35. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
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The idea of the ladder of nature is essentially a religious idea,
whether in its Stoic form (where only humans partake in Zeus's rational
plan for the universe) or in its Judeo-Christian form. It derives from an-
thropocentric religions, according to which God, imagined as rather like
us only better, using speech, reasoning, and language, makes us special,
like God, and then values us because we are Godlike. The idea of superi-
ority is not drawn from looking at nature, and it does not correspond to
what we see when we look at nature, if we can put aside our arrogance.
What we see are thousands of different animal life-forms, all exhibiting a
kind of ordered striving toward survival, flourishing, and reproduction.
Life-forms don't line up to be graded on a single scale: they are just
wonderfully different. If we want to play the rating game, let's play it
fairly. We humans win the prize on the IQ and language parameters. And
guess who invented those tests! But many animals are much stronger and
swifter. Birds do vastly better on spatial perception and the ability to
remember distant destinations. Most animals have a keener sense of
smell. Our hearing is very limited: some animals (e.g., dogs) hear higher
frequencies than we can and many (elephants, whales) hear lower fre-
quencies.3 6 We sing opera, birds sing amazing birdsong, whales sing
whale songs. Is one "better?" To a lover of music that's like asking
whether we should prefer Mozart or Wagner: they are so different that it
is a silly waste of time to compare them on a single scale.
As for life-sustaining abilities: rats are far more successful repro-
ducers and survivors; numerous animals from tubeworms to bowhead
whales have greater individual longevity. Shall we ask about moral abili-
ties? Well, we pride ourselves there, but we humans engage in depths of
deliberate cruelty and torture known to no other animal species, and no
other species makes systematic war against its own kind. Do we think we
are the most beautiful? Jonathan Swift was persuasive when he depicted
Gulliver, after years with the lovely horselike Houyhnhnms, finding the
human shape and smell disgusting.37 No other animal has such arrogance
about its beauty. At the same time, no other animal hates itself and flees
from itself.
In short, if we line up the abilities fairly, not prejudging in favor of
the things we happen to be good at, many other animals "win" many
different ratings games. But by this time the whole idea of the ratings
game is likely to seem a bit silly and artificial. What seems truly interest-
ing is to study the sheer differentness and distinctiveness of each form of
life. Anthropocentrism is a phony sort of arrogance. How great we are!
If only all creatures were like us, well, some are, a little bit. Rather than
unsettling our thinking in a way that might truly lead to a revolutionary
36. See HAL WHITEHEAD & LUKE RENDELL, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF WHALES AND
DOLPHINS 120-21 (2016)
37. JONATHAN SwIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 135-84 (6th ed. 2005).
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embrace of animal lives, Wise just keeps the old thinking and the old line
in place, and simply shifts several species to the other side.
The scala naturae is not just intellectually lazy and complacent: it is
also dangerous in other ways. It discourages useful self-criticism. It leads
to ugly projects in which humans imagine transcending their merely an-
imal bodies, by casting aspersions on the smells and fluids of the body.38
These projects are so often accompanied by attempts to subordinate some
other group of human beings, on the grounds that they are the true ani-
mals.39 Bad smell, contaminating physicality, and hypersexuality are
imputed to some relatively powerless subgroup, as an excuse for violent
types of subordination. One may trace these ideas in U.S. racism, in the
Indian caste hierarchy, in misogyny everywhere, in homophobia.4 0
Wise's strategy does nothing to undermine these baneful human practic-
es; indeed it reinforces them with its line-drawing. When what we need
is a wholly new way of seeing our bodies, it gives us the same old way,
with a few minor adjustments.
Wise's approach, furthermore, cuts most of the animal kingdom
adrift with no help from his interventions. He clearly doesn't want this
result, but it's hard to know what his theory yields for the terrible suffer-
ing of pigs and chickens, for the loss of habitat by polar bears and dozens
of other wild species. Or rather, it is not hard to know what he offers, but
all too easy: he offers nothing. A wholly new approach would need to be
invented once we move outside the special sphere of the species who are
so like us. He gives us no idea what that new approach would be. What is
totally lacking is wonder at the diversity of nature, love of its many dis-
tinctive forms of life.
There is a further disturbing consequence of the "so like us" ap-
proach: it leads to a focus on artificial performances that are not really
characteristic of the species as it lives its life in the wild. Thus "Unlock-
ing the Cage" spends a good deal of time on sign language, and it is in-
deed true, and impressive, that chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas can
learn sign language.4 1 But they don't use it when they are not living
among humans. Indeed, although dolphins occasionally carry human-
38. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW (2004) (critiquing the role that shame and disgust play in human beings' individual and
social lives and, in particular, the law).
39. See generally id
40. See id.; see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) (arguing that disgust has long been among the
fundamental motivations of those who are fighting for legal discrimination against lesbian and gay
citizens). On December 16-18, 2016, the University of Chicago Center in Delhi, India, held a large
conference on Prejudice, Stigma, and Discrimination to investigate the relationships among these
types of disgust-subordination and yet others. The papers are planned for a volume to be edited by
Zoya Hasan, Aziz Huq, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Vidhu Verma. Of particular interest for readers of
the present paper will be Dipesh Chakrabarty's paper on the caste hierarchy, in which he argues that
we must totally reimagine our relationship to nature.
41. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
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learned behavior with them back into the wild and teach it to other dol-
42
phins, I am not aware of any case in which apes have done the same
thing. It just isn't useful to them. And although Wise might have demon-
strated the empathy and emotion of apes and elephants in many ways, as
Frans De Waal has done for decades,4 3 he instead dwells, in the film, on
an example of empathy that is conveyed through the use of sign lan-
guage.4 4 A gorilla watches a movie in which a child is saying goodbye to
its family, and makes the signs for sad and so forth. Again, using sign
language to indicate emotion is something apes do for and to humans,
not something they do among themselves-although among themselves
they have, as De Waal repeatedly shows, plenty of ways of communi-
cating emotion.45 Wise presumably likes the sign language-empathy ex-
ample because it helps him establish likeness to us. But it is a pet trick. It
becomes very hard, in fact, to understand the rationale by which Wise
condemns some taught ape tricks, such as the ape doing karate kicks, and
yet loves and foregrounds the language tricks. Both are similar, it seems
to me (assuming the karate was taught through positive reinforcement
and not cruelty): parlor tricks that show something about the animal, but
not something that lies at the heart of its form of life. Whether it is ethi-
cal to teach such tricks can surely be debated, and I'm sure Wise would
defend the language trick for what it teaches us. But that's just it: what it
teaches us, not what it does for and in the animal life.
Wise argues that we need to begin by focusing on only a few rights
for a few species, because people will be terrified if the door is open to
all sorts of rights for all sorts of creatures. Will my dog be able to sue
me? Will I have to give up eating meat? But that all depends on what is
being asked. Sure, if someone said all animals should be given the right
to vote, people would go crazy. But Wise's approach also has to exercise
caution. If Wise were asking that all apes would immediately be allowed
to roam with no guardianship or supervision, people would also go crazy,
so he insists that this is not what he is asking - a concession that com-
plicates his demand for habeas corpus. Any proposal, then, can prove
unacceptably radical if its demands are extreme. But a proposal that asks
for a species-specific level of ethical consideration for a wide range of
creatures need not do that. And people appreciate consistency and theo-
retical integrity. Sooner or later, people will wake up to the fact that
Wise is playing bait and switch: likeness to humans for some creatures,
some other as yet unannounced rationale for other creatures.
42. See WHITEHEAD & RENDELL, supra note 36, at 120-21 (2016) (describing the example of
a dolphin standing vertically on its tail).
43. See generally FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED (1996) (demonstrating all kinds of
animals respond to social rules, help each other, share food, resolve conflict to mutual satisfactions,
and even develop a crude sense of justice and fairness).
44. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
45. See WAAL, supra note 43.
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THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR APPROACH
It is then with a certain relief that we turn, or return, to the theoreti-
cal approach to animal entitlements that has led the way, in the Western
tradition, since the end of the eighteenth century: the Utilitarian ap-
proach, pioneered by Utilitarianism's founder, Jeremy Bentham,46 and
best known from the important work of Peter Singer. I have discussed
the contributions and shortcomings of the Utilitarian approach to animals
in quite a few publications, so here I must be brief.4 7
Bentham famously held that the salient ethical facts, and indeed the
only salient ethical facts, are pleasure and pain.48 He strongly insisted
that pleasures and pains do not vary along any qualitative dimension, but
only along several dimensions of quantity (of which duration and intensi-
ty are the most important).4 9 The goal of each individual sentient being
is, and ought to be,50 the maximization of net pleasure. The goal of a
rational society ought to be the maximization of net pleasure for all of
society's members.
It is at this point that Bentham points out that given the salience of
pleasure and pain, there is no good reason to exclude animals from the
Utilitarian calculus. "The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can
they talk? But, Can they suffer?"5 I Bentham was keenly aware of animal
suffering, and developed strong arguments against hunting and fishing
for sport, as well as other cruel practices.52 Peter Singer follows Ben-
tham's line.53
What is undoubtedly valuable about the Benthamite approach is its
emphasis on the terrible cruelty of human behavior to animals and the
suffering it inflicts. Pointing to the commonality between humans and
animals in respect of suffering, moreover, is to point to something clearly
46. See generally Jadran Lee, Bentham on the Moral and Legal Status of Animals (June 2002)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with ProQuest Information and
Learning Company, Ann Arbor, MI).
47. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) (critiquing WISE, supra note 6); FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 29,
at 325-407; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANIMAL ETHICS 228 (Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey eds., 2011) (reject-
ing the classical utilitarian approach to the ethics of animal treatment and proposes a theoretical
approach); Martha C. Nussbaum & Rachel Nussbaum Wichert, The Legal Status of Whales and
Dolphins (forthcoming 2017).
48. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
49. See generally id.
50. Bentham notoriously leaves the move from "is" to "ought" undefended.
51. BENTHAM, supra note 48 (emphasis in original).
52. See generally Lee, supra note 46. Much of Bentham's work remains unpublished in an
archive at University College, London, and is gradually being published; Lee was able to study some
of the unpublished and also all of the recently published material.
53. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975) (arguing the interest of animals
should be considered because of their ability to experience suffering).
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relevant to animals themselves, and a salient fact about their lives.
Chimpanzees can learn language but do not care much about it. All ani-
mals flee pain and give evidence of strong aversion to it.
Moreover, now that more of Bentham's work is becoming available,
we are able to see that Bentham was undertaking what Steve Wise defi-
nitely does not undertake, and what I suggested we must undertake: a
radical assault on the human-animal divide in Christian ethics and its
ranking of lives and abilities, its puritanism about bodily pleasure, its
relative indifference to bodily pain. Especially in the radical work Not
Paul But Jesus, published in full only in 2013,54 Bentham's insistence
that pleasures differ only in quantity can be seen clearly as a radical as-
sault on Victorian ideas of "higher" and "lower" pleasures, aimed at es-
tablishing the value of nonmarital and unconventional sexual relations
and at decriminalizing homosexual sex. So Bentham is not being obtuse
when he says all pleasures are one, he is being radical, and his radicalism
leads him to an embrace of the body that offers a good basis for a re-
stored attitude toward animals.
Still, there remain very serious problems with the Benthamite ap-
proach. The first and most obvious is its account of the social goal: the
maximization of net pleasure. Bentham tells us little about how we
should aggregate pleasures across creatures, and little about how quanti-
ties would be assigned to pleasure and pain. But on any plausible reading
the calculus produces an aggregate figure, whether a total or an average,
and it has no account of the permissible floor. Bentham was averse to the
idea of rights, and that means that he offers us no account of the bare
minimum beneath which a creature should not be permitted to fall. Eve-
rything depends on uncertain empirical calculations. On the average con-
ception, according to which we are supposed to maximize average utility
understood as net pleasure, egregious harms to animals will still be al-
lowed by the view, so long as we can show that these harms raise the
average pleasure in the world, and no pleasures are disqualified-not, for
example, by the fact that they are malicious or sadistic. It is far from
clear that the calculus gives us reasons to stop humans from inflicting
torment on animals, since humans greatly enjoy those bad practices. The
argument that this torment is unjustified rests on a fragile and uncertain
empirical calculation. On the total conception, according to which we are
supposed to maximize total utility, things are even more problematic: for
we can add to the world's total by deliberately bringing into the world
creatures, of whatever species, whose lives are extremely miserable, just
so long as the lives exhibit a slim net balance of pleasure over pain.
Meat-eating practices do result in the deliberate creation of millions of
54. JEREMY BENTHAM, NOT PAUL, BUT JESUS (London 1823); see also Martha C. Nussbaum,
Love from the Point of View of the Universe: Walt Whitman and the Utilitarian Imagination, in
POWER, PROSE, AND PURSE (Alison LaCroix, Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds.) (forth-
coming) (under review at Oxford Univ. Press).
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animals who would never have existed otherwise, and this could end up
looking like a good thing under Utilitarianism, depending on how we
measure pleasures and pains in those lives. In general, Benthamism sup-
plies no account of urgent entitlements grounded in justice, and we badly
need such an account to make sense of the human-animal relationship.
A second problem lies in Bentham's insistence in reducing quality
to quantity. We get a very narrow account of what is important in animal
(including human animal) lives: just pleasure and the avoidance of pain,
and recall that Bentham insists that all pleasure is qualitatively similar.
Thus there is no room for the special value of free movement, of com-
panionship and relationships with other members of one's kind, of senso-
ry stimulation, of a pleasing and suitable habitat. In this failing Bentham-
ism converges with Wise's approach: both refuse to consider fully, and
positively value, the many complex forms of life that animals actually
lead. Pleasure and pain simply are not the only relevant issues when
evaluating an animal's chances to flourish.
This problem would be less grave if deprivation of some aspect of
its natural form of life always produced a commensurate pain. Then Ben-
tham might be able to get to the correct conclusion, albeit by a defective
route. It has long been argued that his is not the case for human beings:
the familiar economic concept of "adaptive preferences" refers to the fact
that humans who are deprived in some area often tailor their preferences
and satisfactions to the reduced way of life they have known,55 probably
in order to avoid pointless longing and striving. Thus women who are
brought up thinking that a "good woman" does not get a university edu-
cation or participate in politics will very likely not feel pain at her exclu-
sion from these things.56 It takes a consciousness raising movement to
get her to see what she is missing and why it could be important for
her.57 Unfortunately the same is very likely true for many animals. An
animal raised in captivity cannot form an imaginative conception of a
wild habitat, and thus cannot yearn or long for it. Nor can an animal cut
off from characteristic social interactions with other members of its kind
imagine what those interactions are like, or grieve for their absence. Iron-
ically, then, if humans do only a little depriving the animal may be able
to feel pain about it, and that pain will register in the Utilitarian calculus;
but if humans deprive the animal in deeper and more fundamental ways,
they may not even get to the point of missing what they don't know, and
that pain will not register in the Utilitarian calculus.
55. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ch. 2, Passion (2000).
56. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000)




Finally, Bentham seems to think of pleasure as a feeling.58 That
feeling is typically produced by an activity: the pleasure of eating is pro-
duced by eating, the pleasures of friendship by friendship. But of course
it might be produced in some other way. Philosopher Robert Nozick
imagines an "experience machine": hooked up to that machine you
would have the impression that you were eating, talking to your friends,
and so forth, and you would have the enjoyment related to those pur-
suits-but without doing anything at all. 5 9 Nozick bets that most people
would reject the experience machine, since being the author of their own
actions is important to them, not just the experiences they have.60 Surely
the same is true of animals, and Wise is correct to emphasize the im-
portance of agency. He just defines it too narrowly: most animals like
doing things; being the author of their actions matters to them. The Utili-
tarian approach has a hard time accounting for this.61
Utilitarianism, then, has great advantages but also great problems.
RESPECTING THE DIVERSITY OF ANIMAL LIVES
Both of the approaches I have considered have a common problem:
they reduce the complexity of animal species into an unhelpful simplici-
ty. Wise levels up: reason is the thing, and look how many creatures have
it. Singer and the other Utilitarians level down: pain is the thing, and all
creatures have it and have it alike. What we need is the complexity of
reality: an approach that looks at the whole of animal nature without a
single linear ranking, one that focuses on our evil doing when we cause
pain, but also on the complicated capacities of animals for many types of
fascinating activity, the need of all animals for full and flourishing lives.
The Capabilities Approach (hereafter CA) was developed initially
with only the human case in mind.62 But it was developed using materials
drawn from Aristotle, who advocated that we seek what is shared among
all animals and seek a "common explanation" for the self-maintaining
and self-reproducing striving that characterizes all animal lives.63 So it is
not surprising that it proved easy to extend it to the lives of animals.6 4
The CA argues that the right thing to focus on, when asking how well a
group of humans (or a nation) is doing, is to look not at average utility,
and not simply at opulence (GDP per capita), but, rather, at what people
58. Not all agree: the Western philosophical tradition includes thinkers who see pleasure as an
activity (Epicurus, Aristotle), and others who think that pleasure is closely linked to activity, "super-
vening" on activity (Aristotle again, since Aristotle has two different views).
59. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
60. Id.
61. Of course one might invent a special pleasure and call it the pleasure of agency, but unless
this pleasure is understood to be qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different from other pleasures,
it will be difficult to capture the intuition contained in the example.
62. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 17-18 (2011) [hereinafter CREATING CAPABILITIES].
63. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTUANIMALIUM (1978).
64. See CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 62, at 18.
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are actually able to do and to be.65 The best approach focuses on people's
substantial freedoms to choose things that they value.66 The right ques-
tion to ask is, "What are you able to do and be, in areas of importance in
your life," and the answer to that question is the account of that person's
"capabilities."6 7 I have distinguished three different types of capabilities.
First, there are basic capabilities, the innate equipment that is the basis
for further development.68 Second are internal capabilities, abilities of a
person developed through care and nurture. Developing internal capabili-
ties already requires social resources.6 9 But a person might have these
inside, so to speak, and still not be fully capable of choice and action.
Such a person might, for example, be capable of political speech but de-
nied the chance to act politically. So, the really important type of capabil-
ity for a decent society is what I call combined capabilities, internal
capabilities plus external conditions that make choice available.7 0
Thus far, capabilities specify a space of comparison, and that is the
main use of the approach in Amartya Sen's work, as in the Human De-
velopment Reports of the United Nations Development Programme of
which he was a leading architect.71 But in keeping with my interest in
theories of justice and in constitution-making, I have gone further, using
the idea of capabilities to describe a partial approach to basic justice.72
For that purpose, of course, we must get definite about content-as users
of the approach comparatively do already in their choice of examples. I
have proposed a list of ten capabilities that must be secured up to a min-
imum threshold level, if a nation is to have any claim to justice:
The Central Human Capabilities
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal
length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to
be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including repro-
ductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domes-
tic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for
choice in matters of reproduction.
65. See id at 18-19.
66. Id. at 18.
67. See id at 18, 20.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. (characterizing the combined capabilities approach briefly). The same list of Central
Capabilities appears in all my publications dealing with the approach.
71. See id at 17.
72. See id. at 19-20.
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4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses,
to imagine, think, and reason -- and to do these things in a "truly hu-
man" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education,
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathemati-
cal and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought
in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of
one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able
to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of ex-
pression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and free-
dom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences
and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at
their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing,
gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional develop-
ment blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means
supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be cru-
cial in their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good
and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life.
(This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious ob-
servance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms
of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that consti-
tute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the
freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; be-
ing able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to
that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, na-
tional origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one's Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political
choices that govern one's life; having the right of political partici-
pation, protections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others;
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having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others;
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason
and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition
with other workers.
73
This list, humble and revisable, is an abstract template that can be
further specified in accordance with a particular nation's history and ma-
terial circumstances.7 4
Now let us turn to animals. As you can see, number 8 on the list al-
ready includes relationships with other species and the world of nature as
a central political good. But that is certainly not enough. I have also
urged adopting a similar list of capabilities as ethical goals for all ani-
mals.75 In the human case, I justify the list by arguing that these opportu-
nities are inherent in the notion of a life worthy of human dignity.76 I
then argue that dignity belongs to other animals as well: all are worthy of
lives commensurate with the many types of dignity inherent in their
many forms of life. 7 7 All animals, in short, should have a shot at flourish-
ing in their own way.
In some concrete ways the human list is a bad fit: freedom of the
press and employment opportunities have a place in human lives that
they do not have in other animal lives. But if we simply focus on the
large general categories, the list seems to be a good guide, which can
then be specified further for each animal after a study of its form of life.
If the human list is a template for constitution-making, so too is the list
for each animal species: a written basis for an unwritten constitution for
that species. It tells us the right things to look for, the right questions to
ask.
Very generally, all animals deserve ethical consideration, meaning
ethically informed concern for the types of lives they are trying to lead.
The list directs our attention to a host of pertinent factors. What life span
is normal for that species in the wild? What is the physical condition of a
healthy animal? What human acts invade or impair the bodily integrity of
that sort of animal? What types of movement from place to place are
normal and pleasurable for that sort of animal? What types of sensory
and imaginative stimulation does this animal seek, and what is it to keep
that animal in an unacceptably deficient sensory environment? What is it
for that sort of animal to live in crippling and intolerable fear or depres-
sion, or with a lack of bonds of concern? What types of affiliations does
this animal seek in the wild, what sorts of groups, both reproductive and
73. Id. at 33-34.
74. See id. at 36.
75. See id at 158.
76. See id at 36.
77. See id at 161.
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social, does it form? What types of communication does the animal en-
gage in, using what sensory modalities? What is it for the animal to be
humiliated and not respected? What is it for this animal to play and enjoy
itself? Does the animal have meaningful relationships with other species
and the world of nature? What types of objects does this animal use and
need to control if it is to live its life?
Capability number 6, practical reason, pertains more to some ani-
mals than to others, in that some engage in more complicated strategies
and plans. Perhaps that is what Wise means by autonomy.78 But all ani-
mals direct their own course by their own powers of thought, whatever
those are. Again, political participation seems not pertinent to non-
human animals, but of course it is pertinent for them, just as for us: it is
through politics that the conditions of life are agreed to, and someone
who has no political standing has no voice in choices that govern his or
her life. So too for animals: if they have no legal standing and no legal
status that guarantees ethical consideration, then they have no voice in
what happens to them. As Wise notes, beings and groups that cannot
literally speak have been granted legal standing: humans with profound
cognitive disabilities, young children, and corporations.7 9 So it is clear
that political participation can pertain to a creature even when its exer-
cise of that capability must take place through forms of advocacy or sur-
rogacy.
Each creature, then, deserves ethical consideration for what it is,
and a kind of constitution that specifies what harms it should not be per-
mitted to suffer-not in terms of its likeness to humans or its possession
of some least-common-denominator property, but in terms of what it is
itself, the form of life it leads.
What does this mean for law? One example may help carry our dis-
cussion further. For there is a happy harbinger of what may be a new era
in law, in the form of a remarkable 2016 opinion by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker,8 0 Ninth Circuit ruled that the U. S. Na-
vy violated the law in seeking to continue a sonar program that impacted
the behavior of whales. 8 To some extent he opinion is a technical exer-
cise in statutory interpretation of the Marine Mammals Protection Act:
the court says that the fact that a program has "negligible impact" on
Marine Mammals does not exempt it from a separate statutory require-
ment, namely that it establish means of "effecting the least practicable
adverse impact on" marine mammal species.8 2 What is significant, and
78. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
79. Id.
80. 828 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
81. See id. at 1142; see generally JOSHUA HORWITZ, WAR OF THE WHALES: A TRUE STORY
(2015) (describing the sonar program in detail).
82. Pritzker, 828 F.3d at 1142.
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fascinating, is that the argument relies heavily on a consideration of
whale capabilities that the program disrupts:
Effects from exposures below 180 dB can cause short-term disrup-
tion of abandonment of natural behavior patterns. These behavioral
disruptions can cause affected marine mammals to stop communi-
cating with each other, to flee or avoid an ensonified area, to cease
foraging for food, to separate from their calves, and to interrupt mat-
ing. LFA sonar can also cause heightened stress responses from ma-
rine mammals, Such behavioral disruptions can force marine mam-
mals to make trade-offs like delaying migration, delaying reproduc-
tion, reducing growth, or migrating with reduced energy reserves.83
The opinion does not give whales standing; no such radical move is
necessary to reach the clear result that the program is unacceptable. But
it does recognize whales as beings with a complex and active form of life
that includes emotional well-being, affiliation, and free movement: in
short, a variety of species-specific forms of agency.84 The opinion goes
well beyond Bentham, and it also eschews the anthropocentric approach.
It is a harbinger, it is to be hoped, of a new era in the law of animal wel-
fare.




DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION V. BROHL: STRANDED ON
A PRECEDENTIAL ISLAND
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION. .................................... ........... 627
I. BACKGROUND .............................................. 629
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence ...................... 629
B. Colorado Sales and Use Taxes ....................... 630
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Taxation ........... 630
D. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota................................. 631
E. Removing Precedent ........................ ...... 632
1. Judicial Overruling ....................... ...... 633
2. Legislative Overruling ........................... 634
F. Narrowing Precedent ........................ ..... 635
II. DIRECT AfARKETING ASSOCIATION V. BROHL ........... ...... 636
A. Facts and Procedural History. .................. ....... 636
B. Opinion of the Court ........................ ...... 638
1. Distinguishing Quill ................. ............. 638
2. DMA's Claims .......................... 639
a. Impermissible Discrimination .................... 639
b. Undue Burden ........................ ...... 640
3. Conclusion. ............................. ....... 641
C. Concurring Opinion .............................. 641
IHl. ANALYSIS ........................................... ..... 644
A. The Formation of Quill's Precedential Island .. ............. 644
1. Quill Should Be Overruled. ................ ........ 644
2. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Judicially ............... 645
3. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Legislatively ...... ....... 646
4. The Island of Quill is Formed ................. ..... 647
B. The Rise ofPrecedential Islands.. .................... 647
CONCLUSION ..................................................... 649
INTRODUCTION
Precedence is the guiding principle of American jurisprudence.' It is
the foundational element of common law.2 This adherence to past deci-
sions, eloquently titled stare decisis, "promotes the evenhanded, predict-
able, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
1. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)
("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.") (italics in origi-
nal).
2. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 367 (1988)
("[R]eliance on precedent is one of the distinctive features of the American judicial system.").
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judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process."3 However, stare decisis is not without its downfalls,
particularly its inherent inflexibility. Inflexible adherence to outdated
precedent can cause unjust outcomes, and there are limited ways to re-
move a precedent once it is in place-either the Supreme Court can over-
rule itself;4 the legislature can write legislation nullifying the precedent;
or, in constitutional cases, the Constitution can be amended.6
Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl involves the application of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to Colorado's efforts to improve
use tax collection on sales by out-of-state retailers.8 While taxation under
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a unique issue, this case re-
veals a more systemic issue. Using the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Direct
Marketing Association, this Case Comment will argue that increasingly
rapid change and a failure of the legislative check may begin to hinder
the effectiveness of stare decisis. By chipping away at precedent that it
cannot overturn, courts create a sea of "precedential islands," 9 or cases
that are binding only on their exact factual scenarios. If more and more
precedential islands arise, judicial decisions may become less predictable
and consistent, thus decreasing judicial efficiency and increasing the
number of possible traps for future courts and legal professionals to fall
into.
Part I of this Comment gives a brief background of the underlying
legal issue in this case-the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and its
applicability to taxation-as well as an overview of how precedent is
removed in our system of government. Next, Part II summarizes the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Direct Marketing Association. Finally,
Part III utilizes the Tenth Circuit's distinction between Quill Corp. v.
North Dakotao and Direct Marketing Association as an example of how
a precedential island forms and discusses why these islands may increase
in number and the possible implications of their proliferation: namely,
the weakening of stare decisis.
3. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477 (1854), overruled by Exxon Corp. v. Cent.
Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, (1991).
5. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
6. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
7. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV), 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
8. Id. at 1132.
9. Id. at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
10. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Direct Marketing Association's (DMA) claim before the Tenth Cir-
cuit is rooted in the dormant Commerce Clause, specifically in its ap-
plicability to state taxation." The dormant Commerce Clause is not writ-
ten into the Constitution, but derives from the Commerce Clause itself.12
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the ultimate power to regulate
interstate commerce; even though state and local governments can pass
legislation regulating commerce, those governments can do nothing to
stop Congress from preempting that legislation if it so chooses." The
notion of commerce, as well as commerce itself, has grown dramatically
since the Constitution's drafting, prompting the judicial creation of the
dormant (or negative) Commerce Clause doctrine in the early 1800s. 14
The doctrine arises from the idea that a grant of interstate commerce
power to Congress implies a restriction of interstate commerce power on
the states.'5 Therefore, if a state enacts a law or regulation that discrimi-
nates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce, the judiciary will
use the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate the action.'6
"The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit
state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism,
laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Con-
stitution was designed to prevent."7
When applying a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the focus is
on "whether a state law improperly interferes with interstate com-
merce."" There are two ways a state law can interfere with interstate
commerce: (1) by discriminating against interstate commerce or (2) by
unduly burdening interstate commerce.19 A state law that discriminates
must pass the strictest scrutiny, only surviving if the state can show that
the law "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."20 A state law that
burdens interstate commerce will only be invalidated if the burden im-
posed on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the local benefits of the
law .21
11. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
12. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455-56 (4th ed. 2013).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1135.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1136.
17. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
18. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1135.
19. Id. at 1136.





B. Colorado Sales and Use Taxes
Colorado has utilized sales and use taxes as a means of generating
revenue since the mid-1930s.22 Colorado residents are required to pay
either sales tax or use tax on their purchases, but not both.23 "A sales tax
is imposed on retail transactions or purchases that occur within [Colora-
do] .,,24 The Colorado Department of Revenue requires in-state retailers to
25calculate, collect, and remit sales tax. Consequently, Coloradans are
accustomed to paying sales tax-the state has a 98.3% sales tax compli-
ance rate.26
Use tax, however, is slightly different. "A 'use' tax, sometimes re-
ferred to as a 'compensating' tax, taxes the privilege of using, storing, or
otherwise consuming tangible personal property or services, usually at a
rate equivalent to the sales tax."27 "A use tax is designed to protect a
state's revenues by taking away the advantages to residents of traveling
out of state to make untaxed purchases and to protect local merchants
from out-of-state competition which, because of its lower or nonexistent
tax burdens, can offer lower prices.,2 8 For example, a Colorado resident
purchasing a $2,000 computer in Delaware, which has no sales tax,
would save himself approximately $175 in sales tax. However, the way
the tax system is set up, he would owe an equivalent use tax to the Colo-
rado Department of Revenue. Generally, the requirement of calculating
and remitting these use taxes falls to the purchaser.29 The combination of
these two taxes is meant to create a steady stream of revenue from all
purchases made by Colorado residents, regardless of where the purchase
occurred.30 Nevertheless, even though they are legally required to do so,
most Coloradans do not pay their use taxes3 -the state has a 4% use tax
compliance rate.32
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Taxation
Over the past fifty years, jurisprudence specific to taxation under
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has developed.33 The Court ar-
22. Id. at 1132.
23. Id.
24. 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1 (2017).
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-26-101 to -129 (2016) (codification ofColorado's sales tax
collection and remittance scheme).
26. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132 n.1L
27. Sales and Use Taxes, supra note 24, § 134.
28. Id.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-204(l)(a). There are a few instances when the collection of use
tax falls to the retailer, but they are the exception. Id § 39-26-204(2). Additionally, the use tax on
items that the state requires to be registered, such as cars, is usually paid at the time of registration.
See id. § 39-26-113.
30. See Sales and Use Taxes, supra note 24, § 134.
31. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
32. Id. at 1132 n.1.
33. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1967); see also
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
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ticulated a framework in 1977,34 holding that a tax on an out-of-state
entity will be upheld if it "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the State."3 5 The "substantial nexus" requirement is
minimal "and is established if the taxed entity 'avails itself of the sub-
stantial privilege of carrying on business within the State,' but the Court
has held that an entity lacking a physical presence within a state but
mailing goods into it from outside is not connected to the state by such a
nexus."36
The "physical presence" requirement was expressed in 1967, prior
to the establishment of the modem framework. The Supreme Court, in
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,37 addressed wheth-
er Illinois could require a Delaware-based mail-order business with no
physical presence in Illinois to collect and remit use taxes on sales to
Illinois customers.38 The Court held that Illinois could not require Bellas
Hess to collect use tax, stating that Illinois may not "impose the duty of
use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with
customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail."
Although the Court did not reference Bellas Hess when first an-
nouncing the taxation framework in 1977,40 the Court has since specifi-
cally noted that it did not overrule its holding.41 Rather, "Bellas Hess
concerns the first of these tests and stands for the proposition that a ven-
dor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common
carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce Clause.A2
Bellas Hess's holding was integrated into the taxation framework as ap-
plied in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.4 3
D. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Twenty-five years after Bellas Hess, the Quill Court used the propo-
sition it established to create a bright-line rule.44 The facts of Quill are
the same as Bellas Hess: they "involv[ed] a State's attempt to require an
out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representa-
34. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
35. Id.
36. Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV. 255,
268-69 (2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
220 (1980) (internal quotations omitted))).
37. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
38. Id. at 754-56.
39. Id. at 758.
40. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 274, 279.
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1992).
42. Id. at 311.
43. Id
44. Id. at 317-18.
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tives in the State to collect and pay use tax on goods purchased for use
within the State.'-A
The Supreme Court of North Dakota "declined to follow Bellas
Hess because 'the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal
innovations' of the past quarter-century have rendered its holding 'obso-
lete.'"A6 While the Supreme Court "agree[d] with much of the state
court's reasoning," it declined to come to the same conclusion.4 7
The Court determined that "the continuing value of a bright-line
rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indi-
cate[d] that the Bellas Hess rule remain[ed] good law" and declined to
overturn Bellas Hess.48 The conviction in the Court's holding is belied by
the opinion's conclusion, in which the Court stated: "[O]ur decision is
made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress
has the ultimate power to resolve.A9
Quill was decided in 1992, the same year AOL was released for
Windows.50 At that time, Quill protected the relatively small mail-order
industry, which totaled only $180 billion. Throughout the next the twen-
ty-five years the Internet grew exponentially, and Quill's bright-line rule
now protects a $3.16 trillion industry and is causing "a serious, continu-
ing injustice" to the states.
E. Removing Precedent
When courts want to remove precedent, they have traditionally had
two options. Courts can either overrule their previous precedent or they
can call, implicitly or explicitly, for legislative intervention.52 Courts are
hesitant to overrule themselves; a high threshold must be passed in order
45. Id. at 301.
46. Id. (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 504
U.S. 298 (1992)).
47. Id. at 302.
48. Id. at 317 (italics in original).
49. Id. at 318.
50. David Lumb, A Brief History of AOL, FAST COMPANY (May 12, 2015, 1:15 PM),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3046194/fast-feed/a-brief-history-of-aol.
51. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n III), 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg's Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052900740.html; see also Richard L. Hansen, End of the
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 208
(2012); James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1092 (2001).
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for this to happen.53 In order for legislative intervention to be effective,
the country must have a functioning legislature.
1. Judicial Overruling
It is not easy to overrule past precedent. "The Court has said often
and with great emphasis that 'the doctrine of stare decisis is of funda-
mental importance to the rule of law."' 54 "[S]tare decisis is a basic self-
governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with
the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurispru-
dential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion."'55 It "en-
sures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society
to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in
the proclivities of individuals."56 Stare decisis promotes "clarity, stabil-
ity, and predictability in the law, efficiency, legitimacy, and fairness and
impartiality." 57 Courts have overruled prior decisions only "where the
necessity and propriety of doing so has been established."5 8 This practice
is rare, however, as "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis de-
mands special justification." 59 Since its inception in 1789 until 2010, the
Supreme Court has explicitly overruled prior decisions 236 times, or
60
approximately one per year.
"The overruling of a precedent, despite its infrequen-
cy ... represents a dramatic form of legal change."6 I The Court, there-
fore, addresses myriad informal factors when determining if a precedent
should be overruled.6 2 One factor that weighs heavily is the type of inter-
pretation at play: constitutional or statutory.63 As Justice Scalia stated,
"[the Court has] long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has
special force where Congress remains free to alter what we have done."64
"Th[is] idea has long been advanced .. . because Congress has the power
to pass new legislation correcting any statutory decision by the Court that
Congress deems erroneous."65 "The traditional justification for this in-
formal rule is that Congress can alter an incorrectly interpreted statute by
amending it. Revisions of a constitutional decision, however, generally
53. See generally Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("We have held that any departure from the doctrine of stare deci-
sis demands special justification.").
54. Patterson, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 438 U.S. 468, 494 (1978)).
55. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
56. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
57. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1092 (internal citations omitted).
58. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
59. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
60. S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 2601-15 (2016).
61. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1092.
62. See generally id.
63. See id. at 1103.
64. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1094.
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require a constitutional amendment, and thus for most practical purposes
only the Court can change a piece of constitutional doctrine."66 There-
fore, the Court has been more reluctant to overturn statutory precedent,
assuming instead that "if the legislature does not alter the Court's inter-
pretation of a statute, and thus silently acquiesces to it, this informal
norm asserts the precedent should not be overruled."67
Not only must a precedent meet the Court's discerning eye, it must
position itself before the Court to begin with. The only court that may
overrule Supreme Court precedent is the Supreme Court itself. There-
fore, in order to reevaluate a prior precedent, the Court must grant a peti-
tion for certiorari to a suitable case. Over the past thirty-five years, the
Court's docket has dropped by 56%, from a high of 167 opinions in 1981
to 74 opinions in 2015.68 While a small docket helps create some stability
in law, the sharp decline in the Court's docket increases the burden for
being heard.
2. Legislative Overruling
When the particularities of a case do not lend themselves to overrul-
ing past precedent, the Court has historically turned to the legislature to
intervene.69 Legislative intervention is one aspect of the separation of
powers doctrine, creating a legislative check on the judicial system.70
While Congress may not explicitly overturn Supreme Court opinions, it
can create legislation that effectively nullifies Supreme Court prece-
dent.7 1 "The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court relations
is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: Congress
writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has the
power to overrule the Court's interpretations."72
However, the number of laws enacted by Congress has seen a sig-
nificant downward trend since the early 1970s, falling from 772 in the
93rd Congress to 296 in the 113th Congress.7 3 In particular, the number
of overrides has fallen dramatically. Overrides have fallen "from an av-
erage of twelve overrides of Supreme Court cases in each two-year con-
gressional term during the 1975-1990 period, to an average of 5.8 over-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1094-95.
68. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based
Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 151-53 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) ("The ball is once again in Congress' court to correct the error into which this Court has fall-
en.").
70. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 518-21 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(effectively nullifying the Court's opinion in Ledbetter).
72. Hansen, supra note 52, at 208; see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
73. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTRACK (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics.
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rides for each term from 1991-2000, and to a mere 2.8 average number
of overrides for each term from 2001-2012."74
Legislative override is an important tool in our system of govern-
ment. For example, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,75 a gender pay discrimination case. The
Court held that, while Ms. Ledbetter had "demonstrated that her current
pay was discriminatorily low due to a long series of decisions reflecting
Goodyear's pervasive discrimination against women managers in general
and Ledbetter in particular," her claim was time-barred.76 Justice Gins-
burg's dissent, read from the bench,77 attacked the majority for their
"cramped interpretation of Title VII" and called for legislative interven-
tion, stating, "[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress' court."78
Two years later, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
clarifying the statute of limitations on gender pay discrimination claims
and making it easier for such claims to be brought.7 9 Through Congress,
the people spoke up and corrected the injustice they saw. This is exactly
how legislative overrides should work. As the rates of legislative over-
rides fall, "Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes are now very
likely to be final," and the people's voice within the government is likely
to become quieter.80
F. Narrowing Precedent
The Court's high threshold for both accepting a petition for certiora-
ri and overruling prior holdings, combined with a fast-paced world and
an increasingly divided Congress, has severely limited the judicial sys-
tem's ability to overturn precedent." When faced with precedent that
does not quite reach the exacting threshold required for overruling and a
Congress that is divided and deadlocked, courts lean toward a third op-
tion: distinguishing, rather than overruling, prior precedent.8 2 Distin-
guishing prior decisions narrows the impact of the prior precedent. As
cases become narrower and narrower, without any hope for congression-
al intervention, we may begin to see an increase in "precedential is-
74. Hansen, supra note 52, at 209. The rate of overrides likely fell even more dramatically
than the numbers indicate, as the 1991 term included the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a single law
which nullified ten Supreme Court cases.
75. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
76. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 659-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Barnes, supra note 52, at 1 ("The decision moved Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to read a
dissent from the bench, a usually rare practice that she has now employed twice in the past six weeks
to criticize the majority for opinions that she said undermine women's rights.").
78. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
80. Hansen, supra note 52, at 224.
81. See discussion infra Section IV.
82. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L.
REv. 1861, 1862-67 (2014).
2017] 635
DENVER LAW REVIEW
lands," or cases that are binding only on their exact factual scenario.8 3
When courts are faced with precedent they cannot overrule and do not
want to apply, they narrow the past precedent, chipping away at the cov-
erage of the precedent.84 As more and more courts chip away at the edges
of a precedent, it becomes less and less applicable to cases at bar.8 5 Even-
tually, the judicial system creates a precedential island: a precedent so
narrow that it covers only its specific factual scenario. In creating these
islands, it becomes more and more difficult to find a suitable case in
which the Supreme Court can reexamine the necessity and propriety of
keeping this precedential island on the books.86
II. DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIA TION V. BROHL
A. Facts and Procedural History
In an effort to address the low rate of use tax compliance,87 the Col-
orado legislature passed a law (the Colorado Law) imposing a notice
requirement on retailers that do not collect sales or use tax when selling
to Colorado purchasers.88 The Colorado Law went into effect on Febru-
ary 24, 2010.89
The Colorado Law imposes three obligations on non-collecting re-
tailers.90 The Colorado Law imposes three obligations on non-collecting
retailers, including providing notice informing customers of their use tax
obligations.91 Failure to provide notices as required by the Colorado Law
results in fines of five to ten dollars for each failure.92
83. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
see Re, supra note 82, at 1867.
84. See Re, supra note 82, at 1863.
85. For example, the Court's 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
upheld the executive order creating Japanese internment camps; however, as this factual scenario has
yet to arise again, this precedent is still on the books as good law. See Adam Liptak, A Discredited




87. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1132 n. 1(10th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Colorado
Department of Revenue estimates "the compliance rate of remote retail sales" from retailers not
required to collect taxes at 4%. In contrast, the sales tax compliance rate is 98.3%).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(11) (2017); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1:39-21-
112.3.5 (2017).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5).
90. 1 CCR § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5 (explaining that a non-collecting retailer is defined as a
"retailer that sells goods to Colorado purchasers and that does not collect Colorado sales or use
tax").
91. Non-collecting retailers must: (1) "send a transactional notice to purchasers informing
them that they may be subject to Colorado's use tax"; (2) "send Colorado purchasers who buy goods
from the retailer totaling more than $500 an annual purchase summary with the dates, categories,
and amounts of purchases, reminding them of their obligation to pay use taxes on those purchases";
and (3) "send the Department [of Revenue] an annual customer information report listing their
customers' names, addresses, and total amounts spent." Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1133
(citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)).
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5).
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DMA is "a group of businesses and organizations that market prod-
ucts via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet."93
The members of DMA are non-collecting retailers and thus subject to the
Colorado Law.94 In 2010, DMA filed a suit against the Colorado De-
partment of Revenue (the Department) in federal district court, claiming
the Colorado Law discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate
commerce, thus violating the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine." The
federal district court granted DMA's motion for summary judgment and
enjoined the Department's enforcement of the Colorado Law.96 The De-
partment appealed to the Tenth Circuit.97
The Tenth Circuit held that the federal district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, per the Tax Injunction Act98 (TIA). 99 The TIA re-
moves the federal courts' jurisdiction in cases that would "enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of state taxes.100 The
Tenth Circuit remanded the case with orders to dismiss the claims and
dissolve the injunction.iot After the Tenth Circuit denied a request for en
banc review,102 the federal district court dismissed the claims 'without
prejudice and dissolved the injunction.'03 DMA brought two subsequent
actions-a new suit against the Department in state district court and a
petition for certiorari of the Tenth Circuit's decision.'04
While the state district court rejected DMA's claim that the Colora-
do Law unduly burdened interstate commerce, it issued a preliminary
injunction based on DMA's facial discrimination argument. o0 Four and a
half months later, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari review of
the Tenth Circuit's decision.10 6 The state district court subsequently
stayed its proceedings, pending a ruling by the Supreme Court.' 07
93. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1133-34.
96. Id. at 1134 (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber (Direct Mktg. Ass'n I), No. 10-cv-01546-
REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012), rev'd sub nom. Direct Mktg.
Ass'n v. Brohl, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015)).
97. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n II), 735 F.3d at 904, rev'd, 135 S. Ct.
1124 (2015).
98. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) ("[D]istrict courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.").
99. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
101. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
102. Id. (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 12-1175 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, No. 13CV34855, at 1, 22-23
(Dist. Ct. Colo. Feb. 18, 2014)).
106. Direct Mktg. Ass'n II, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2901
(2014).
107. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
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Approximately eight months later, the Supreme Court held that the
Colorado Law addressed reporting requirements not taxation and there-
fore did not fall within the TIA's definition of "assessment, levy, or col-
lection of any tax." 08 Thus, the suit was not barred from federal court by
the TIA. 109 The case was reversed and remanded to the Tenth Circuit for
further proceedings on the merits of DMA's dormant Commerce Clause
claims.no
B. Opinion of the Court
Judge Scott Matheson authored the opinion of the court.' Judge
Neil Gorsuch filed a separate concurring opinion.l 12 The Tenth Circuit
held that the Colorado Law neither discriminates against nor unduly bur-
dens interstate commerce.1 13 The court began by providing an overview
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.1 14 It then distinguished Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, determining that the bright-line rule Quill recog-
nized is limited to tax collection."'5 Finally, the court analyzed DMA's
claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, finding neither undue bur-
den nor discrimination.'6
After briefly reviewing the history of the dormant Commerce
Clause and its proper application, Judge Matheson expressly pointed out
that the decision reached in this case "need not be final." 17 Judge Mathe-
son explained that if the Colorado Law is upheld, Congress may preempt
it with its own law; however, if the Colorado Law is struck down, Con-
gress may expressly authorize it with its own law."'8 "In that sense, the
judicial decision determines which party would need to go to Congress to
seek a different result." 1 9
1. Distinguishing Quill
As Judge Matheson succinctly stated, "The outcome of this case
turns largely on the scope of Quill." 20 Judge Matheson referenced the
numerous criticisms of Quill's bright-line "physical presence" rule, in-
cluding Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the opinion that remanded this
case.121 Justice Kennedy called Quill "a holding now inflicting extreme
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1131 (2015).
109. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1132, 33.
110. Id. at 1134.
111. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1129.
112. Id. at 1147.
113. Id. at 1134.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1147.




121. Id. at 1137.
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harm and unfairness on the States."12 2 Judge Matheson expressly pointed
out that, while never overruled, Quill has never been extended "beyond
the realm of sales and use tax," and declined to do so in this case.123
DMA argued that Quill has been cited outside the context of sales
and use tax in three separate Supreme Court opinions.124 However, Judge
Matheson quickly rejected this argument, as "these opinions merely de-
scribe points of law in Quill and do not actually extend its holding to
other contexts."1 25 He additionally cited to a Tenth Circuit case in which
the court declined to apply the Quill rule to licensing and registration
requirements imposed on out-of-state entities.126 Judge Matheson con-
cluded that Quill's bright-line rule "applies narrowly to and has not been
extended beyond tax collection" and therefore was inapposite in this
127case.
2. DMA's Claims
The lower court's opinion granted summary judgment to DMA on
their argument that the Colorado Law impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce and their argument that the Colorado Law
unduly burdens interstate commerce.128 Judge Matheson addressed each
in turn.
a. Impermissible Discrimination
The district court determined that he Colorado Law was discrimi-
natory because "the combination of state law[ 129] and Quill guarantees
that [the Colorado Law] applies only to out-of-state retailers."130 After
finding discrimination, the district court "subjected the law to strict scru-
tiny."13' "The court concluded the Department failed to carry its burden
on the discrimination analysis and granted summary judgment to DMA"
based on that conclusion.'32
Judge Matheson reviewed the district court's opinion de novo. First,
Judge Matheson determined that he Colorado Law does not facially dis-
criminate because the law's differential treatment is based on whether a
retailer collects sales or use tax, not whether the retailer is out-of-state. 133
Because facial discrimination is not the only manner in which a law can
122. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1137.
124. Id. at 1138.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing American Target Advert., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000)).
127. Id. at 1139.
128. Id.
129. Colorado law requires that all retailers doing business in Colorado and selling to Colorado
purchasers collect and remit sales tax. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 39-26-101 to -129 (2016).
130. Direct MAktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1140.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1141-42.
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discriminate against interstate commerce, Judge Matheson went on to
address "the direct effect of the Colorado Law."1 3 4
Turning to the direct effect of the law, Judge Matheson rejected
DMA's argument of discriminatory treatment.1 35 He first rejected
DMA's argument that Quill applies, as "Quill applies only to the collec-
tion of sales and use taxes, and the Colorado Law does not require the
collection or remittances of sales and use taxes."1 3 6 Then he rejected
DMA's claim outright, reiterating that the Colorado Law is only discrim-
inatory if it constitutes "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter and
thereby alters the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-state"
businesses. 137 The tax collection requirement on in-state retailers creates
a hefty burden. DMA did not establish that this burden was out-
weighed by the reporting requirement of the Colorado Law and, thus, the
Colorado Law has no discriminatory effect.' 39
b. Undue Burden
Even nondiscriminatory laws must not unduly burden interstate
commerce.140 When turning to the undue burden analysis, Judge Mathe-
son noted that the district court decided the issue of undue burden under
Quill's "physical presence" rule, and DMA limited its argument similar-
ly.14 1 The district court found an undue burden, "concluding that the bur-
dens imposed by the Act and the Regulations are inextricably related in
kind and purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill." 42
However, as Judge Matheson once again pointed out, "Quill is not
binding in light of the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit decisions con-
struing it narrowly to apply only to the duty to collect and remit taxes."43
After pointing out that Quill is not controlling five more times, Judge
Matheson stated that "[b]ecause the Colorado Law's notice and reporting
requirements are regulatory and are not subject to the bright-line rule of
Quill, this ends the undue burden inquiry." 44
134. Id. at 1142.
135. Before analyzing the direct effect, Judge Matheson rejects DMA's argument that non-
adverse differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state entities violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause and its argument that the Colorado Law should be viewed in isolation. Id at 1142-44.
136. Id. at 1144.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1145.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1146.
142. Id
143. Id. at 1146-47.
144. Id. at 1147.
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3. Conclusion
The majority found no dormant Commerce Clause violation and re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment, remanding for
further proceedings consistent with its decision.145 The Tenth Circuit
concluded "by noting the Supreme Court's observation in Quill that
Congress holds the 'ultimate power' and is 'better qualified to resolve'
the issue of 'whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden
interstate retailers with a duty to collect sales and use tax[]."'l
46
C. Concurring Opinion
Judge Gorsuch wrote a separate concurring opinion "only to
acknowledge a few additional points that ha[d] influenced [his] thinking
in this case." 4 7 He acknowledged that which has thus far only been hint-
ed at: "At the center of this appeal is a claim about the power of prece-
dent."l148
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine "might be said to be an ar-
tifact of judicial precedent," and it is on the precedential power one of
"the most contentious of all dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause cases" that
the instant case rests. 149 Quill has been criticized for many years, by
scholars as well as Supreme Court justices.50 However, as Judge Gor-
such reminded, "Quill remains on the books and [the court] is duty-
bound to follow it."' 5 ' Regardless of the Court's confidence (or lack
thereof) in the decision itself, it is a Supreme Court decision that the
Court may never overrule.152
After determining that Quill must be followed, Judge Gorsuch pon-
dered "what exactly Quill requires of us."1 53 There have been numerous
interpretations of Quill, but "[m]ost narrowly, everyone agrees that
Quill's holding forbids states from imposing sales and use tax collection
duties on firms that lack a physical presence in-state." 54 The reporting
requirement imposed by the Colorado Law "doesn't go quite that far." 55
Colorado even "suggests that its statutory scheme carefully and con-
sciously stops (just) short of what Quill's holding forbids."'5 6
Judge Gorsuch went one step further and stated that he court's "ob-



























but also to afford careful consideration to the reasoning (the 'ratio de-
cidendi') on which it rests."l5 7 Judge Gorsuch emphasized that this con-
sideration is particularly important when the prior decision "emanates
from the Supreme Court."15 8 It is the consideration of the court's reason-
ing, Judge Gorsuch explained, on which DMA's argument rests.'5 9 Judge
Gorsuch summarized DMA's argument: the burdens imposed by the
Colorado Law are "burdens comparable in their severity to those associ-
ated with collecting the underlying taxes themselves."l6 0 Judge Gorsuch
disagreed with this analysis.161
When looking at the reasoning on which Quill rests, Judge Gorsuch
clarified, it has very little to do with the burden of "laws commanding
out-of-state firms to collect sales and use taxes." 62 Judge Gorsuch de-
clared that "[I]t is instead and itself all about the respect due precedent,
about the doctrine of stare decisis and the respect due a still earlier deci-
sion."l63 He concluded that it is "this distinction [that] proves decisive"
in this case.'64
In Quill, the Court decided to retain the physical presence rule es-
tablished in Bellas Hess, "but did so only to protect the reliance interests
that had grown up around it."' 65 Judge Gorsuch stated that the Quill court
went so far as the "expressly acknowledge[] that Bellas Hess very well
might have been decided differently under contemporary Commerce
Clause jurisprudence .... "166 He pointed out that "The Court also ex-
pressly acknowledged that states can constitutionally impose tax and
regulatory burdens on out-of-state firms that are more or less comparable
to sale and use tax collection duties."' 67 Judge Gorsuch determined that,
as the Quill court called the distinction between regulatory burdens and
collection burdens "artificial and formulistic," this court is "under no
obligation to extend [Bellas Hess] to comparable tax and regulatory obli-
gations."'68 He also pointed out the numerous lower courts that have held
that Quill does not apply to regulatory duties.'6 9
Judge Gorsuch went on to discuss another precedent that has "suf-
fer[ed] as highly a distinguished fate," 7 0 returning to 1922, when "the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1148-49 ("Indeed, our court has said that it will usually defer even to the dicta (not
just the ratio) found in Supreme Court decisions.").










169. Id. at 1149-50.
170. Id. at 1150.
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Supreme Court held baseball effectively immune from federal antitrust
laws and did so reasoning that the 'exhibition[] of base ball' by profes-
sional teams crossing state lines 'didn't involve commerce among the
States." '17 As Judge Gorsuch explains, even "though it has long since
rejected the reasoning of [the case], the Supreme Court has still chosen to
retain the holding itself." 17 2 It has done so "only out of respect for the
reliance interests" that have risen up around the holding.173 "And, of
course, Congress has since codified baseball's special exemption."7 4
As Judge Gorsuch determined that Quill does not require the nulli-
fying of the Colorado Law, he looked to "whether some other principle
in dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause doctrine might."75 DMA raised the
discrimination argument, "[b]ut any claim of discrimination is easily
rejected." 76 There is no evidence that the notice and reporting burdens
on out-of-state retailers "compare unfavorably to the administrative bur-
dens the state imposes on in-state" retailers.177 "If anything, by asking
[the court] to strike down Colorado's law, out-of-state mail order and
internet retailers don't seek comparable treatment to their in-state brick-
and-mortar rivals, they seek more favorable treatment, a competitive
advantage, a sort of judicially sponsored arbitrage opportunity. ...
Unfortunately, as Judge Gorsuch pointed out, it is actually this sort
of competitive advantage that Bellas Hess and Quill create.179 While the
"mainstream of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence . . . is all about
preventing discrimination between firms[,]" the jurisprudence stemming
from Bellas Hess "guarantees a competitive benefit to certain firms simp-
ly because of the organizational form they choose to assume."so And,
while it seems antithetical to conclude that Quill requires the court to
remove this benefit, Judge Gorsuch believed it to be "entirely consistent
with the demands of precedent."'8 '
"After all, by reinforcing an admittedly 'formalistic' and 'artificial'
distinction between sales and use tax collection obligations and other
comparable regulatory and tax duties, Quill invited states to impose
comparable duties."'82 Just as the Quill court upheld the Bellas Hess rule
to protect the reliance interests that had grown up around it, this court
171. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922)).
172. Id.
173. Id.






180. Id at 1150-51.




reaffirms the outer limits of Quill, protecting the reliance interests of
state legislatures such as Colorado's who are "find[ing] ways of achiev-
ing comparable results through different means."l83
Judge Gorsuch concluded by stating, "[W]hile some precedential is-
lands manage to survive indefinitely even when surrounded by a sea of
contrary law, a good many others disappear when reliance interests never
form around them or erode over time."1 84
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Formation of Quill's Precedential Island
1. Quill Should Be Overruled
Change in this country is occurring at an exponential rate and Quill
is a perfect example of this rapid movement. The rule from Quill came
out of a world that was drastically different from today's world. Mail-
order sales was a small industry in 1992, totaling only $180 billion."ss In
the time it took for Quill to be addressed again, the fledgling area it pro-
tected had evolved into a $3.16 trillion industry.186 Brick-and-mortar
stores have seen a steady decline in foot traffic every month for the last
forty-eight months and in monthly sales for the last thirty-six months.18 7
In a 2000 Pew Research Center survey, 22% -of Americans had made
online purchases; in a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, that percentage
had increased to 79%.188 "The Internet has caused far-reaching systemic
and structural changes in the economy, and, indeed, in many other socie-
tal dimensions. Although online businesses may not have a physical
presence in some States, the Web has, in many ways, brought the aver-
age American closer to most major retailers."
As Judge Gorsuch pointed out, "if it were ever thought that mail-
order retailers were small businesses meriting (constitutionalized, no
less) protection from behemoth brick-and-mortar enterprises, that
thought must have evaporated long ago."l90 He pointed to "today's e-
commerce retail leader, Amazon, [who] recorded nearly ninety billion
dollars in sales in 2014 while the vast majority of small businesses rec-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
187. Andria Chang, Holiday Sales Trends Heighten Brick-and-Mortar Woes, EMARKETER
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Holiday-Sales-Trends-Heighten-Brick-and-
Mortar-Woes/1014990.
188. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewintemet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-and-e-commerce.
189. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1135. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. Direct Aktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 n.1 (10th Cir.) (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring).
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orded no online sales at all." 91 The pendulum has swung fully in the
other direction. Far from ensuring out-of-state retailers do not bear an
undue burden, the protection afforded to out-of-state retailers by Quill's
holding now equates to a "tax shelter."'9 2
The rationale behind protecting out-of-state retailers is no longer
applicable. Indeed, by significantly reducing state tax revenue, the hold-
ing in Quill is not just out-of-date, but "a serious, continuing injustice
faced by Colorado and many other States."'93
2. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Judicially
While dormant Commerce Clause doctrine decisions appear to be
constitutional at first glance, they have significantly more in common
with statutory decisions. The rationale behind stare decisis's stronger
hold on statutory decisions arises from the ability of Congress to correct
any judicial interpretation it finds erroneous.194 This rationale applies just
as strongly to decisions under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Because the Constitution gives the power to regulate interstate
commerce to Congress, Congress has the ability to correct any judicial
interpretation under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.195 There-
fore, unlike other constitutional interpretations, Congress would not need
to invoke a two-thirds majority in Congress and garner support from
three-quarters of state legislatures to enact a constitutional amendment in
order to overrule the Court.'96 This view is further supported by looking
at Quill itself, which upheld Bellas Hess's dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine ruling, but overturned its Due Process Clause ruling.'97 In doing
so, the Court noted, "[W]hile Congress has plenary power to regulate
commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that
burden interstate commerce, . . . it does not similarly have the power to
authorize violations of the Due Process Clause."' Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine jurisprudence has many of its own idiosyncrasies; how-
ever, just as Congress can amend a statute it believes has been erroneous-
ly interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress can write a statute sanc-
tioning state legislation it believes the Supreme Court erroneously over-
turned. As such, decisions under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
are imbued with the same "special force" of stare decisis as statutory
decisions.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1150.
193. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Hansen, supra note 52, at 208.
195. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422-427 (1946).
196. U.S. Const. art. V.
197. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
198. Id. at 305.
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This "special force" of stare decisis alone makes it difficult to raise
Quill above the threshold required for overruling. This is where the speed
of change occurring in society throws a wrench into the system. Normal-
ly, the Court will wait for "the legal system [to] find an appropriate case
for th[e] Court to reexamine" the existing precedent.199 However, the
holding in Quill became outdated faster than the legal system could pro-
vide an opportunity for the Court to address it. The case was contentious
when it was heard, as evidenced by the eleven amicus curiae briefs filed
urging the Court to uphold Bellas Hess's rule, including DMA and the
eight amici curiae who filed briefs urging Bellas Hess's reversal, one of
whom was joined by twenty-six states' attorneys general. The Quill opin-
ion itself, while upholding Bellas Hess, expressly acknowledged "con-
temporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same
result were . . . [Bellas Hess] to arise for the first time today."200 Quill's
holding was out-of-date before its ink dried.
Because courts are loathe to apply a case in a way that comes to an
unjust outcome, the lower courts continue to narrow Quill.201 While this
may provide more just outcomes for the time being, as Quill becomes
narrower the number of cases that would be appropriate vehicles for the
Court to reconsider its overruling will diminish. With the minuscule rate
at which the Supreme Court grants certiorari review and the shrinking
number of appropriate cases, it is less and less likely that the opportunity
will arise for Quill to be judicially overturned.
3. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Legislatively
The Supreme Court called for congressional intervention in Quill's
majority opinion, stating "that the underlying issue is not only one that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress
has the ultimate power to resolve."202 "In this situation, it may be that the
better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the
other branches of government."203 The following congressional session
204enacted 610 laws. None addressed Quill.
The Tenth Circuit called for Congress to legislate over Quill in the
instant case, quoting the majority's plea in Quill. 205 While Congress rare-
ly overrules precedent, the average age of those few that Congress has
overruled in the last twenty-five years is 5 years.206 The first call for leg-
199. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311.
201. See, e.g., Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015)
(declining to extend Quill to cover resale royalties provided for by California statute).
202. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
203. Id. at 3 18-19 (citations omitted).
204. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
205. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1147 (2016).
206. Hansen, supra note 52, at 252-55.
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islative intervention was placed twenty-four years ago. It has gone unan-
swered.
Since that first call, Congress has become increasingly divided. Pri-
or to 2000, the majority of legislative overrides were bipartisan.2 07 Now
"we see a new, but rarer, phenomenon, partisan overriding."208 Partisan
overrides are significantly more difficult, as they often require "an unu-
sual set of events: a president, House, and Senate majority of the same
party; a president with ample political capital; and enough crossover
votes to beat a filibuster." 209 Congress was unable to legislate over Quill
during a time when Congress enacted twice as many laws as it does to-
day and had an easier time gaining the support needed for legislative
overrides, and when Quill was at the prime age for overruling. It is un-
likely that the second call will produce different results.
4. The Island of Quill is Formed
At least some members of the Supreme Court would like to address
Quill. 210 However, it has yet to, and is unlikely to, encounter a case
properly situated to overrule Quill. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
call to legislate in this area has remained unanswered. The Tenth Circuit
used the only option it had left: it distinguished Quill from Direct Mar-
keting, thus narrowing Quill's holding. The majority opinion states thir-
teen separate times that Quill does not apply.211 It is in this emphatic dis-
tinguishing that a precedential island is formed.
B. The Rise ofPrecedential Islands
As change in society increases at a rapid rate, precedent may be-
come outdated quicker than the courts can overrule it. Division in the
legislative branch may cause the Court's holdings to become the final
word on statutory questions. While courts scramble to prevent unjust
outcomes, the stability and predictability of stare decisis will slowly dis-
appear. Stare decisis's promise "that bedrock principles are founded in
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals" will be broken.2 12
This is best illustrated by taking a deeper look at Direct Marketing's
procedural posture. When Direct Marketing reached the Supreme Court,
it had already been refiled in state court and the Colorado Law was pre-
207. Id. at 209.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 238.
210. See Direct Mktg Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('The
legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.");
see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
211. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134, 1136-37, 1139, 1144-47.
212. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
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liminarily enjoined.2 13 Therefore, there were two possible outcomes from
the Supreme Court's decision: the case would be barred from federal
courts and the injunction in state court would stand, or the case would
not be barred from federal courts and would be remanded to the Tenth
Circuit for a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court's opinion is intriguing for two reasons. First,
the Court appears to like the Colorado Law. During oral arguments, Jus-
tice Scalia seemed shocked that this law is one-of-a-kind and could not
understand why other states have not taken similar measures.214 Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating what an injustice the contin-
uation of Quill and Bellas Hess jurisprudence has played on Colorado
and the states, an issue which had no relation to the jurisdictional ques-
tion before the Court.2 15 Upholding the Colorado Law would allow other
states to follow suit and, thus, lessen the fiscal burden placed on the
states as more and more retailers limit their presence to the Internet.
Even more interesting, though, is the rationale for remanding the
case. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding based on
reasoning barely mentioned in either parties' briefings; the reporting
requirements did not fall within the definitions in the TIA. DMA's main
argument was that "[c]hallenges . .. brought by non-taxpayers who con-
test neither their own tax liability, nor anyone else's, and which present
none of the elements of the prototypical TIA case, are not barred."2 16
Colorado's main argument was that because DMA was seeking "to en-
join and restrain the methods Colorado uses to assess and collect its sales
and use taxes," DMA's suit was barred.2 17 However, the Supreme Court
ultimately held that TIA did not bar federal jurisdiction because the re-
porting requirements were not part of assessment, levy, or collection as
defined under the Act.218 It went one step further and held that the words
"enjoin, suspend, or restrain" in the TIA "capture[]only those orders that
stop (or perhaps compel) acts of 'assessment, levy and collection."'
2 19
The Court did not wish to send the case back to the court that had
already preliminarily enjoined the Colorado Law. It did not want the
Tenth Circuit to be bound by Quill. By basing its holding on the inap-
plicability of the TIA, the Court gave the Tenth Circuit an out. The em-
phatic statement hat the Colorado Law was not a part of tax assessment,
levy or collection, was all the reasoning needed to uphold the Colorado
213. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, No. 13CV34855, at 1, 22-23 (Dist. Ct.
Colo. Feb. 18, 2014) (order granting preliminary injunction).
214. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Direct Atg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2014) (No.
13-1032).
215. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. Brief of Petitioner at 15, Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 13-1032).
217. Brief ofRespondent at 13, Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 13-1032)
(emphasis added).
218. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1133-34.
219. Id.at1132.
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Law. The Tenth Circuit was now free to distinguish Quill, which only
applies to taxation, and find that the Colorado Law did not offend the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Court shaped its unanimous
opinion in a way that provided the outcome the nine Justices wanted.
Instead of being "founded in the law," as promised by stare decisis, this
case turned on "the proclivities of individuals."22 0
CONCLUSION
While the precedential island of Quill is, at this time, unique, the
systematic factors that led to its creation are not. If the pace of the mod-
em world increases, precedent will become outdated more quickly and
more frequently. If the American public, and thus the legislature, be-
comes more divided, the ability of Congress to correct statutory interpre-
tations will diminish. If the country's population grows and the number
of petitions for certiorari increases, the percent of petitions the Court
hears will decrease. Even if the Court disagrees with or wishes to clarify
a precedent, the judicial system may move too slowly for an appropriate
case to come before the Court. If these systematic factors remain, Quill,
now a solitary island, may find itself with neighbors.
On December 12, 2016, the Supreme Court denied DMA's petition
for certiorari.221 As Justice Kennedy stated, this "case does not raise this
issue in a manner appropriate for the Court to address it." 222 But will
there ever be an appropriate case? If states continue to legislate around
Quill, following in Colorado's footsteps, the Court may never have a
chance to address Quill. Some may argue that this is exactly how prece-
dent is supposed to function: that a precedential island forms and then,
over time, the sea of certainty washes it away and it disappears. But if
times change too quickly and the islands form too rapidly, it may be that
the sea of certainty will disappear instead.
KRISTINL. ARTHUR
220. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
221. Direct Mktg Ass'n v. Brohl, 2016 WL 4565072, at *1 (2016) (denying petition for certio-
rari).
222. Direct Mktg Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Professor Alan Chen for his time and insight and Professor Nantiya Ruan for her continued support
and encouragement. I would also like to thank the Staff Editors and Executive Board of Denver Law
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"YOU'VE GOT MAIL!" DECODING THE BITS AND BYTES OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT COMPUTER SEARCHES AFTER
ACKERMAN
ABSTRACT
In the digital age, courts have been searching for rational solutions
and definitions regarding computer searches that comport with current
Fourth Amendment law, specifically the private search doctrine. Recent-
ly, in United States v. Ackerman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that when a government entity or agent opens and examines
emails previously unopened by private actors, they have conducted a
"search" to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Although the ultimate
holding is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy doctrine, the Tenth Circuit offered a controversial alterna-
tive rationale rooted in the trespass-to-chattels doctrine. This alternative
rationale has far-reaching implications, specifically regarding the viabil-
ity of the private search doctrine as applied to computer searches.
This Comment first argues that courts should adopt a "file" ap-
proach in Fourth Amendment cases involving searches of computers
rather than the previously proposed "physical device" and "human ob-
servation" approaches. A person who leaves a file open on a computer
does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the open file, but
a person does possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed files.
Secondly, this Comment argues that the reintroduction of the trespass-to-
chattels limb of Fourth Amendment searches will practically extinguish
the private search doctrine as applied to computers, unless courts adopt a
different definition of "trespass," specifically a definition anchored in the
unit of a computer file. The abstract concept of a computer file is analo-
gous to the "metes and bounds" of physical property, and the data con-
tained within the file is analogous to the property contained within said
physical metes and bounds. Under both the reasonable expectation of
privacy and trespass-to-chattels doctrines, focusing on the unit of a com-
puter "file" is the most favorable approach. In short, opening a file on a
computer should be considered a distinct search under the Fourth
Amendment and therefore should require a distinct justification.
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INTRODUCTION
As technology continues to rapidly advance and become more inte-
grated in our day-to-day lives, computer evidence will increasingly be-
come more valuable and pertinent in both civil and criminal investiga-
tions. Computer forensic examination is now a common tool in almost all
criminal investigations.' To support this tool, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) alone has over two hundred full-time computer forensic
examiners.2 However, computer forensic examination continues to gen-
erate unnecessary Fourth Amendment complications. Because most
modem-day computers possess storage capacities from anywhere be-
tween 250 gigabytes to several terabytes,3 the application of the Fourth
Amendment becomes problematic. In light of their "immense storage
capacit[ies]"4 and ability to store and transport "millions of pages of text,
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos," electronic devices are
quantitatively different from physical spaces. Electronic records, unlike
physical records, possess an "element of pervasiveness" because elec-
tronic records can be transferred among devices around the world in mil-
liseconds whereas physical records cannot.6 Furthermore, electronic de-
1. Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 112,112 (2011).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION 131 (2010).
3. See Kim Komando, How Much Computer Storage Do You Really Need?, USA TODAY
(Nov. 30, 2012, 7:51 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/komando/2012/11/30/komando-computer-
storage/I 726835; Lucas Mearian, With Tech Breakthrough, Seagate Promises 60TB Drives this
Decade, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 20, 2012, 11:58 AM),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2502838/data-center/with-tech-breakthrough--seagate-
promises-60tb-drives-this-decade.html.
4. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
5. See id.




vices are qualitatively different than physical spaces because data stored
on electronic devices may include "private information never found in a
home in any form."7 For example, consider an electronic device's persis-
tent tracking of Global Positioning System (GPS) location data or artifi-
cial intelligence algorithms that determine a user's social profile and
preferences. Such private information rarely exists in physical form in a
home because displaying this information on a tangible medium requires
printing tens of thousands of pages.8
The Fourth Amendment is heavily premised on physical objects and
was drafted to regulate searches of homes and physical property.9 Until
the Warren Court, judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tected only against physical intrusions on tangible things.10 This purely
physical conception of the Fourth Amendment's protections changed
with the seminal decision of Katz v. United States," where the Court
replaced property-based theories with a two-part "expectation of priva-
cy" test.12 According to Katz, a search under the Fourth Amendment oc-
curs when a governmental employee or agent of the government violates
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.13 However, because
the Fourth Amendment applies only to governmental employees and
agents, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered when private parties con-
duct searches.14 The Supreme Court established the "private search doc-
trine" to regulate what law enforcement is allowed to see without com-
plying with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."5 The private search
doctrine allows police and law enforcement officials to reconstruct the
private party search and see what the private party saw, but police and
7. Id. at 2491.
8. 1.4 gigabytes (GB) is equivalent to 105,000 pages. 5.8 GB is equivalent to 435,000 pages.
5,200 GB is equivalent to 390,000,000 pages. See Data Volume Estimates and Conversions, SDS
DISCOVERY, http://www.sdsdiscovery.com/resources/data-conversions (la t visited May 30, 2017);
see also ERICSSON, ERICSSON MOBILITY REPORT: ON THE PULSE OF THE NETWORKED SOCIETY 2
(2016) (total monthly mobile data traffic per smartphone was 1.4 GB in 2015; total monthly mobile
data traffic per mobile PC was 5.8 GB in 2015); see also International Data Corporation, The Digital
Universe in 2020: Big Data, Bigger Digital Shadows, and Biggest Growth in the Far East, EMC
(Dec. 2012), https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2012iview/executive-summary-a-
universe-of htm (the digital universe will exceed 40 trillion GB, which is "5,200 GB for every man,
woman, and child").
9. See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 290-92 (2005).
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that no precedents permit the
Fourth Amendment to apply as a viable defense in cases where no official search and seizure of the
person, his papers, tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of property had occurred),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 353.
13. Id at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the test commonly associated with
Katz); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
14. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
15. Id. at 115-16.
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law enforcement may not exceed the scope of the private party search
without triggering the Fourth Amendment.16 A private search extin-
guishes an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the object
searched;'7 once this has occurred, the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit governmental use of this non-private information.' By merely re-
peating the search, the government does not further infringe on a per-
son's privacy.19 Unsurprisingly, the private search doctrine's application
to electronic devices has caused controversy within federal courts.20
Although this privacy rationale has been the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment searches for almost fifty years, in 2012, United States v.
Jones21 supplemented the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine by
reintroducing the trespass doctrine.22 If an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, a governmental employee or agent
may still trigger a Fourth Amendment "search" by trespassing onto that
individual's property in order to obtain information.23 With regard to the
private search doctrine, even though a police officer accurately repeated
a prior private search, the police officer's repeated search would qualify
as a "trespass" under Jones and therefore a distinct search under the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the prior private party search becomes irrele-
vant under a Jones trespass-to-chattels analysis, which inevitably chal-
lenges the continued viability of the private search doctrine as applied to
computers.24
This Gomment explores both the history and future of Fourth
Amendment computer searches in light of the Tenth Circuit's recent rul-
ing in United States v. Ackerman25 and concludes by proposing a simple
framework for administering the Fourth Amendment that preserves the
private search doctrine regarding computers. This Comment will argue
that by adopting a "file" framework for defining computer searches, both
16. Id. at 115-20.
17. Id.atll7.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 120.
20. Compare United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that police
did not exceed the scope of the private party's search by opening and viewing additional files on
CDs), and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that police did not exceed
scope of the private party's search after opening and searching previously unopened files on a zip
drive), with United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger 1), 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that police exceeded the scope of the private party's search when files were opened on the
same device that had not been searched earlier), and United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335
(11th Cir. 2015) (holding that police exceeded the scope of the private party's search when previous-
ly unopened images and a video were searched on the same device).
21. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
22. Id. at 405-06 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)) (discussing the
trespass rule).
23. Id. at 407-08.
24. See, e.g., Andrew MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine After Jones, 126 YALE
L.J. F. 326, 330 (2017) ("[E]ven if a particular action passes Jacobsen's test (and is thus not a search
under Katz), it may still be a search under Jones.").
25. 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
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the reasonable expectation of privacy prong and the trespass-to-chattels
prong of Fourth Amendment searches will be satisfied.
Part I of this Comment traces the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment's application to computers and details the significant differences
between searching a computer and searching a physical space. Part I also
summarizes the recent federal circuit split regarding the application of
the Fourth Amendment's private search doctrine to computers. The Fifth
Circuit26 and the Seventh Circuit27 both subscribe to the "physical de-
vice" approach: if a private party accessed even just one file on a com-
puter, the entire computer was searched by that private party, and there-
fore, the police can access the entire computer without conducting a
search to which the Fourth Amendment applies. By contrast, the Sixth
Circuit28 and Eleventh Circuit29 both subscribe to a data or "file" ap-
proach: if a private party searched one file on a computer, only that file
can be searched by the police. The latter decisions from the Sixth and
Eleventh circuits trigger several questions about he file approach.3 0 For
example, if the private party only viewed one file on the computer,
should the police be limited to searching only that single file, or should
the police be allowed to search other files contained within the same
folder? Is a folder a file? If a private party observed only part of a file on
the screen, should the police be allowed to search the remaining contents
of that file (e.g., scrolling through a Word document)? Part I of this
Comment will also discuss the reintroduction of the trespass-to-chattels
definition of a Fourth Amendment search and the implications of that
paradigm shift for the private search doctrine.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief summary of the facts, opin-
ions, and holdings of Ackerman. Part III first analyzes the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Ackerman, with a particular emphasis on the alternative
holding.31 The last half of Part III endorses the file framework for admin-
istering the Fourth Amendment in computer searches. It explains why the
file approach is superior to previously-considered approaches and also
why the file approach is the most appropriate framework in light of
Ackerman, Jones, and United States v. Jacobsen.32 Furthermore, if courts
continue to recognize property rights in data, applying the file approach
26. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
27. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
28. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2015).
29. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (1lth Cir. 2015).
30. See Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit Deepens the Circuit Split on Applying the Private Search
Doctrine TO Computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-
circuit-split-on-applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers (noting that the deepening circuit
split regarding the application of the private search doctrine to computers is ripe for Supreme Court
review).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14.
32. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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to Fourth Amendment computer searches emerges as the preeminent
logical framework.
I. BACKGROUND
The dawn of the digital age has produced a wide range of new
Fourth Amendment complications. Not only have courts been faced
with privacy concerns regarding electronic devices, but they also have
been forced to consider the ever-increasing storage capacities of comput-
ers and smartphones.34 Section A details the history of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the Court's doctrine regarding information previous-
ly accessed by private parties, and its application to electronic devices.
Section B focuses on the current federal circuit split regarding the con-
tours of the private search doctrine's application to computers. Finally,
Section C discusses the trespass-to-chattels doctrine under Jones and its
impact on the private search doctrine under Jacobsen.
A. The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their "person, houses, papers,
and effects."35 Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence defines a search
in one of two ways. Since the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz, a
search occurs when a governmental employee or agent of the govern-
ment violates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.3 6 In
2012, the Supreme Court supplemented the Katz "reasonable expectation
of privacy" doctrine by reintroducing the trespass doctrine. Under the
Jones trespass doctrine, a trespass into an individual's property consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment search.38 Thus, even in the absence of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the government may still trigger the
Fourth Amendment if it trespasses into a person's property.
One way the Fourth Amendment grants government agents the
power to conduct reasonable searches is after receiving a proper war-
rant.3 9 Besides a growing list of exceptions,4 0 warrantless searches and
33. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014) (analyzing constitutionality of
searching cell phone data after arrest); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (analyzing
whether attaching a GPS device to defendant's vehicle was a trespass under the Fourth Amendment);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (analyzing constitutionality of using a thermal imag-
ing device from a public street to scan a private home).
34. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing the ever-increasing storage capacities of electron-
ic devices).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 406-07.
40. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (allowing a search incident to lawful
arrest); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (allowing a plain view exception to
the Fourth Amendment); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (allowing a search "when
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seizures are unreasonable on their face.41 When determining whether to
exempt a search from the warrant requirement, courts have generally
attempted to conduct a balancing assessment between an individual's
privacy and the government's interest in gathering evidence.42 However,
these Fourth Amendment protections only apply to governmental entities
or agents.43 An unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a private
individual is exempt from the aforementioned limitations unless the indi-
vidual who conducted the search was acting under the direction of a gov-
ernment official or agent.44 In Jacobsen, the U.S. Supreme Court articu-
lated the private search reconstruction doctrine (private search doc-
trine).45 Under the private search doctrine, when a private party's search
violates a person's privacy, a government agent's warrantless search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it simply replicates the same
46search already conducted by the private party. The rationale is that a
private search extinguishes an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.47 Furthermore, the private search doctrine allows a government
official to conduct a follow-up search within the scope of the initial
search;48 however, if the government exceeds that scope, then its search
will be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 9
Jacobsen involved a search of a package by a government agent af-
ter Federal Express (FedEx) employees intercepted and searched the
same package upon noticing the presence of a suspicious white powder.o
In addition to replicating the search conducted by the FedEx employees,
a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent also tested the white powder
and identified the powder as cocaine.51 The FedEx employees only
searched the package but did not test the white powder.52 Based on the
field test results from the DEA agent and other supporting evidence, the
DEA obtained a warrant to search the addressee's home.53 The DEA
voluntary consent has been obtained"); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (allowing
a motor vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment).
41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... ).
42. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) ("[W]e generally determine whether to
exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement 'by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."') (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
43. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (explaining that Fourth Amend-
ment limitations only apply to governmental searches and seizures).
44. Id. (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to unreasonable searches
by private persons).
45. Id. at 117-18.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 115.
49. See id. at 117-18.
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id. at II1-12.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 298 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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subsequently found more incriminating evidence and arrested Jacobsen.54
After denying Jacobsen's motion to suppress the evidence, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Minnesota convicted Jacobsen of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Jacobsen appealed the district court decision, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the DEA agents' field test of the
white powder expanded the scope of the private search and thus required
56a warrant. The Eighth Circuit reversed Jacobsen's convictions, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.5 7 The Court adopted the "virtual cer-
tainty" test, which states that to determine whether the government's
search exceeded the scope of the initial private search, courts must con-
duct a balancing test between the amount of information the government
stands to gain and the level of certainty regarding what they will find.5 8 If
the officer is "virtually certain[]" that nothing new will be discovered,
then the government's search is within the scope of the initial search.59
Applying the virtual certainty standard specifically to the DEA agents'
field tests, the Court reasoned that the suspicious nature of the white
powder made it "virtually certain" that it was some sort of contraband.60
In short, the government's apparent search was no search at all for
Fourth Amendment purposes because it compromised no "legitimate
privacy interest."6 1
Since Jacobsen, courts have focused on the nature of the area being
searched when applying the virtual certainty test.62 For example, in Unit-
ed States v. Allen,6 3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit de-
64clined to extend the private search doctrine to a search of a motel room.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished its holding from Jacobsen, citing the
material differences between a suspicious package and a motel room.65 In
balancing individual privacy interests with the government's interest in
obtaining evidence, the court noted that the package in Jacobsen con-
tained only contraband, whereas the motel contained numerous other
personal possessions irrelevant to the search.
More recently in Riley v. California,67 the U.S. Supreme Court
made an effort to protect data privacy.68 After police pulled over defend-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 299-300.
57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 12-13.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 124-25.
61. Id. at 123.
62. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997).
63. 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997).
64. Id. at 699.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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ant Riley for a minor traffic infraction, the police searched his phone,
revealing gan -related content that tied Riley to a shooting that occurred
weeks prior. 9 The government argued that permitting warrantless
searches of cell phones incident to arrest could ultimately prevent de-
struction of evidence and aid law enforcement officers.70 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that cell phones represent an
important privacy interest that must be protected because of the signifi-
cant volumes of personal information contained within them.71 To pro-
tect this privacy interest, the Court held that police officers must obtain a
72warrant before searching a cell phone. The cellphone in Riley is akin to
the motel room in the Allen case: They both contain numerous pieces of
information that may be irrelevant to the search.
To summarize, under the reasonable expectation of privacy defini-
tion of a Fourth Amendment search, a search occurs when "[t]he Gov-
ernment's activities ... violate[] the privacy upon which [a person] justi-
fiably relie[s]."74 However, the Supreme Court has carved out an excep-
tion to this definition-the private search doctrine. Under the private
search doctrine, once a private party conducts an initial search, the gov-
ernment may repeat that search without triggering a Fourth Amendment
"search."76 With the development of new technology and exponentially
increasing storage capacities, applying the private search doctrine to
electronic devices has raised unforeseen difficulties and caused splin-
tered decisions.
B. The Private Search Doctrine Circuit Split
Recent circuit court decisions regarding the private search doctrine
as applied to computers have led to a circuit split.77 The split among the
circuit courts is rooted in disagreement over the appropriate measuring
unit to apply when searching computers:7 8 When a private party has
68. Id. at 2494-95.
69. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013),
rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
70. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
71. Id. at 2494-95.
72. Id. at 2495.
73. Compare United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (remarking that a
motel room contains several personal possessions that may be outside the scope of a private search),
with Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (noting that cell phones may contain several "privacies of life" that
may be outside the scope of a private search).
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (emphasis added).
75. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1984).
76. Id.
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
78. Compare United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
entire physical device was searched), and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the entire physical device was searched), with Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th
Cir. 2015) (holding that only the files opened were searched), and United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d
1323, 1335 (11 th Cir. 2015) (holding that only the files opened were searched), and United States v.
Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2016).
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searched a file on a computer, what exactly has been searched? Has the
entire computer been searched? Or has the visible part of the file on the
screen only been searched? Or has the entire file itself been searched,
regardless if it was displayed in its entirety on the screen? These ques-
tions are significant for computer searches, as the answers provide the
extent to which government officials are allowed to search a computer
absent a warrant after a private citizen has already searched the comput-
er.
In 2001, in United States v Runyan,79 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered the application of the private search doctrine
to digital storage devices containing child pornography.s0 While in the
process of moving her things out of the home pending a divorce with her
husband, the wife of defendant Robert Runyan discovered CDs and zip
disks81 that contained pornographic images of minors.82 She turned over
the CDs and zip disks to the police, and Runyan was indicted on child
pornography charges.83 Runyan moved to suppress the evidence on the
digital storage devices that the law enforcement personnel searched
without a warrant.84 However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas denied his motion on the grounds that the police had
not exceeded the scope of his wife's initial search.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court assumed that a computer
disk is a closed container in the context of analyzing a warrantless search
under the Fourth Amendment.8 6 Accordingly, when police officers exam-
ine more items of a container than were previously viewed during a pri-
87vate search, the officers do not exceed the scope of the initial search.
Thus, when the police officers searched the storage devices, they did not
exceed the scope of the private search, even though they opened files on
the storage devices previously unopened by Runyan's wife.8 8 Here, the
Fifth Circuit used a physical device measuring unit when reconstructing
the private search: because the digital storage device had already been
opened and examined to some extent by a private party, the police offic-
ers were free to reopen and search all the contents of the digital storage
device.89
79. 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
80. See id. at 456.
81. Zip Disk, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/55217/zip-disk (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (providing a
definition of zip disk).
82. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452-53.
83. Id. at 454-55.
84. Id. at 455.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 464 (treating the computer disk as a closed container).
87. Id at 465.




Similarly, in 2012, in Rann v. Atchison,90 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that a more thorough search of a zip drive
did not exceed the scope of the previous private search.91 Defendant
Rann was charged with sexual assault and child pornography involving
his then-fifteen-year-old daughter.9 2 Rann's wife and daughter turned
over to police a memory card and a zip drive containing pornographic
images of the daughter and another minor.93 It appeared to the court that
Rann's wife had downloaded the images to the zip drive herself.94 Even
though Rann's wife only visibly searched through a few of the files on
the zip drive she compiled, the court held that the police's more exhaus-
tive follow-up search of the zip drive did not exceed the scope of the
initial search.95 The court reasoned that because the police were certain
that nothing new would be discovered during the follow-up search, the
96scope of the follow-up search had not been exceeded. Indeed, the court
could not "imagine more conclusive evidence that [the defendant's
daughter] and her mother knew exactly what the memory card and the
zip drive contained."97
In 2015, in United States v. Lichtenberger,98 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the physical device (or
"closed container") approach of the Fifth and Seventh circuits.99 Instead,
the Sixth Circuit held that police officers exceeded the scope of the prior
private search by opening and examining files on the same physical de-
vice that the private party searched, but that may not have been viewed
by the private party.00 Defendant Lichtenberger's girlfriend suspected
Lichtenberger of possessing child pornography on his computer.'0 Of
her own volition, the girlfriend hacked into Lichtenberger's computer
using a password recovery program and eventually discovered a folder
containing child pornography.102 The girlfriend contacted the police, and
an officer arrived at the house and requested that the girlfriend show him
what she had found.10 3 The girlfriend "opened several folders and began
90. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
91. Id. at 838.
92. Id. at 834.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 838.
96. Id. (adopting the "substantial certainty" language used in Runyan).
97. Id.
98. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
99. See Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/201 5/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-
computers (arguing that the Sixth Circuit took the correct approach).
100. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490-91.
101. United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger 1), 19 F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (N.D. Ohio





clicking on random thumbnail images to show him." 04 A warrant was
later obtained to search the entire computer, but in later criminal pro-
ceedings for possession and distribution of child pornography, Lichten-
berger moved to suppress all evidence found on his computer because his
then-girlfriend testified that she was not sure the files she showed the
police officers were the exact same files she viewed during her private
search.105 Obviously, the same physical device had been searched, but it
was not clear that the same files had been searched.10 6
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio suppressed
the evidence, finding that the private search doctrine did not apply. 07
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the
police officer exceeded the scope of the prior search because he viewed
files that may have differed from those viewed by the private party.1os
Reiterating the concerns from Riley v. California,109 the Sixth Circuit
focused on the unique storage capabilities and inevitable privacy inter-
ests posed by digital storage devices, concluding that the "virtual certain-
ty" threshold was not met due to the nature of the electronic device."o
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the police officer was not virtually cer-
tain of what he was to discover on Lichtenberger's computer because the
files could not have been viewed without first clicking on them. i The
Sixth Circuit further remarked that "[o]ther documents, such as bank
statements or personal communications, could also have been discovered
among the photographs."" 12 In short, the Sixth Circuit created a split with
the Fifth and Seventh circuits by rejecting the physical device unit of
measurement and adopting a file or "data" unit of measurement.' 3
More recently, in United States v. Sparks, 114 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the file or data unit of measure-
ment, which brought the circuit split to 2-2 with regard to how the pri-
vate search doctrine should apply to computers.'5 In Sparks, defendants
Johnson and Sparks left their cellphone at a Wal-Mart where a Wal-Mart
employee opened it and looked through its contents.'6 The employee
found hundreds of disturbing images and videos of child pornography.' 17
104. Id.
105. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481.
106. See id.
107. Lichtenberger I, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 758-59.
108. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490-91.
109. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (focusing on the significant privacy interests at stake).
110. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489) (discussing unique
privacy concerns posed by electronic devices).
111. Id. at 481, 489 (noting that the main folder was labeled "private" and sub-folders were
"labeled with numbers not words").
112. Id. at 489.
113. See id. at 489-91.
114. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
115. See supra notes 20, 78 and accompanying text.
116. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1329.
117. Id. at 1330-31.
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The employee told her fianc6, Widner, about the images and videos."1 8
Widner searched through the phone, opening a few images and watching
one video.' 19 Widner then contacted the police, turned over the phone,
and showed the officers what he had seen.120 Subsequently, one of the
police officers searched the entire phone-opening all the images to full
size and watching a second video that Widner had not viewed.121
The Eleventh Circuit held that (1) the police officer who searched
the entire phone did not exceed the scope of Widner's private search
when he viewed the same images (including thumbnails) and one video
that Widner had previously viewed; but (2) the police officer did exceed
the scope of Widner's private search when he opened and viewed images
and a second video that Widner had not watched.12 2 They made this hold-
ing despite the fact that the second video was located within the same
folder as the first video.12 3 Although the "private search of the cell phone
might have removed certain information from the Fourth Amendment's
protections, it did not expose every part of the information contained in
the cell phone." 24 Considering the "tremendous storage capacity of cell
phones and the broad range of types of information that cell phones gen-
erally contain,"12 5 the Eleventh Circuit adopted the file approach to the
private search doctrine as applied to computers, deepening the circuit
split.126
Currently, under the reasonable expectation of privacy definition,
two circuit courts subscribe to the physical device framework,127 which
holds that a search of a single file on a computer means the entire com-
puter has been searched. Two other federal circuit courts subscribe to a
file framework,128 which essentially holds that the opening of a file con-
stitutes a distinct search. In light of the sharp division among these feder-
al circuit courts, the private search doctrine in computer searches is ripe
for Supreme Court review. In fact, in two of the four aforementioned




120. Id. at 1331.
121. Id. at 1331-32.
122. Id. at 1335-37.
123. Id. at 1335.
124. Id. at 1336.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rann v.
Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
128. See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Sparks,
806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
129. Rann v. Atchison, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012); Sparks v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016).
130. Atchison, 133 S. Ct. at 672 (denying petition for certiorari); Sparks, 136 S. Ct. at 2009
(denying petition for certiorari).
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C. The Death of the Private Search Doctrine after Jones
In 2012-forty-five years after Katz and twenty-eight years after
Jacobsen-the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision that
has raised doubts concerning the viability of the private search doctrine.
In United States v. Jones, the Court reintroduced the trespass test for
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.131 The Court held that the
police officers' physical installation of a GPS device on defendant Jones'
car was a trespass against Jones' personal effects.13 2 This physical intru-
sion-or trespass-constituted a search per se.'33 The trespass test, re-
vived by Jones, requires (1) trespass34 on (2) a constitutionally protected
area3 5 (3) "conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain
information." 36 General Fourth Amendment scholarship teaches that
courts utilized the trespass test throughout American history until the
1960sl37 when Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United
138States introduced the two-part expectation-of-privacy inquiry. In the
years following the Katz decision (in which electronic eavesdropping on
a public telephone booth was held to be a search), the vast majority of
search and seizure case law has shifted away from that approach founded
on property rights and towards an approach based on a person's expecta-
tion of privacy.139 According to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Jones, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test merely supple-
mented the pre-Katz trespass test.140
The reintroduction of the Jones trespass test jeopardizes the viabil-
ity of Jacobsen.141 In Jacobsen, the chemical testing of narcotics that
resulted in the destruction of a "trace amount" of cocaine was not a
search because it failed to reveal more significant information.142 The
reasoning in Jacobsen focused only on the reasonable expectation of
privacy-the sole test to determine whether a government action was a
search when the case was decided.143 However, by applying the Jones
trespass test, "the destruction of only a 'trace amount' of private proper-
131. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Curious
History ofFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 87-91 (2013).
132. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05.
133. Id.
134. Id at 406.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 408 n.5.
137. See id. at 405 ("[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,
at least until the latter half of the 20th century.").
138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the
subjective expectation of privacy and the objective expectation of privacy).
139. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406.
140. See id. at 409 ("[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
141. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that Jacob-
sen has an "uncertain status" after Jones).
142. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 125-26 (1984).




ty" may now be considered a trespass-to-chattels.144 In fact, even though
the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy was exhausted when
the FedEx employees initially opened the package, the government
agents' replicated search of the package in Jacobsen would be consid-
ered a trespass under Jones. Under such a theory, the outcome in Jacob-
sen would have been different because destroying the trace amount of
powder would have constituted a trespass and, therefore, a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Ultimately, the property interests protected
under Jones are more robust than the privacy interests protected under
Jacobsen because a person's property rights are not eroded when a pri-
vate party searches (i.e., trespasses) the property. Indeed, a prior private
search is completely irrelevant to the Jones trespass inquiry.
In the context of computer searches, the private search doctrine's
continuing role after Jones is questionable. Consider the following fact
pattern. Suppose a private party accesses a defendant's computer while
the defendant is away at work and uncovers incriminating files. The pri-
vate party notifies the police, and a police officer arrives at the defend-
ant's residence. The police officer asks the private party to recreate the
search that the private party previously conducted so that the officer
could view the incriminating files. Because the private party is now an
actor under the direction of a police officer, the moment the private party
physically touches the computer to begin recreating the prior search is
arguably a trespass under Jones. Admittedly, under such a broad defini-
tion of trespass, 145 it is hard to imagine a scenario where the govern-
ment's recreation of a prior private search of a computer does not amount
to a trespass under Jones.
Although Jones does not explicitly overrule Jacobsen, it does limit
the applicability of the private search doctrine to Katz-based reasona-
ble-expectation-of-privacy searches.146 As the Jones Court articulated,
"Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formula-
tion." 47 In brief, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence now has two
independent inquiries regarding the definition of a search. Under Katz,
the sole question is whether the government action invaded an individu-
al's reasonable expectation of privacy.148 Under Jones, the inquiry is
whether the government action constitutes a trespass on a constitutional-
ly protected area for the purpose of gathering information. 149 As a result,
cases involving government actions that did not constitute a search under
Katz and Jacobsen may have constituted a search under Jones. With this
144. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307-08.
145. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring) ("But under the Court's reasoning,
[trivial contact with personal property] may violate the Fourth Amendment.").
146. Id. at 407-09 (noting that "the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test") (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 406.
148. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
149. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406-07.
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background, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
United States v. Ackerman.
II. UNITED STATES V. ACKERMAN
A. Facts
AOL, Inc., implements "an automated filter designed to thwart the
transmission of child pornography."150 This image detection filtering
process (IDFP) scans images sent, saved, or forwarded from an AOL
email account.'5 ' Additionally, AOL possesses a database of hundreds of
thousands of hash values corresponding to pictures meeting the defini-
tion of child sexual images.152 A hash value is "a short string of charac-
ters generated from a much larger string of data (say, an electronic im-
age) using an algorithm-and calculated in a way that makes it highly
unlikely another set of data will produce the same value."'5 3 AOL's IDFP
compares the images scanned from emails with the images in the data-
base.15 4 If a hash value match is detected, AOL captures the email and
prevents the message from sending.'5 5 AOL also deactivates the user's
email account and, pursuant to statutory requirement,156 forwards the
email with its attachments to the National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children (NCMEC) through a tool called the CyberTipline.5 1
CyberTipline was launched in 1998 as a way for online users,
members of the public, and internet service providers to report suspected
child sexual exploitation. Reports can be made online or through the
hotline number.159 Once a report is made with the NCMEC, an analyst
opens the file to determine if it meets the definition of child sexual abuse
images.o NCMEC then utilizes the internet protocol (IP) address and
email address of the user to determine the geographic location of the
user.i16 NCMEC then alerts law enforcement agents in that geographic
162area.
150. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (2016).
151. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13-10176-01-EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *1-2 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2014), rev'd, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
152. Id.
153. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294; see also Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and
the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REv. 38, 38-40 (2005).
154. Ackerman, 2014 WL 2968164 at *2.
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(h)(4) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b)(P)-(Q) (2012).
157. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294.
158. CyberTipline, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD.,
http://www.missingkids.org/cybertipline (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
159. Id.





On April 22, 2013, AOL's IDFP detected a hash value match on
one of defendant Ackerman's four outgoing email attachments.163 The
aforementioned process was triggered.164 AOL forwarded a report to
NCMEC with the four attached images.1 65 An NCMEC analyst opened
the email along with all four of the attachments.1 66 No warrant was ob-
tained by NCMEC. NCMEC confirmed that all four images met the
definition of child pornography and determined that the defendant's loca-
tion was Kansas. 168 NCMEC then alerted law enforcement agents in the
area, and a special agent obtained a warrant to search Ackerman's resi-
dence while Ackerman was at work, finding "multiple digital items that
revealed the presence of child pornography."'69 A federal grand jury then
indicted Mr. Ackerman on charges of possession and distribution of child
pornography.170
B. Procedural History
The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas rejected Acker-
man's argument that the email and its attachments were "obtained
through an illegal search and seizure"'7 ' and, therefore, denied Acker-
man's motion to suppress the evidence.172 The district court specifically
rejected Ackerman's arguments to employ a three-part test from the First
Circuitl 73 and instead relied on the test the Tenth Circuit articulated in
United States v. Souza 174: "A search by a private person becomes a gov-
ernment search if the government coerces, dominates, or directs the ac-
tions of a private person conducting the search."75 "To determine
whether a search by a private person becomes a government search, there
is a two-part inquiry: '1) whether the government knew of and acqui-
esced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) whether the party performing the
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends. '176
Because a law enforcement agent was not present when NCMEC
conducted its search, the district court found that a law enforcement
163. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13-10176-01-EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2014), rev'd, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
164. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1294.
165. Id
166. Id
167. Id. at 1294-95.
168. Id. at 1294.





173. Id. at *6-7 (citing United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2013)).
174. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).
175. Ackerman, 2014 WL 2968164 at *5, *7 (citing id at 1201).
176. Id. at *5 (quoting Souza, 223 F.3d at 1201).
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agent did not direct NCMEC.1 7 7 Furthermore, the district court held that
NCMEC is a private, non-profit corporation. 178 Alternatively, the district
court held that even if NCMEC was considered a government actor,
NCMEC did not exceed the scope of AOL's initial search "in such a way
that would be constitutionally significant."1 79
Two questions were on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.180 First, "[D]oes
NCMEC qualify as a governmental entity or agent?"'8 Second, if
NCMEC does qualify as a governmental entity or agent, "did NCMEC
simply repeat or did it exceed the scope of AOL's investigation?" 82
C. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the
district court on both counts.1 83 In the first section of the opinion, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that NCMEC qualifies as the government for
Fourth Amendment purposes.'84 Judge Gorsuch, writing for the court,
relied on NCMEC's two authorizing statutes'8 and recent Supreme
Court decisions'86 to support this argument.
Even if the Tenth Circuit was wrong in determining that NCMEC is
a governmental entity, the court held that NCMEC acted as an agent for
the government in this particular case.'87 Judge Gorsuch returned to the
Tenth Circuit's two-part inquiry under Souzal8 8 but concluded that re-
gardless of which circuit court test is applied, "it's hard to see how we
could avoid deeming NCMEC the government's agent in this case." 89
In the third part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that if
NCMEC is considered a government entity or agent, its actions still im-
plicated the Fourth Amendment, specifically because the actions did not
fall within the scope of the private search doctrine.'9 0 Judge Gorsuch
initially pointed out that "[n]o one in this appeal disputes that email is a
'paper' or 'effect' for Fourth Amendment purposes, a form of communi-
cation capable of storing all sorts of private and personal details, from
correspondence to images, video or audio files, and so much more."'91
However, because the district court assumed that Mr. Ackerman had a
177. Id. at *7, *10.
178. Id. at *8.
179. Id. at *8, *10.
180. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (2016).
181. Id. at 1295.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1299.
185. Id. at 1296-97.
186. Id. at 1297-98 (drawing comparisons between NCMEC and Amtrak).
187. Id. at 1300-04.
188. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000).
189. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1301-02.
190. Id. at 1304-08.
191. Id. at 1304.
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reasonable expectation of privacy and decided to not analyze the Su-
preme Court's so-called "third-party doctrine,"'9 2 the Tenth Circuit de-
clined to reach the broad issue of whether emails are protected under the
Fourth Amendment.'93
Nevertheless, the government argued on appeal that the private
search doctrine compelled a ruling in its favor.194 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected this argument, noting that "AOL never opened the email itself." 95
AOL only scanned the email and images, found a positive hash-value
comparison on one of the attachments with its internal database, and
forwarded the email and attachments to NCMEC.1 9 6 Applying Jacob-
sen's private search doctrine, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that there
was no virtual certainty that the email itself and the other three attach-
ments contained child pornography.'97 "Indeed, when NCMEC opened
Mr. Ackerman's email it could have learned any number of private and
protected facts . . . ."198 Because NCMEC's search "could have revealed
something previously unknown about noncontraband items," a Fourth
Amendment search exceeding the scope of the initial search took
place.'99
In Section B of the third part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit
reached the same conclusion regarding the private search doctrine, but
under a different line of reasoning: the United States v. Jones trespass
test.200 Section B of the third part of this opinion, which was joined only
by Judge Phillips and not Judge Hartz,2 0' concluded that when NCMEC
opened Ackerman's email message it constituted a physical intrusion or
trespass into Ackerman's papers or effects under the Jones trespass
test.202 Not only did Judge Gorsuch call into question the continuing via-
bility of United States v. Jacobsen,203 but he also noted that "many courts
have already applied the common law's ancient trespass to chattels doc-
trine to electronic . . . communications."20 4 Simply stated, regardless of
whether the court applies the Jacobsen and Katz reasona-
ble-expectation-of-privacy standard or the Jones trespass-to-chattels test,
192. Id. at 1304-05.
193. Id.
194. Id at 1305.
195. Id. at 1305-06.
196. Id. at 1306.
197. Id. at 1305-06.
198. Id. at 1306.
199. Id.
200. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307-08.
201. Id at 1294.
202. Id. at 1307-08.
203. Id. at 1307.
204. Id. at 1308 (citing eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063, 1069-70
(N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019, 1027 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1565-67 (1996)).
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the result is the same: "NCMEC conducted a 'search' when it opened
and examined Mr. Ackerman's email."205
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ackerman's Alternative Holding is Binding
Briefly, Section B of the third part of the opinion is important not
only for its "puzzling" and "far-reaching implications"2 0 6 with regard to
the Jones trespass test and the viability of Jacobsen and Katz,20 7 but also
because this section serves as an "alternative holding."208 Alternative
holdings are binding on the Tenth Circuit,209 which means that the appli-
cation of the Jones trespass test is no longer limited to what is generally
considered physical and tangible property.210
B. The Jones Trespass Test Applies to "Virtual" 2 11 Property
United States v. Jones produced significant uncertainty among legal
scholars regarding exactly what kind of test it creates.2 12 The first Su-
preme Court case applying the Jones trespass test after Jones itself was
Florida v. Jardines.2 13 With Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the
Court found that when the police officers were gathering information in
the "curtilage of the house," they physically entered and intruded into a
constitutionally protected area.214 Some scholars have suggested that
after Jardines the Jones trespass test only applies to the physical intru-
205. Id.
206. See Orin Kerr, Tenth Circuit: Accessing Email is a 'Search' Under the Jones Trespass
Test, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/08/09/tenth-circuit-accessing-email-is-a-search-under-the-jones-trespass-test.
207. See discussion supra Section I.C and discussion infra Section III.B.
208. See Chinua Asuzu, JUDICIAL WRITING: A BENCHMARK FOR THE BENCH 134 (2016) ("Al-
ternative holdings are separate and independent grounds for a decision.").
209. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Alternative
rationales such as this, providing as they do further grounds for the Court's disposition, ordinarily
cannot be written off as dicta.").
210. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) ("It is important to be clear about what
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered
a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." (citing Entick v.
Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.)) (emphasis added). Even though the property is not
limited to only physical and tangible assets, the trespass itself must be physical per Jones.
211. From a physics perspective, there is no such thing as "virtual" objects. All "virtual" elec-
tronic data is tangible because it exists in computer memory in the form of magnetic particles (i.e.,
electrons). See, e.g., C. Claiborne Ray, The Weight of Memory, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/science/25qna.html.
212. See Kerr, supra note 131, at 90-93; see also Marc J. Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future
of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV.
21, 26-32 (2013); see also Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the University of San Francisco); see also US v. Jones, From Jones to Drones: How to
Define Fourth Amendment Doctrine for Searches in Public, YouTUBE (June 24,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-_pGCWZGdqO8.
213. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
214. Id. at 1414.
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215sion of property, not virtual property2. However, if courts define elec-
tronic communications, such as emails and text messages, as an individ-
ual's papers or effects under the Fourth Amendment,2 16 then a police
officer who intrudes into those spaces without a warrant is intruding into
a constitutionally protected area. Simply because emails, text messages,
and other electronic forms of communications are not physically tangible
in the sense that an individual cannot physically touch or hold them-
absent printing the electronic communications on physical paper-does
not mean that such electronic communications lack the necessary "physi-
cal" aspect of the Jones trespass test. For a computer, most electronic
data is physically stored on a hard disk drive.217 A traditional hard disk
drive is a physical and tangible object comprised of a spinning disk or
disks with magnetic coatings and heads that can read or write magnetic
information.218 These read-write headS219 record binary numbers as a
series of tiny physical areas on the disc that are magnetized either north
or south (i.e., O's and 1'S).220 "As the disk spins, a laser is either reflected
or not reflected by a series of tiny mirrored sections on the disk."2 21 Al-
ternatively, a more modem solid-state drive (SSD) does not rely on mov-
ing parts or spinning disks, but instead relies on flash memory.222 A
charged electron corresponds to a "0," whereas an uncharged electron
corresponds to a "1" in bit code.223 Electrons are physical atoms that
have mass.224 Thus, when the government accesses electronic data, it
physically intrudes on papers or effects under the Fourth Amendment
because the government is obtaining information by physically extracting
215. See Orin Kerr, What is the State of the Jones Trespass Test After Florida v. Jardines?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (March 27, 2013, 2:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/27/what-is-the-state-
of-the-jones-trespass-test-after-florida-v-jardines/ ("[P]erhaps the Jones test is not about the techni-
calities of trespass doctrine but rather about physical intrusion into property.").
216. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307-08 (2016).
217. ANDREW S. TANENBAUM & HERBERT Bos, MODERN OPERATING SYSTEMS 281, 300 (4th
ed. 2015) ("File systems are stored on disks.").
218. Hard Disk, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/44079/hard-disk (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
219. Read/Write Head, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/50247/read-write-head (l st visited Mar. 30, 2017).
220. See id.; see also Timothy Smithee, How is Data Stored in a Computer?, TECHWALLA,
https://www.techwalla.com/articles/how-is-data-stored-in-a-computer (last visited Mar. 30, 2017);
see also JAMES R. PARKER, PYTHON: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROGRAMMING Ch. 5 (Mercury Learn-
ing & Information, 2016) ("Magnets have two orientations; they have a North Pole and a South Pole.
Current flowing one way will create a magnet in the disk that has a North Pole appearing before the
South Pole, or an N-S mark. Current flowing the other direction through the head will create a mag-
net on the disk that has the South Pole appearing before the North Pole, or an S-N mark. One orien-
tation, say N-S, will represent a binary number 'I,' and the other (S-N) will represent a '0.' In this
way, binary numbers can be written to the surface of the moving disk.").
221. See id.
222. Joel Hruska, How Do SSDs Work?, EXTREMETECH (May 3, 2017, 3:23 AM),
https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/210492-extremetech-explains-how-do-ssds-work.
223. Id.
224. 1 electron = 9 x 10 ' kg. Fundamental Physical Constants, NIST REFERENCE ON




the binary data that is physically encoded onto a physical hard disk drive
with magnetic coatings or electrons.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently elabo-
rated upon the Jones trespass test by establishing a two-part inquiry225
Triggering a Jones trespass requires (1) confirming "possession of the
property in question" and (2) establishing "the ability to exclude others
from entrance onto or interference with that property."226 In the context
of electronic data, the first step of the Seventh Circuit's inquiry poses an
initial problem: if an individual's data is accessed on a government hard
disk drive (e.g., a private party sends the data to the government on its
own volition), who has possession of the property? By adhering to the
aforementioned principles regarding the physical nature of electronic
data, this problem is solved by recognizing property rights within data
itself. Not only does this solution comport with the first step of the Sev-
enth Circuit's inquiry, but it also agrees with the physical characteristics
of the Jones test. An individual's copied data on a government-owned
hard disk drive is still property of the individual under the data-rights
theory. Furthermore, even if a court disregarded the physical properties
of electronic data, such an interpretation does not vex the Jones test be-
cause accessing the data (i.e., the "property") still requires entrance into a
physical space, such as a physical hard disk drive, random access
memory (RAM), solid state drive, or memory chip commonly found in
USB keys, SD cards, MP3 players, and cell phones.22 7 Accessing data
will always require physical intrusion into a physical space, regardless of
how physically small that space may be.228
The second step in the Seventh Circuit's inquiry is easily satisfied in
the context of electronic data. For example, a closed laptop computer
would satisfy the second step because it is closed for the purpose of ex-
cluding others from opening the laptop and accessing the data therein.
More robust examples of excluding others "from entrance onto or inter-
ference with" data include standard login passwords, two-factor authen-
tication protocols,229 fingerprint recognition, and verification codes.230
225. United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2016).
226. Id.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
228. See Magnetic Storage, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/46497/magnetic-storage (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) ("In
the digital world, information is recorded by writing tiny spots (bits) of negative or positive polarity
on tapes and disks.").
229. See Two-Factor Authentication, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/53279/two-factor-authentication (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
230. See Eric Griffith, Two-Factor Authentication: Who Has It and How to Set It Up, PC MAG.
(Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2456400,00.asp.
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In short, the Jones trespass-to-chattels standard23 1 is not hindered
when applied to virtual property because (1) electronic data is stored in
physical spaces; (2) electronic data is only accessed by intruding into the
physical area where the electronic data is stored; and (3) electronic data
commands a physical property right within itself.
C. Applying Jones to Ackerman
Returning to Ackerman, Judge Gorsuch failed to explain why the el-
ements of the Jones trespass-to-chattels tort were satisfied in this particu-
lar case.232 Rather, he simply relied on an analogy between the ordinary
postal system and email, assuming that he analogy speaks for itself.233
234Although email and regular mail are analogous, the details of why the
elements of trespass are satisfied in this case should be clarified. First,
the test articulated by the Tenth Circuit states "that government conduct
can constitute a Fourth Amendment search .. . when it involves a physi-
cal intrusion (a trespass) on a constitutionally protected space or thing
('persons, houses, papers, and effects') for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation."2 35 Applying this standard to the facts and drawing from the
aforementioned reasoning in Section B, Ackerman possessed a physical
property right within the data of the email itself. Thus, although AOL
copied the email with all of its data and forwarded it to NCMEC,
Ackerman's property right in the data still existed. Furthermore, even
though NCMEC supposedly stored Ackerman's email on its own physi-
cal storage device(s), Ackerman still retained a physical property right in
the data itself. Next, NCMEC's act of opening Ackerman's email and
thereby exposing his electronic data constituted a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected space or thing, namely papers and effects. As
previously mentioned, the act of opening electronic data requires a phys-
ical intrusion into a physical space on a physical memory device.236
Thus, (1) possession of the property is established by finding a property
right within the data itself, and (2) physical intrusion into that property is
established by the act of impermissibly opening the email file that resides
on a physical memory device containing the data, regardless if the sus-
pect has physical possession of that particular memory device.
231. United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400, 404-07 (2012).
232. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 2016).
233. Id. at 1308 ("[A] more obvious analogy from principle to new technology is hard to imag-
ine . . . .").
234. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment o the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1023 (2010).
235. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
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D.' The File Approach and the Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
The majority of data located on a computer or other electronic de-
vice resides in a structure called a "filesystem."237 A filesystem simply
describes the way in which files are named and where they are placed
logically for storage and retrieval among the hard disk drive, RAM, and
external memory devices.238 A file is simply a collection of data or in-
formation and serves as a computer's primary storage unit.23 9 With this
technical backdrop in mind, a simple framework for determining a per-
son's reasonable expectation of privacy can be derived: When a file is
opened on a computer, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with
regard to that opened file; when a file is closed on a computer, a reason-
able expectation of privacy attaches with regard to that closed file. The
file approach adequately comports with the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine.
In the context of physical and tangible searches, a house is searched
when a government agent enters it,240 and a package is searched when a
government agent opens it.241 Individuals should have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their personal files just as individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their home and packages. A person's
data in a file is his or her private property and should be treated no dif-
ferently than other privately sealed containers.2 42 Since a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the container,243
opening the container and seeing the contents constitutes a distinct
Fourth Amendment search and violates the reasonable expectation of
privacy. Applying these same foundational principles to computers, a
closed file is analogous to a closed container, whereas an opened file is
analogous to an opened container. Similarly, the act of double-clicking to
open a previously unopened file is analogous to the act of physically
opening a closed container. As demonstrated, the file approach accurate-
ly corresponds to the physical world notions of Fourth Amendment
searches. "A computer is akin to a virtual warehouse of private infor-
mation,"244 and accordingly, a single file stored in a computer's hard
drive is akin to a single container or box stored inside the warehouse.
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an already-opened con-
237. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 264.
238. Id at 42, 264.
239. Id at 264.
240. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999).
241. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
242. See United States v. Bias, No. 90-CR-162, 1990 WL 265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4,
1990) ("[A]n individual has the same expectation of privacy in a pager, computer or other electronic
data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container . . .
243. Id.




tainer just as there should be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an
already-opened file.
Alternative methodologies to the file approach yield imbalanced re-
sults. For example, consider the physical device approach, which states
that once a single file has been searched on an electronic device, the en-
tire electronic device no longer commands a reasonable expectation of
privacy.245 In the age of cloud technology and remote servers, a group of
physical storage devices in a data warehouse can house files belonging to
hundreds of millions of individuals.2 46 Thus, absurd outcomes would be
inevitable if looking at one file on a remote server meant that the entire
server had been searched, and therefore, the government could analyze
all the files stored on that server, allowing unrestricted access to poten-
tially millions of documents belonging to other people. Such a problem is
also compounded by the current debate as to whether cloud-based data
247even deserves Fourth Amendment protections initially. As suggested
in Ackerman248 and previously proposed in Section C,249 the Fourth
Amendment should track the individual's data, not the physical device
where the data is stored.
Although not as obvious as the physical device approach, concerns
also exist with the human observation approach.250 The human observa-
tion approach advocates that the scope of a computer search should be
limited to "whatever information appears on the output device."251 "Un-
der this approach, scrolling down a word processing file to see parts of
the file that were previously hidden is a distinct search of the rest of the
file."2 52 However, this would imply that the zone of a computer search
could be oddly defined, for example, by the "zoom" tool for a document.
Zooming out of the document would allow more pages of the document
to be displayed on the screen, whereas zooming in to the document
would allow less pages to be displayed. Similarly, the human observation
standard yields odd results regarding pixilated images. A person could
easily enhance a blurry image displayed on a screen by adjusting the
image size (e.g., increasing screen resolution or pixel volume).253 In both
examples, the human observation standard is uncertain. In the document
245. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 127.
246. See, e.g., Drew & Arash, Celebrating Half a Billion Users, DROPBOx BLOG (Mar. 7,
2016), https://blogs.dropbox.com/dropbox/2016/03/500-million.
247. See Aaron J. Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment and Searching Cloud
Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56WM. & MARY L. REV. 2321, 2325 (2015);
see also Ryan Watzel, Riley's Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud,
124 YALE L.J.F. 73, 73-74 (2014).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 183-205.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
250. See Kerr, supra note 244, at 556.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 556-57.
253. A similar issue arises when considering thumbnail images because thumbnails are usually
smaller and less clear than full images. See, e.g., Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 480-81 (6th Cir.
2015) (addressing thumbnails, which are smaller versions of the file's images).
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example, the government technically "observed" the document, but he
extent of the observation was tied to the "zoom" tool. In the picture ex-
ample, the government technically "observed" the picture, but the extent
of the observation was tied to the resolution of the image. Such ambigui-
ties will likely spawn unnecessary obstacles during litigation.
The best definition for the zone of a computer search is the file. As
previously stated, individuals should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal files. Using a file as the zone of a computer
search eliminates several of the complications that accompany both the
physical device approach and the human observation approach. Most
importantly, the file approach comports with the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine and is easy to apply: When a file is opened on a com-
puter, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with regard to that
opened file; when a file is closed on a computer, a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy attaches with regard to that closed file.
E. The File Approach and Trespass
When a file is opened on a computer, a series of complicated physi-
cal steps occur.2 54 First, the filesystem code is invoked to read raw bytes
from the disk and interprets those byte patterns as a tree of files and di-
255rectories. The filesystem then translates a user instruction such as
"Open file X" into individual machine-readable input/output instruc-
tions.256 The input/output instructions use the built-in capabilities of the
processor chip257 and the motherboard controller258 to send and receive
electrical signals on a wire going to the physical drive. On the other end
of this wire, the disk's firmware2 59 interprets the electrical signals and
then accesses the physical data through methods such as spinning the
platters and moving the magnetic heads or reading a flash ROM
cell. 26 1 The method necessary to access the desired data depends on the
type of storage device housing the data.262 Notwithstanding the type of
storage device housing the data or where the data is located on that stor-
age device, in order to access any type of data, a device must always
execute physical actions of sending and receiving electrical signals.
254. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 288.
255. See id.
256. See id. ("machine-readable" meaning bit code (i.e., O's and 1's)).
257. Id. at 21 (describing the central processing unit as the "brain" of the computer).
258. Id. at 34 (motherboard contains low-level input/output software, "including procedures to
read the keyboard, write to the screen, and do disk I/O, among other things").
259. Id. at 893 (software that is loaded on PCs by the manufacturer and "persists in memory").
260. Id. at 27 ("A disk consists of one or more metal platters that rotate at 5400, 7200, 10,800
RPM or more.").
261. Flash Memory, PC MAG.: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/43272/flash-memory (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (defin-
ing "flash memory" and noting their replacement of spinning platters).
262. See TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 1025.
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By using this technical foundation and recognizing a unique proper-
ty right within data itself, a trespass of an electronic device should be
defined by opening a file rather than broadly defined as any physical
manipulation of the device (e.g., merely touching the device would con-
stitute a trespass under Jones). Adopting this narrower definition of tres-
pass produces two clear benefits. First, the private search doctrine as
applied to computers can be preserved. A police officer who recreates the
exact prior private search is no longer hindered by the "trivial" 263 nuanc-
es of physically touching a computer that would otherwise constitute a
trespass under Jones.26 4 Specifically, a police officer would be allowed to
touch, scroll, and click on a computer during the recreation of the prior
private search without triggering a trespass, as long as new files that
were previously closed during the prior search are not opened.
Secondly, by focusing on the file as opposed to the physical device;,
a trespass can now occur even if the suspect's data is not accessed on the
suspect's computer. Consider Ackerman: If a trespass was defined as a
physical intrusion on the physical device, then the government's access
of Ackerman's email would not technically be a trespass because AOL
captured the email and forwarded that data to NCMEC. 265 NCMEC did
not obtain a warrant to search through Ackerman's data,266 but nonethe-
less, under a definition of trespass that only focuses on physical intru-
sions of the physical device, NCMEC would not have triggered a unique
Fourth Amendment search under the trespass-to-chattels definition be-
cause it did not access the data on Ackerman's physical device. Con-
versely, this problem is solved by couching the definition of trespass in
the unit of a computer file. Regardless of where the data was accessed, a
trespass occurred the moment NCMEC opened Ackerman's files without
a warrant.2 67 The "chattel" that is trespassed is the data, not the electronic
device where the data is stored.
A main critique of the file approach is that "much information
stored on a computer does not appear in a file." 268 This is a baseless con-
cern because the information on a computer that is technically not stored
in a file per se is stored physically in magnetic strings of 0's and I's on a
disk.269 In other words, the information not stored in a file cannot be read
by humans without first converting that information into a file of some
sort. Moreover, by adopting a broad definition of file,270 a coherent ar-
263. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 425 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("But under
the Court's reasoning, [trivial contact with personal property] may violate the Fourth Amendment.").
264. Id. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70.
268. Kerr, supra note 244, at 557.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 217-30.
270. See supra text accompanying note 246.
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gument could be made that the collection of physical information stored
on a disk is still considered a file.
The Fourth Amendment trespass-to-chattels earch doctrine as ap-
plied to electronic devices should be defined by files and not physical
devices. A file is directly analogous to real property because the file
structure itself represents the "fence" of the property, and the data con-
tained within the file represents the land and other possessions contained
within the fence. The conceptual framework is simple: opening a file is
271akin to crossing the fence of real property.
F. The File Approach in Practice
Another reason for adopting the file approach is that the actions of
opening and closing a file trigger clear physical movements within the
hard drive of a computer that are corroborated by timestamp metadata.272
When an analyst takes a mouse, clicks, and scrolls down the file to see
parts of the file not previously exposed, no other files or information
273contained outside of the already-opened file are copied to the RAM,
and the standard metadata in the file is not altered.274 Thus, maintaining
the integrity of the human observation standard becomes problematic
because few alternative sources of evidence exist to prove whether an
analyst "scrolled through" or "zoomed in on" a document or image, es-
pecially without some type of "saved state" operation.2 75 Additionally,
adhering to a physical-device-based definition of trespass is also prob-
lematic because few alternative sources of evidence exist to prove
whether or not an analyst touched a computer, opened a laptop, and
scrolled through a document. Fortunately, the file approach is supple-
mented by several accountability mechanisms built-in to most electronic
devices.276 For example, a timestamp is recorded when a file is opened or
271. See, e.g., Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (illustrating that the act
of clicking on a thumbnail to open the file constitutes a distinct search); see also United States v.
Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that an officer opening a previously
unopened file is a distinct search).
272. TANENBAUM , supra note 217, at 956 ("The standard information field contains the file
owner, security information, the timestamps needed .... ).
273. Id. at 433 ("To scroll a window, the CPU (or controller) must move all the lines of text
upward by copying their bits from one part of the video RAM to another.").
274. See id. at 271 (explaining that standard metadata attributes do not include state infor-
mation).
275. Id. at 829 (describing the Android OS that provides a "saved state" operation and explain-
ing that "[t]he saved state for an activity is generally small, containing for example where you are
scrolled in an email message, but not the message itself, which will be stored elsewhere by the
application in its persistent storage").
276. See, e.g., Whitson Gordon, How to Find Out if Someone's Secretly Been Using Your
Computer, LIFEHACKER (Jan. 5, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://lifehacker.com/5873538/how-to-find-out-if-
someones-secretly-been-using-your-computer; see also Matthew Panzarino, Paranoid? Here 's How





closed.277 When a file is saved and closed, it is stored to a specific parti-
tion on the hard drive disk, which alters the metadata in the file.2 7 8 In
short, an analyst who double clicks to open a file is doing something
fundamentally different than an analyst who simply scrolls through an
already-opened file. The former's actions are far more ascertainable and
concrete, whereas the latter's actions will result in frivolous uncertainties
that lack other means of authentication. Using the file as the unit of
measurement to define a computer search is the superior approach.
Most importantly, lawyers will be able to more adequately advocate
these issues on behalf of their clients. Because courts will be analyzing
the open/close timestamps of files on a storage device,279 discovery and
introduction of evidence is straightforward. Although law enforcement
officers may still be able to testify about what they "opened" or what
they "saw" during the reconstructive search, more weight should be giv-
en to the more objective evidence located on the storage devices. Addi-
tionally, the file approach removes many of the abstract technicalities of
computer functionality because lawyers, judges, and analysts will only
be concerned with whether a particular file was "open" or "closed." Un-
der a human observation approach of the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy definition,280 many cases would require the consultation of technical
experts to attempt to reconstruct the exact portions of the file that were
exposed on the screen, even if those portions of the files were captured
for only a nanosecond and no metadata record of them was retained. For-
tunately, equipped with the more well-defined file standard, judges will
be able to more adequately render appropriate decisions under both the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine281 and the trespass-to-chattels
doctrine.282 A possible bright-line rule emerges from the file approach
that comports with both definitions of a Fourth Amendment search: As
established by a timestamp and metadata analysis, accessing a file that is
already-opened is not a Fourth Amendment search. However, opening a
previously-closed file triggers a unique Fourth Amendment search in the
absence of a warrant.
CONCLUSION
As technology continues to rapidly evolve, more complications will
inevitably arise regarding the Fourth Amendment's application to com-
puters and other electronic devices. Within the last two decades, two
277. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 271 ("The various times keep track of when the file was
created, most recently ac[Icessed, and most recently modified.").
278. Id. at 272-73 ("A disk is written in blocks, and closing a file forces writing of the file's
last block. . . .").
279. See infra text accompanying note 286.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 250-53.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 237-53.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 254-73.
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circuit courts have adopted a concerning physical device approach,2 83
whereas three other circuit courts have adopted a more stringent file ap-
proach.284 The deepening split among the federal circuit courts with re-
gard to the private search doctrine's application to computers makes this
issue ripe for Supreme Court review in the imminent future. Moreover,
the re-emergence of the JoneS285 trespass test further confounds existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Thus, once the opportunity arises, it is im-
perative for the Supreme Court to articulate a viable and consistent
framework that is flexible enough to adapt to the ever-changing digital
landscape.
The file approach is the most viable, consistent, and flexible frame-
work with regard to Fourth Amendment computer searches. All pro-
grams and human-readable data on a computer are contained in a file,
from Microsoft Word documents (.DOC files) to JPEG images (.JPG
files) to executable applications (.EXE files).286 In fact, the architectural
underpinnings of computer storage are built upon the concept of a file
287system. Unless the underlying hardware of electronic devices and
computers abruptly departs from the foundational file and file system
data structures, the file approach to Fourth Amendment computer search-
es will remain a clear and steadfast framework for generations to come.
Roderick O'Dorisio*
283. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463-464 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rann v.
Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012).
284. See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Sparks,
806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304-08
(10th Cir. 2016).
285. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012).
286. TANENBAUM, supra note 217, at 4 (noting that all operating systems contain files in order
to avoid "having to deal with the messy details of how the hardware actually works").
287. Id. at 41 ("Another key concept supported by virtually all operating systems is the file
system.").
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